

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX

2015



MEASURING AND UNDERSTANDING
THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM

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**NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR THE
STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM**

SPECIAL THANKS to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) headquartered at the University of Maryland for their cooperation on this study and for providing the Institute for Economics and Peace with their Global Terrorism Database (GTD) datasets on terrorism.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the third edition of the Global Terrorism Index, which provides a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last 15 years with a special emphasis on 2014.

Produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace, the GTI is based on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) which is collected and collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. The GTD is considered to be the most comprehensive dataset on terrorist activity globally and has codified over 140,000 terrorist incidents.

This report provides a detailed analysis of the changing trends in terrorism since 2000, for 162 countries. It investigates the changing patterns of terrorism by geographic activity, methods of attack, organisations involved and the national economic and political context. The GTI has also been compared to a range of socio-economic indicators to determine the key underlying factors that have the closest statistical relationship to terrorism.

In 2014 the total number of deaths from terrorism increased by 80 per cent when compared to the prior year. This is the largest yearly increase in the last 15 years. Since the beginning of the 21st century, there has been over a nine-fold increase in the number of deaths from terrorism, rising from 3,329 in 2000 to 32,685 in 2014.

Terrorism remains highly concentrated with most of the activity occurring in just five countries — Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria. These countries accounted for 78 per cent of the lives lost in 2014. Although highly concentrated, terrorism is spreading to more countries, with the number of countries experiencing more than 500 deaths increasing from five to 11, a 120 per cent increase from the previous year. The six new countries with over 500 deaths are Somalia, Ukraine, Yemen, Central African Republic, South Sudan and Cameroon.

While the majority of countries in the world did not have a death from terrorism, the total number of countries which

experienced at least one death increased by eight, raising the total to 67 countries in 2014. This includes OECD countries such as Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada and France which experienced high profile terrorist attacks last year.

Also notable over the past year is the major intensification of the terrorist threat in Nigeria. The country witnessed the largest increase in terrorist deaths ever recorded by any country, increasing by over 300 per cent to 7,512 fatalities. Boko Haram, which operates mainly in Nigeria, has become the most deadly terrorist group in the world. Boko Haram pledged its allegiance to ISIL (also known as the Islamic State) as the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) in March 2015.

There was also a shift in the distribution of targets during 2014, with an 11 per cent decrease in the number of deaths of religious figures and worshipers. This was offset by a 172 per cent increase in the deaths of private citizens.

The majority of deaths from terrorism do not occur in the West. Excluding September 11, only 0.5 per cent of all deaths have occurred in Western countries in the last 15 years. The West is designated as the countries where ISIL has advocated for attacks. They include the United States, Canada, Australia, and European countries.

The report highlights the striking prevalence of lone wolf attacks in the West. Lone wolf attacks account for 70 per cent of all terrorist deaths in the West since 2006. Additionally,

Islamic fundamentalism was not the primary driver of lone wolf attacks, with 80 per cent of deaths in the West from lone wolf attacks being attributed to a mixture of right wing extremists, nationalists, anti-government elements, other types of political extremism and supremacism.

The flow of foreign fighters into Iraq and Syria continued in 2014 and 2015. The current estimates are that since 2011 between 25,000 and 30,000 fighters, from 100 different countries, have arrived in Iraq and Syria. The flow of foreign fighters is still high with estimates suggesting that over 7,000 new recruits arrived in the first half of 2015. This highlights that the attraction of these jihadist groups is still strong. Europe comprises 21 per cent of all foreign fighters, while 50 per cent are from neighbouring Middle-East and North Africa (MENA) countries.

State based conflicts coupled with high levels of terrorism, have been the major cause of the massive flow of refugees and displaced people. Ten of the 11 countries with more than 500 deaths from terrorism also had the highest levels of refugees and Internally Displaced People (IDP) migration in the world. The Syrian conflict alone has resulted in four million people migrating beyond its borders with another seven million people internally displaced.

Mirroring the broader increase in terrorism, the economic costs of terrorist activity have also dramatically increased. IEP conservatively estimates the economic cost of terrorism reached its highest ever level in 2014 at US\$52.9 billion. This is a 61 per cent increase from the previous year and a ten-fold increase since 2000.

Statistical analysis has identified two factors which are very closely associated with terrorist activity: political violence committed by the state and the existence of a broader armed conflict. The research finds that 92 per cent of all terrorist attacks over the past 25 years occurred in countries where state sponsored political violence was widespread, while 88 per cent of attacks occurred in countries that were involved in violent conflicts. The link between these two factors and terrorism is so strong that less than 0.6 per cent of all terrorist attacks have occurred in countries without any ongoing conflict and any form of political terror.

When analysing the correlates of terrorism between wealthier and poorer countries, different factors were found to be statistically significant. In the richer OECD countries, socio-economic factors such as youth unemployment, confidence in the press, belief in democracy, drug crime and attitudes towards immigration are the most statistically significant factors correlating with terrorism. This highlights many of the underlying drivers of radicalisation and lone wolf terrorism.

In non-OECD countries, factors such as a history of armed conflict, ongoing conflict within the country, corruption and

a weak business environment are more strongly correlated, reflecting the larger group-based dynamics seen in many countries.

Other correlates which are common to both groups include lower respect for human rights, the existence of policies targeting religious freedoms, group grievances, political instability and lower respect for the UN or the EU.

The report also includes a section featuring expert commentary on various aspects of terrorism. The essay by Christina Liang Schori of GCSP details the financing of ISIL, highlighting that the organisation is effectively acting as a state, including a taxation system, estimated to be US\$11 million a month, and oil sales which are estimated to exceed ½ billion US dollars per annum. Glazzard and Pantucci from RUSI, as well as Anne Aly from Curtin University comment on various approaches to defining terrorism and the difficulties associated with measuring it. Koser and Cunningham from GCERF explore the linkages between migration, violent extremism and terrorism while the essay from Georgia Holmer at USIP focuses on a variety of government approaches to returning fighters.

Although the findings presented in this report paint a disturbing picture, it is important to put it in context with other forms of violence. At least 437,000 people are murdered each year, which is over 13 times more than the number of victims of terrorism.

The majority of deaths from terrorism in 2014 occurred in three countries, Syria, Iraq and Nigeria. Without an international agreement on the future of the Assad regime it will be very difficult to effectively combat ISIL. Any solution to ISIL must be inclusive of the Sunni population and have regional support, otherwise the sectarian violence may continue for decades. Nigeria's terrorism is more diverse, with two major groups, Boko Haram and Fulani militants, having different aims and drivers. The new president, Muhammadu Buhari, a retired Nigerian Army major general, has made the reduction of corruption and the defeat of Boko Haram as his main priorities. The new government will provide a change in the country's strategic approach to these groups. Any successful approach will need to deal effectively with the terrorist groups while also addressing the underlying drivers of conflict in the country.

The findings of this report emphasise the increasing intensity and spread of terrorist activity globally and point to the key underlying factors that give rise to terrorism. Understanding the factors that are associated with higher levels of terrorism is vital to informing countering violent extremism (CVE) policy. Without solutions to the underlying grievances or causes that lead to extremism, tackling terrorism will be more difficult.

KEY FINDINGS

2015 GTI Results

1

- **Terrorist activity increased by 80 per cent in 2014 to its highest recorded level.** The largest ever year-on-year increase in deaths from terrorism was recorded in 2014, rising from 18,111 in 2013 to 32,685 in 2014. The number of people who have died from terrorist activity has increased nine-fold since the year 2000.
- **Boko Haram overtakes ISIL to become the most deadly terrorist group in the world.** Deaths attributed to Boko Haram increased by 317 per cent in 2014 to 6,644. ISIL was responsible for 6,073 terrorist deaths.
- **Terrorist activity is highly concentrated — five countries accounted for 78 per cent of deaths.** Fifty-seven per cent of all attacks and 78 per cent of all deaths occurred in only five countries; Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria.
- **Almost 60 per cent of the countries covered in the GTI experienced no terrorist deaths in 2014.** Ninety-five of the 162 countries covered in the study experienced no deaths from terrorism, while 67 countries experienced one or more deaths from terrorist activity.
- **However, a majority of countries did experience a terrorist incident of some kind.** Ninety-three countries experienced a terrorist incident in 2014, up from 88 in 2013.
- **More countries than ever have high levels of terrorism.** Countries suffering from more than 500 deaths increased by 120 per cent. In 2014, 11 countries had over 500 deaths while in 2013 only five did.
- **Thirteen times as many people are killed globally by homicides than die in terrorist attacks.** At least 437,000 people are victims of homicide each year, which is over 13 times more than the number of victims of terrorism.

Trends

2

- **Private citizens are increasingly the targets of terrorist attacks.** Deaths of private citizens increased by 172 per cent between 2013 and 2014 compared to the total number of deaths which rose 80 per cent.
- **Terrorist attacks on religious targets resulted in 11 per cent fewer deaths in 2014.** Whilst there are many active religious terrorist groups, attacks involving religious figures and institutions accounted for fewer deaths in 2014.
- **Two groups are responsible for half the deaths from terrorism — Boko Haram and ISIL.** Fifty-one per cent of terrorist deaths that are attributed to a terrorist group were by Boko Haram and ISIL.
- **Nigeria has experienced the largest increase in deaths from terrorism in 2014.** There were 7,512 fatalities from terrorist attacks in 2014, an increase of over 300 per cent. The country houses two of the five most deadly terrorist groups in 2014; Boko Haram and the Fulani militants.
- **ISIL inflicts more deaths on the battlefield than through terrorism.** ISIL was involved in at least 20,000 battlefield deaths with other state and non-state combatants compared to the over 6,000 terrorist related deaths that are attributed to the group.
- **The flow of foreign fighters into Iraq and Syria continued in 2014 and 2015.** Between 25,000 and 30,000 foreign fighters have arrived in Syria and Iraq since 2011, 7,000 in the first six months of 2015.
- **Excluding Turkey, Europe accounted for 21 per cent of all foreign fighters in 2014.** Half of the foreign fighters are from neighbouring Middle-East and North Africa (MENA) countries and an additional four per cent are from Turkey.

Terrorism in Western Countries

3

- **The majority of deaths from terrorism do not occur in the West.** Excluding the September 11 attack, only 0.5 per cent of deaths from terrorism have occurred in the West since 2000. Including September 11, the percentage reaches 2.6.
- **Lone wolf attackers are the main perpetrators of terrorist activity in the West.** Seventy per cent of all deaths from terrorism in the West since 2006 were by lone wolf terrorists with the rest being unknown or group attacks by more than three attackers.
- **Islamic fundamentalism was not the main cause of terrorism in the West over the last nine years.** Eighty per cent of deaths by lone wolf terrorists in the West were

driven by right wing extremism, nationalism, anti-government sentiment and political extremism and other forms of supremacy.

- **Terrorist activity is a significant driver of refugee activity and internal displacement.** The countries which are the greatest source of refugees and internally displaced people also suffer the most deaths from terrorism. Ten of the 11 countries that had more than 500 deaths from terrorism in 2014 had the highest levels of refugees and IDPs in the world.

Economic Cost of Terrorism

4

- **The economic cost of terrorism increased by 61 per cent in 2014.** The economic cost of terrorism reached its highest ever level in 2014 at US\$52.9 billion. This is a 61 per cent increase from the previous year and a ten-fold increase since 2000.
- **However, costs from terrorism are lower than other forms of violence.** The losses from violent crime and homicide globally were 32 times greater than losses from terrorism and the number of lives lost 13 times higher.

- **The costs of containing terrorism are significant and greater than the direct costs of terrorism.** IEP estimates the global national security expenditure to be approximately US\$117 billion. These national security agencies are tasked with preventing terrorist activity as well as supporting other elements of national security.

Correlates and Drivers of Terrorism

5

- **Terrorist activity is correlated with political violence.** The research found that 92 per cent of all terrorist attacks between 1989 and 2014 occurred in countries where political violence by the government was widespread.
- **Terrorism is also intrinsically linked to a country's safety and security environment.** In the last 25 years, 88 per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries that were experiencing or involved in violent conflicts. Less than 0.6 per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries without any ongoing conflict and any form of political terror.
- **Lack of respect for human rights and for international organisations also correlates with terrorism.** Other important correlates aside from political terror and ongoing conflict include lower respect for human rights, the existence of policies targeting religious freedoms,

group grievances, political instability and lower respect for the UN or the EU.

- **There are different drivers of terrorism in wealthier countries than in poorer countries.** In OECD countries socio-economic factors such as youth unemployment, confidence in the press, faith in democracy, drug crime and attitudes towards immigration correlate significantly. In non-OECD countries factors such as a history of armed conflict, ongoing conflict within the country, corruption and a weak business environment are more strongly correlated.

ABOUT THE GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX

The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) is a comprehensive study which accounts for the direct and indirect impact of terrorism in 162 countries in terms of its effect on lives lost, injuries, property damage and the psychological after-effects of terrorism. This study covers 99.6 per cent of the world's population.

It aggregates the most authoritative data source on terrorism today, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) into a composite score in order to provide an ordinal ranking of nations on the negative impact of terrorism. The GTD is unique in that it consists of systematically and comprehensively coded data on domestic as well as international terrorist incidents and now includes more than 140,000 cases.

Given the resources committed to counterterrorism efforts internationally, it is important to analyse and aggregate available data related to terrorism to better understand its various properties such as:

- The differing socio-economic conditions under which it occurs.
- The geopolitical drivers associated with terrorism and ideological aims of terrorists groups.
- The types of strategies deployed, tactical terrorist targets; and how these evolve over time.

In this context, one of the key aims of the GTI is to examine these trends to help inform a positive and practical debate about the future of terrorism and the required policy responses.

The GTI was developed in consultation with the GPI Expert Panel, and in particular with the advice of Expert Panel member and terrorism expert Dr Ekaterina Stepanova, Head of the Peace and Conflict Studies Unit at the Institute of World Economy & International Relations.

Defining terrorism is not a straightforward matter. There is no single internationally accepted definition of what constitutes

terrorism, and the terrorism literature abounds with competing definitions and typologies. IEP accepts the terminology and definitions agreed to by the authors of the GTD, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) researchers and its advisory panel. The GTI therefore defines terrorism as **'the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation'**. This definition recognises that terrorism is not only the physical act of an attack, but also the psychological impact it has on a society for many years after.

In order to be included as an incident in the GTD the act has to be: **'an intentional act of violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor.'** This means an incident has to meet three criteria in order for it to be counted as a terrorist act:

1. The incident must be intentional — the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.
2. The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence — including property damage, as well as violence against people.
3. The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors. This database does not include acts of state terrorism.

In addition to this baseline definition, two of the following three criteria have to be met in order to be included in the START database from 1997:

- The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.
- The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience other than to the immediate victims.
- The violent act was outside the precepts of international humanitarian law.

In cases where there is insufficient information to make a definitive distinction about whether it is a terrorist incident within the confines of the definition, the database codes these incidents as 'doubt terrorism proper'. In order to only count unambiguous incidents of terrorism this study does not include doubted incidents.

It is important to understand how incidents are counted. According to the GTD codebook; "incidents occurring in both the same geographic and temporal point will be regarded as a single incident, but if either the time of the occurrence of the incidents or their locations are discontinuous, the events will be regarded as separate incidents." Illustrative examples from the GTD codebook are as follows¹:

- *Four truck bombs explode nearly simultaneously in different parts of a major city.* This represents four incidents.
- *A bomb goes off, and while police are working on the scene the next day, they are attacked by terrorists with automatic weapons.* These are two separate incidents, as they were not continuous, given the time lag between the two events.
- *A group of militants shoot and kill five guards at a perimeter checkpoint of a petroleum refinery and then proceeds to set explosives and destroy the refinery.* This is one incident since it occurred in a single location (the petroleum refinery) and was one continuous event.
- *A group of hijackers diverts a plane to Senegal and, while at an airport in Senegal, shoots two Senegalese policemen.* This is one incident, since the hijacking was still in progress at the time of the shooting and hence the two events occurred at the same time and in the same place.

ABOUT THE REPORT

The 2015 GTI report comprises of six sections:

1 THE RESULTS SECTION analyses the changes in terrorism over the last year. It includes detailed country profiles for the ten countries with the highest levels of terrorist impact in 2014. These countries experienced 88 per cent of global terrorist deaths and 79 per cent of terrorist attacks.

2 THE TRENDS SECTION explores the overall trends in terrorism over the past 15 years including the increasing targeting of private citizens. This section also contains analysis on the changing techniques of the five most lethal terrorist groups as well as changes in the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq and Syria.

3 THE TERRORISM IN WESTERN COUNTRIES SECTION analyses the impact of terrorism in the areas international jihadist groups have labelled as the West, namely Europe, North America and Australia. This section also contains analysis on the impact of terrorism on the refugee crisis.

4 THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF TERRORISM SECTION summarises the economic losses from terrorism which reached the highest ever level in 2014 at US\$52.9 billion. It contextualises the economic losses from terrorism compared to other forms of violence and provides an estimate of the costs of preventing terrorism

5 THE CORRELATES OF TERRORISM SECTION explores the relationship between terrorist activity and levels of political terror and ongoing conflict. The research found that 92 per cent of all terrorist attacks between 1989 and 2014 occurred in countries where political violence by the state against citizens was widespread. The section also explores the different drivers of terrorism in wealthier and poorer countries.

6 THE EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS SECTION features research from leading academics and applied researchers to help contextualise terrorism and provide approaches to countering terrorism.

RESULTS

The 2015 Global Terrorism Index highlights that terrorism continues to rise. The total number of deaths from terrorism in 2014 reached 32,685, constituting an 80 per cent increase from 18,111 the previous year. This is the highest level ever recorded. The significant majority of these deaths, over 78 per cent, occurred in just five countries; Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria.

While terrorism is highly concentrated in a small number of countries, the number of countries which have had a terrorist attack is also increasing. In 2014 terrorism impacted more countries than ever before. Attacks were recorded in 93 countries, up from 88 in 2013. This continues the trend from 2011 with more countries experiencing terrorist attacks and deaths each year.

Furthermore, there was a 120 per cent increase in the number of countries that recorded over 500 deaths: in 2014 eleven countries, up from five countries in 2013. Nigeria experienced the biggest year-on-year increase in deaths ever recorded with 5,662 more people being killed, an over 300 per cent increase.

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE
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
1	Iraq	10
2	Afghanistan	9.233
3	Nigeria	9.213
4	Pakistan	9.065
5	Syria	8.108
6	India	7.747
7	Yemen	7.642
8	Somalia	7.6
9	Libya	7.29
10	Thailand	7.279

11	Philippines	7.27
12	Ukraine	7.2
13	Egypt	6.813
14	Central African Republic	6.721
15	South Sudan	6.712
16	Sudan	6.686
17	Colombia	6.662
18	Kenya	6.66
19	Democratic Republic of the Congo	6.487

20	Cameroon	6.466
21	Lebanon	6.376
22	China	6.294
23	Russia	6.207
24	Israel	6.034
25	Bangladesh	5.921
26	Mali	5.871
27	Turkey	5.737
28	United Kingdom	5.613
29	Greece	4.976

30	Uganda	4.894
31	Bahrain	4.871
32	Nepal	4.791
33	Indonesia	4.755
34	Algeria	4.75
35	United States	4.613
36	France	4.553
37	Mozambique	4.386
38	South Africa	4.231
39	Iran	4.222

THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM



GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2015

MEASURING THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE
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
80	Honduras	2.077
81	Guatemala	2.009
82	Belgium	1.977
83	Kazakhstan	1.881
84	Tajikistan	1.869
85	Jordan	1.751
86	Kyrgyz Republic	1.722
87	Zimbabwe	1.71
88	Argentina	1.674
89	Eritrea	1.636
90	Trinidad and Tobago	1.583

91	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.516
92	Morocco	1.446
93	Azerbaijan	1.381
93	Ghana	1.381
95	Switzerland	1.349
96	Iceland	1.219
96	Liberia	1.219
98	Guinea	1.187
98	Hungary	1.187
98	New Zealand	1.187
101	United Arab Emirates	1.045

102	Republic of the Congo	0.823
103	Montenegro	0.659
104	Ecuador	0.577
105	Netherlands	0.429
106	Serbia	0.41
107	Burkina Faso	0.305
107	Bhutan	0.305
107	Mauritania	0.305
110	Portugal	0.267
111	Angola	0.243
112	Jamaica	0.229

113	Guinea-Bissau	0.153
113	Cambodia	0.153
113	Taiwan	0.153
116	Armenia	0.115
116	Croatia	0.115
118	Denmark	0.091
119	Bolivia	0.076
119	Estonia	0.076
121	Laos	0.038
121	Moldova	0.038
123	Kuwait	0.019

40	Paraguay	4.094	50	Ethiopia	3.544	60	Sweden	3.083	70	Bulgaria	2.421
41	Myanmar	4.08	51	Niger	3.485	61	Cyprus	3.08	71	Georgia	2.373
42	Sri Lanka	4.077	52	Senegal	3.467	62	Kosovo	3.018	72	Canada	2.297
43	Saudi Arabia	4.006	53	Germany	3.442	63	Nicaragua	2.928	73	Macedonia	2.252
44	Mexico	3.985	54	Italy	3.364	64	Norway	2.738	74	Brazil	2.207
45	Tanzania	3.979	55	Burundi	3.342	65	Spain	2.622	75	Chad	2.142
46	Chile	3.969	56	Rwanda	3.334	66	Dominican Republic	2.581	76	Venezuela	2.139
47	Tunisia	3.697	57	Peru	3.316	67	Djibouti	2.567	77	Belarus	2.125
48	Ireland	3.663	58	Cote d'Ivoire	3.141	68	Czech Republic	2.484	78	Albania	2.116
49	Malaysia	3.579	59	Australia	3.114	69	Madagascar	2.444	79	Austria	2.088



124	Benin	0	124	South Korea	0	124	Poland	0	124	Turkmenistan	0
124	Botswana	0	124	Lesotho	0	124	North Korea	0	124	Timor-Leste	0
124	Costa Rica	0	124	Lithuania	0	124	Qatar	0	124	Uruguay	0
124	Cuba	0	124	Latvia	0	124	Romania	0	124	Uzbekistan	0
124	Finland	0	124	Mongolia	0	124	Singapore	0	124	Viet Nam	0
124	Gabon	0	124	Mauritius	0	124	Sierra Leone	0	124	Zambia	0
124	The Gambia	0	124	Malawi	0	124	El Salvador	0			
124	Equatorial Guinea	0	124	Namibia	0	124	Slovakia	0			
124	Guyana	0	124	Oman	0	124	Slovenia	0			
124	Haiti	0	124	Panama	0	124	Swaziland	0			
124	Japan	0	124	Papua New Guinea	0	124	Togo	0			

* Refer to GTI methodology in Annex C.




- All attacks in 2014 scaled by number of fatalities
- Worst attacks in 2014

TERRORIST INCIDENTS

THE TWENTY MOST FATAL TERRORIST ATTACKS IN 2014

DATE	COUNTRY	CITY	FATALITIES / INJURIES	GROUP	DESCRIPTION
10/06/14	Iraq	Badush	670 / 0	ISIL	Assailants stormed a prison, released the Sunni inmates and killed 670 Shiite prisoners.
03/08/14	Iraq	Sinjar	500 / —	ISIL	Assailants attacked Yizidi civilians in Sinjar town. At least 500 people were killed and 300 women were kidnapped in the incident.
05/05/14	Nigeria	Gamboru Ngala	315 / —	Boko Haram	Assailants attacked residents and buildings with firearms and explosive devices in Gomboru Ngala town. At least 315 people were killed, an unknown number were injured, and numerous buildings were destroyed in the attack.
17/07/14	Syria	Palmyra district	310 / —	ISIL	Assailants attacked National Defense Force soldiers and then the Shaer Gas Field in Homs governorate. In addition to 40 assailants, 270 people were killed. An unknown number were taken hostage during the attack.
17/07/14	Ukraine	Hrabove	298 / —	Donetsk People's Republic	Assailants launched a surface-to-air missile at a Malaysia Airlines aircraft, travelling from Amsterdam city to Kuala Lumpur city, near Hrabove village. 298 people were killed. The Donetsk People's Republic claimed responsibility for the incident.
15/04/14	South Sudan	Bentiu	287 / —	Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO)	Assailants attacked a mosque being used as a civilian shelter and abducted a number of people in Bentiu town. This was one of five attacks in Bentiu town on this day.
14/03/14	Nigeria	Maiduguri	212 / —	Boko Haram	Assailants attacked the Giwa Army Barracks and a University of Maiduguri hostel in Maiduguri city. An unknown number of prisoners, who were being held at the base, were freed as a result of the attack.
17/09/14	Nigeria	Konduga	201 / —	Boko Haram	Assailants attacked Konduga town, Borno state, Nigeria. At least 201 assailants were killed in the attack.
13/05/14	Nigeria	Kalabalge district	200 / —	Boko Haram	Assailants attacked residents and buildings in Tsangayari village. Residents repelled the attack, killing approximately 200 assailants.
05/04/14	Nigeria	Galadima	200 / —	Fulani militants	Assailants opened fire on community leaders and residents that were meeting in Galadima village. At least 200 people were killed and an unknown number were injured in the attack. Sources attributed the attack to Fulani assailants.



DATE	COUNTRY	CITY	FATALITIES / INJURIES	GROUP	DESCRIPTION
16/12/14	Pakistan	Peshawar	157 / 131	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	Assailants detonated an explosives-laden vehicle and then stormed the Army Public School in Peshawar city, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, Pakistan. At least 150 students and staff were killed and 131 were wounded in the attack. All seven assailants were either killed by security forces or detonated their explosives-laden vests.
13/05/14	Nigeria	Garawa	151 / —	Boko Haram	Assailants attacked residents and buildings in Garawa village. Residents repelled the attack, killing approximately 151 assailants.
16/12/14	Iraq	Fallujah	150 / —	ISIL	Assailants killed 150 women who had refused to engage in a jihad marriage.
07/09/14	Iraq	Mosul	150 / —	ISIL	Assailants executed 150 former security members in Mosul city.
29/10/14	Iraq	Ramadi	150 / —	ISIL	Assailants kidnapped 150 members of the Albu Nimr tribe from villages near Ramadi city. The victims were executed and buried in Albu Ali al-Jasim area.
28/11/14	Nigeria	Kano	122 / 270	Boko Haram	Two suicide bombers and a roadside bomb detonated at the Grand Mosque in Kano city. Assailants opened fire on worshippers fleeing the explosions.
17/12/14	Cameroon	Am Chide	117 / —	Boko Haram	Assailants attacked soldiers and residents in Am Chide town. The assailants detonated explosives before descending on Am Chide, setting fire to houses and shops. At least 116 attackers and one soldier were killed in the ensuing clash with security forces.
15/02/14	Nigeria	Izghe	106 / —	Boko Haram	Assailants dressed in military uniforms attacked residents in Izghe village. This was one of two such attacks in Borno on this day.
06/09/14	Cameroon	Fotokol	101 / —	Boko Haram	Assailants attacked the border town of Fotokol.
17/05/14	Nigeria	Unknown	101 / 6	Boko Haram	Assailants attempted to take control of the Damaturu-Benishek-Maiduguri road in Borno state.

CONCENTRATED IMPACT OF TERRORISM

Two countries, Iraq and Nigeria, account for 53 per cent of all deaths from terrorism in 2014. The levels in Iraq are the highest ever recorded in a single country with 9,929 deaths, an increase of 55 per cent from 2013. There were three times as many terrorist deaths in Iraq in 2014 than in the entire world in the year 2000.

Iraq and Nigeria are also the countries that host the most deadly terrorist groups. While 24 per cent of terrorist attacks resulting in deaths are not attributable to any organisation in 2014, of the deaths that are attributable over 50 per cent were caused by either ISIL or Boko Haram. ISIL is also known as ISIS, Daesh or the Islamic State: in this report it is referred to as ISIL. It was the second most deadly terrorist group killing 6,073 people in 2014.


Boko Haram, an Islamist terrorist group based in northern Nigeria, was responsible for 6,644 deaths. The group, which pledged allegiance to ISIL on March 2015 and hence is also

known as Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP), is now the deadliest terrorist group with 14 deaths per terrorist attack in 2014. Due to the increase in deadliness of Boko Haram, Nigeria now has the second highest number of deaths, behind Iraq.

From 2012 to 2014 deaths from terrorism have largely been in five countries; Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria. The start of the increases in deaths from terrorism in Iraq coincided with the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Deaths from terrorism spiked in 2007 with the surge in US troops in Iraq and then subsequently fell by 56 per cent. It was only in 2013 with the rise of ISIL that Iraq suffered from the same level of terrorism again. This increased in 2014 to the highest levels of terrorism ever recorded in a single country for one year. Iraq had 9,929 deaths, which is more than the cumulative total of fatalities from terrorism in the entire world from 1998 to 2000.

FIGURE 1 DEATHS FROM TERRORISM, 2000-2014

Deaths from terrorism have increased dramatically over the last 15 years. The number of people who have died from terrorist activity has increased ninefold since the year 2000.



Source: START GTD

NOTE: In 2011 there was a change in the data collection methodology for terrorist acts. The methodology change did not materially alter the results as the increase in terrorism is verifiable. For more information on the methodology change please see Annex D in the 2014 Global Terrorism Index.

TABLE 1 NUMBER OF YEARS A COUNTRY HAS BEEN RANKED IN THE TEN COUNTRIES MOST AFFECTED BY TERRORISM, 2000–2014

Many of the same countries have suffered from terrorism over an extended period. Angola was in the worst ten for two years, whereas India has featured 14 times. Afghanistan and Pakistan have featured 13 times.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
Burundi	Angola	DRC	Nepal	Colombia	Nigeria		Somalia	Algeria			Iraq	Afghanistan	India	
CAR	Chad	Israel	Uganda	Sudan	Philippines			Russia				Pakistan		
China	Indonesia	Syria		Yemen	Sri Lanka									
Egypt					Thailand									
Guinea														
Kenya														
South Sudan														
Spain														
Ukraine														
United States														

Iraq had 25 per cent of all terrorist incidents, followed by Pakistan with 14 per cent and Afghanistan with 12 per cent. Nigeria experienced only five per cent of the incidents but had the second highest number of deaths at 23 per cent. Terrorist attacks are much more lethal in Nigeria than any other country. On average there were 11 deaths per attack in Nigeria. In contrast Iraq had an average of three deaths per attack.


There were ten countries which were ranked as being amongst the countries with the ten highest levels of fatalities for only one year out of the last 15 years. This includes the United States, which had 44 per cent of global deaths in 2001 due to the September 11 attack. In contrast, there were 22 countries which were in the group for at least two years.

Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan have all been ranked in the ten countries with the highest number of deaths from terrorism for every year in the last ten years. This reflects that terrorism has remained a significant issue in these three countries ever since 2003. Somalia has featured in the ten most affected countries for the last eight years in a row.

2014 was the first time since 2000 that India has not featured among the ten countries with highest fatalities from terrorism. However, this is due to the growth of terrorism in other countries more than to an improvement in India. The number of people killed from terrorism in India increased by 1.2 per cent from 2013 to reach a total of 416.

FIGURE 2 TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2000–2014

The majority of terrorist incidents are highly centralised. In 2014, 57 per cent of all attacks occurred in five countries; Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria and Syria. However the rest of the world suffered a 54 per cent increase in terrorist incidents in 2013.



Source: START GTD

TEN COUNTRIES WHERE TERRORISM HAD THE GREATEST IMPACT IN 2014

The ten countries with the highest number of deaths in 2014 accounted for 88 per cent of the global total. However, the majority of these deaths have occurred in just five countries. As in both 2012 and 2013, Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria remain the five countries most affected by terrorism.

In 2014 these five countries accounted for 78 per cent of all terrorist deaths. Four of the five countries had the highest levels ever recorded. Nigeria's increase in deaths is also the largest yearly increase ever recorded.

The order between these five countries has altered from previous years. Nigeria has moved from the country with the fifth highest levels of fatalities in 2013 to the second highest in 2014. Pakistan was the only country in the ten most impacted countries that saw a decline in deaths and accordingly it dropped from third to fourth. In Pakistan in 2013 terrorism killed 2,356 people whereas in 2014 1,760 people were killed, a difference of nearly 600 people. This is in part due to the further fracturing of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

There was also movement in the countries ranked six to ten, with three countries moving into the group for the first time. These countries are Ukraine, Central African Republic and South Sudan. The three new additions to the ten most impacted countries all experienced large increases in deaths. In the years from 2000 to 2013 Ukraine had only three deaths from terrorism, the Central African Republic had 193 and


South Sudan had 167. In 2014, all three countries had over 550 deaths. The Central African Republic had an increase of over 500 per cent. South Sudan experienced an increase of 361 per cent. However, the biggest proportional change was in Ukraine which had no deaths from terrorism in 2013 and 665 deaths in 2014.

Both the deadliness and the concentration of terrorism has increased across the rest of the world. The rest of the world refers to all countries bar the ten countries with the highest number of deaths.

- Outside the ten countries with the highest number of deaths from terrorism, deaths increased by 139 per cent from 2013 to 2014.
- In 2014 there were 4,005 deaths from terrorism in the rest of the world, representing 12 per cent of total deaths.
- In contrast, in 2013 there were 1,679 deaths from terrorism in the rest of the world representing 9.3 per cent of deaths in that year.
- This reflects the spread of terrorism and its increasing deadliness around the world.

FIGURE 3 COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF DEATHS BY TERRORISM, 2014

Five countries account for nearly 80 per cent of global terrorist deaths.



Source: START GTD

INCREASING SPREAD OF TERRORISM

One of the more worrying trends highlighted by this year's report is the sharp increase in the number of countries suffering major terrorist activity. There was a 120 per cent increase in the number of countries that suffered more than 500 deaths — 11 countries in 2014, up from five countries in 2013.

Whilst the same five countries as 2013 continued to have over 500 deaths from terrorism, the six additional countries all experienced the highest levels of terrorism in their history. These countries are Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine and Yemen.

In 2014 there were 17 countries that had over 250 deaths from terrorism, up from the previous high of nine countries in 2013. Eight new countries passed the 250 death threshold. The characteristics of these countries vary: some previously had very low levels of terrorism, such as Cameroon and Ukraine; others increased from already relatively high levels of terrorism such as the Central African Republic, China, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Libya, South Sudan and Sudan.

- In 2014 the number of countries that lost over 50 lives to terrorist attacks reached 25, the most it has been in the 15 years covered by this report.
- Two countries, Cameroon and Ukraine, didn't experience any deaths from terrorism in 2013 and had over 500 deaths each in 2014.
- From 2000 until 2013 Cameroon recorded no deaths from terrorism and Ukraine had a total of only three deaths from terrorism. In 2014 Cameroon had 530 deaths and Ukraine had 665 deaths. This was largely driven by Boko Haram encroaching into Cameroon and bombings and explosions conducted by the group Donetsk People's Republic in Ukraine including launching a surface-to-air missile at a Malaysia Airlines aircraft.

FIGURE 4 NUMBER OF COUNTRIES THAT EXPERIENCED SEVERE LOSSES FROM TERRORISM, 2000-2014

Terrorism has become more deadly in more countries. The number of countries that lost more than 250 or 500 lives is at an all-time high.



Source: START GTD

LARGEST INCREASES AND DECREASES IN TERRORISM 2013 TO 2014

The year-to-year trends of terrorism highlight the unprecedented increase in deaths around the world. Twenty-seven countries had a decrease in the number of deaths from terrorism from the previous year, whilst 48 countries recorded an increase.

Globally, from 2013 to 2014 the number of deaths from terrorism increased by 14,574, which represents an 80 per cent increase. Nigeria had the biggest year-on-year increase ever recorded. Iraq also had a substantial increase in deaths, rising by 3,532 to remain the country with the highest impact from terrorism.

“ Globally, from 2013 to 2014 the number of deaths from terrorism increased by 14,574, which represents an 80 per cent increase.

Of the 162 countries included in the GTI, 69 did not experience an attack. However, the spread of terrorism is increasing. In 2014 there were 93 countries that had a terrorist attack, up from 88 in 2013 and 81 in the year prior. As well as the spread,

the deadliness of terrorism is increasing. There were 67 countries which had at least one death from terrorism in 2014 compared to 59 the previous year.


There was also an increase in the lethality of attacks from 2013 to 2014. In 2013 there was an average of 1.8 deaths per attack. In 2014 this jumped to an average of 2.4 deaths per attack reaching the highest level of lethality since 2007 when the surge in Iraq corresponded with a dramatic increase in deadly attacks.

The five countries with the biggest increases in deaths had 11,843 more deaths in 2014. These countries are also the countries most impacted by terrorism. The increase in the number of deaths in these five countries represents 81 per cent of the total increase in deaths.

The country with the biggest increase is Nigeria which saw the biggest year-on-year increase in terrorism on record. There were 5,662 more people killed from terrorism in 2014 than in 2013, an increase of 306 per cent. This yearly increase alone is more than the number of people who were killed from terrorism around the world in 2005.

FIGURE 5 LARGEST INCREASES IN DEATHS FROM 2013 TO 2014


Nigeria’s increase in deaths is the biggest ever recorded.



Source: START GTD

FIGURE 6 LARGEST REDUCTIONS IN DEATHS FROM 2013 TO 2014

Despite some significant reductions in deaths from terrorism, the countries with the biggest reductions all had relatively high historical rates of terrorism.



Source: START GTD

The country with the second largest increase in the number of deaths is Iraq which had 3,532 more people killed in 2014, representing an increase of 55 per cent. For the last three years the average percentage growth in deaths has been 85 per cent.

Afghanistan had the third largest increase in deaths in 2014 with 1,391 deaths, being 45 per cent higher than in 2013. The Taliban killed almost 50 per cent more people in 2014 than the previous year, largely targeting the police through explosions.

“ The five countries with the biggest increases in deaths had 11,843 more deaths in 2014. These countries are also the countries most impacted by terrorism. The increase in the number of deaths in these five countries represents 81 per cent of the total increase in deaths.

Ukraine had the fourth biggest increase in deaths from terrorism. The leap from no deaths in 2013 to 665 in 2014 is a drastic change. The vast majority of the attacks are by the Donetsk People's Republic, with most deaths being attributed to the launching of a surface-to-air missile at a Malaysia Airlines aircraft which killed all 298 people on board.

Syria, a country ravaged by civil war, continues to see escalating terrorist activity. In the two years before the start of the civil war in 2011, Syria had two years without any terrorist incident. In the year the civil war began Syria had 136 deaths from terrorism. The number of deaths has increased by around 500 each year since the start of the war to 1,698 deaths in 2014. Terrorism in Syria is mainly in the form of explosions targeting private citizens conducted by just two groups: ISIL and the al-Nusra Front.

The country with the biggest decrease in deaths is Pakistan, where the number of deaths from terrorism fell by 596, or 25 per cent to 1,760. This is due in part to the further fracturing of the Tehrik-i-Taliban following the death of leader Hakimullah Mehsud in November 2013.

In the last 15 years Pakistan experienced a sharp increase in terrorist activity. From 1998 to 2006 Pakistan averaged 153 deaths per year, whereas from 2007 to 2014 the number of deaths had jumped to an average of 1,592.

Algeria had the second biggest decrease in deaths, dropping by 82. This represents a 92 per cent decline. With only seven deaths in 2014, Algeria reached its lowest levels of terrorism since 1993. The fall in deaths in Algeria is largely due to the lessening activity of al-Mu'a'qi'oon Biddam Brigade (Those who


Sign with Blood), a group that killed 69 in Algeria in 2013 and none in 2014.

The third biggest improvement was seen in Russia which reached its lowest levels of terrorist activity since 2007. Deaths fell by over 50 per cent from 137 in 2013 to 57 in 2014. Terrorist activity continues to be largely driven by the Caucasus Emirate, a militant jihadi separatist group. In 2014 they were responsible for half the deaths from terrorism in Russia.




Lebanon experienced the fourth biggest improvement, with the death rate decreasing by 49 per cent to 68 deaths. Despite this decrease, terrorism in Lebanon remains quite high. Although deaths were down in 2014, Lebanon had the highest number of incidents the country ever recorded at 135, up from the previous high of 94 in 2013.

The major form of terrorism in Lebanon are explosions targeting private citizens and executed by groups that have grown through the Syrian civil war like the al-Nusra Front and ISIL. The Abdullah Azzam Brigades, a Sunni group affiliated with al-Qa'ida, is also a significant terrorist actor in Lebanon having killed 13 people in February 2014 through a suicide bombing in Beirut.

The fifth biggest improvement occurred in the Philippines which saw deaths decrease by 18 per cent to 240 fatalities in 2014, down from 291 in 2013. Deaths in 2014 are still the second highest recorded, the highest being in 2013. Terrorism in the Philippines is intrinsically tied with nationalist and separatist claims by people living in provinces in southern Philippines. The largest individual group was the New People's Army, a communist organisation, which claimed responsibility for 32 per cent of deaths in 2014.



GTI RANK | 1
GTI SCORE | 10



INCREASE IN DEATHS SINCE 2000



In 2014 Iraq had the most deaths from terrorism ever recorded for a country. There were a total of 9,929 deaths, representing a 55 per cent increase from the previous year.

Iraq has ranked as the country most impacted by terrorism for every year since 2004. The catalyst for the rise in terrorism in Iraq had been the US-led invasion in 2003. From 1998 to 2002 there were 65 deaths from terrorism in Iraq. With the commencement of the Iraq war in 2004 there were nearly five times as many deaths than in the previous five years. There have been two distinct periods where terrorism has jumped in Iraq. The first occurred in 2007 with the US troop surge when 6,100 deaths were reported, an increase of 39 per cent from the previous year. Deaths then fell by 56 per cent in the following year to be below the levels in 2006. The second increase began in 2013 and has continued through to 2015 fuelled by increasing sectarian violence and the activities of ISIL.

2014 continued the deteriorating trend from 2013 when terrorist deaths jumped by 166 per cent to 6,397. In 2013 ISIL was responsible for 77 per cent of deaths from claimed terrorist attacks which resulted in 1,310 deaths. In 2014 this increased to 95 per cent of claimed attacks with 5,436 deaths. ISIL mainly targets private citizens using explosions.

ISIL has undergone some changes in tactics by dramatically increasing its number of kidnappings. ISIL claimed responsibility for 101 separate kidnappings in 2014, up from 13 in 2013. The targets of kidnapping by ISIL are private citizens 44 per cent of the time, followed by police 25 per cent and journalists 15 per cent.



As well as being a terrorist group, ISIL is also involved in the Syrian civil war where it engages in combat with forces loyal to Assad, the al-Nusra front, Kurdish forces and the international coalition against ISIL. This means that ISIL is responsible for more deaths than just from terrorism but also battle deaths and other related deaths that occur in the context of conflict. These conflict deaths have not been included in the GTI.

AFGHANISTAN

GTI RANK | **2**
GTI SCORE | **9.233**




INCREASE IN DEATHS SINCE 2000




ATTACKS BY TARGET

-  Police
-  Private citizens & property
-  Government (general)
-  Military, militia or terrorist groups
-  Other



DEATHS BY GROUP

-  Taliban
-  Unknown
-  Other



Terrorism continues to increase in Afghanistan, with 38 per cent more terrorist attacks and 45 per cent more fatalities in 2014 than in 2013. The Taliban was responsible for the majority of these attacks and casualties.

The Taliban remains one of the most deadly terrorist groups in the world. In 2012, 2013 and 2014 it was responsible for around 75 per cent of all terrorist fatalities in Afghanistan. The deadliness of attacks increased in 2014 with the Taliban killing 3.9 people per attack, over 200 per cent higher than 2013.

In 2014 there were terrorist acts in 515 different cities in Afghanistan clearly highlighting the breadth of terrorism across the country. However, the areas of the country where terrorism is most intense are within 100 miles of the border with Pakistan. This is in both the south and east regions of the country with around ten per cent of attacks having occurred in the Helmand Province in the south. The Nangarhar Province in the east experienced eight per cent of attacks and the two largest cities, Kabul and Kandahar both received seven per cent of the attacks.

Police are the main target of terrorism with 38 per cent of attacks against police. These attacks are among the most lethal with an average of 3.7 people killed per attack.





In contrast, when private citizens are the target there is an average of 2.9 deaths per attack.

The number of people killed in an educational institution fell substantially to 13 with 34 injuries. This compares to 21 deaths and 198 injuries in the prior year. In 2013 the Taliban conducted at least seven attacks targeting girls attending school, mostly in the north, resulting in over 160 casualties.

Suicide attacks account for ten per cent of all attacks; however, they are more lethal accounting for 18 per cent of all deaths and 32 per cent of all injuries. For every suicide attack there is on average five deaths and nine injuries. The majority of these attacks are bombings, constituting 93 per cent of all suicide attacks. The remaining suicide attacks were assassinations mainly targeting the police and hostage taking. Targets have included the United States aid organisation named Roots of Peace, the Independent Election Commission, the New Kabul Bank where soldiers were collecting salaries and an NGO called Partnership in Academics and Development.

NIGERIA

GTI RANK | **3**
GTI SCORE | **9.213**



In 2014 Nigeria experienced the biggest yearly deterioration in terrorism on record. There were 5,662 more people killed from terrorism in 2014 than in 2013, an increase of almost 300 per cent. This is largely due to the increasing ruthlessness of Boko Haram, an Islamist terrorist group based in north-east Nigeria.

Boko Haram was the world's deadliest terrorist group in 2014 killing 6,118 people in Nigeria through terrorist attacks. In 2013 Boko Haram had killed 1,595 people. Despite this very large increase in deaths, the proportion of the total deaths that Boko Haram was responsible for fell slightly. In 2013 Boko Haram was responsible for 86 per cent of deaths in Nigeria, whereas in 2014 they were responsible for 81 per cent.

The reason for this change is the Fulani militants who killed 1,229 people in 2014, up from 63 in 2013. They now pose a serious threat to stability. There has been an ongoing conflict over access and control of land between the semi-nomadic Fulani herdsmen and farmers in north-eastern Nigeria. There have been reports of a link between Boko Haram and Fulani militants, particularly in regards to smuggling and organised crime. However, unlike Boko Haram who are now affiliated with ISIL and align with the establishment of a caliphate, the Fulani militants have very localised goals, mainly greater access to grazing lands for livestock.

In Nigeria private citizens are overwhelmingly targeted, most often with firearms resulting in very high levels of deaths per attack. In 2014 Boko Haram killed on average 15 people per attack whereas Fulani militants killed eight per attack.






Most terrorist attacks were in the northeast of Nigeria where Boko Haram is based, with 40 per cent of attacks in their home state of Borno. The most attacks were seen in Maiduguri, the regional capital of Borno State, and Kano in northern Nigeria which is the second largest city in Nigeria. There were 146 cities that had at least ten people killed from terrorist attacks in 2014 and 19 cities that had at least 100 people killed. The two areas with the most deaths from terrorism were Konduga with 444 and Maiduguri with 431 deaths. Konduga is a community in Borno State with a population of less than 20,000. Konduga served as a minor base for Boko Haram members which led to government forces clashing with Boko Haram members in early 2015.

The nature of terrorism in Nigeria is different to Iraq and Afghanistan. Terrorist activity in Nigeria has more in common with the tactics of organised crime and gangs, focusing more on armed assaults using firearms and knives than on the bombings of other large terrorist groups. Firearms were used in over half of all attacks in Nigeria and were responsible for 67 per cent of all deaths by Boko Haram and 92 per cent of deaths from Fulani militants.

Whilst previously the use of suicide attacks by Boko Haram was rare, in 2014 they were responsible for 31 suicide attacks with an average of nearly 15 deaths per attack. The majority of these attacks were against private citizens and education and religious institutions. No other group in Nigeria conducted suicide attacks in 2014.

PAKISTAN

GTI RANK | **4**
GTI SCORE | **9.065**



Whilst Pakistan saw a seven per cent reduction in incidents and a 25 per cent reduction in deaths from 2013 to 2014, the country still has the fourth highest number of deaths from terrorism in the world. There were 1,760 people killed from terrorism in Pakistan in 2014.

Terrorism in Pakistan is strongly influenced by its proximity to Afghanistan with most attacks occurring near the border and involving the Taliban. Nearly half of all attacks had no groups claiming responsibility. The deadliest group in Pakistan in 2014, responsible for 31 per cent of all deaths and 60 per cent of all claimed attacks, is Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistani Taliban. This group killed 543 people in 2014, slightly down from 618 in 2013. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a jihadi group based in Pakistan, also saw a substantial decline in activity to 45 deaths in 2014 down from 346 in 2013. In addition the leader of the group, Malik Ishaq, was killed by Pakistani police forces in July 2015.

Terrorism in Pakistan has a diverse array of actors. In 2014 there were 35 different terrorist groups, up from 25 groups in 2013. However, seven groups account for the majority of claimed attacks. While many of these groups are Islamist there are also other organisations such as separatist movements for Baloch, the Bettani tribe and Sindhi people. The majority of terrorism occurs in just three provinces: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the north-west, which recorded 35 per cent of the deaths; the Sindh province, in the south east, which recorded 23 per

cent of the deaths; and Balochistan in the south-west which recorded 20 per cent of the deaths.

There were 535 cities or regional centres in Pakistan that had at least one terrorist incident in 2014, with at least one death in each of 253 cities. The largest city in Pakistan, Karachi, had the most deaths with 374. Islamabad, the capital, had the second highest deaths from terrorism with 38 deaths. The city of Parachinar in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the closest point in Pakistan to Kabul in Afghanistan, had among the highest rates of deaths per incident with 12 killed per incident.

Bombings and explosions continue to be the most common type of attack accounting for around 40 per cent of fatalities. However, the use of firearms and armed assault attacks has increased. In 2013 armed assaults were responsible for 26 per cent of fatalities whereas in 2014 this had increased to 39 per cent. The numbers killed by armed assaults rose 14 per cent to 685, up from 602 in 2013.

The biggest target for terrorism in Pakistan is private citizens, who are the target of 20 per cent of incidents and account for 29 per cent of fatalities. Educational institutions continue to be targeted. In 2014 there were 103 attacks on schools which caused 201 deaths and 203 injuries. The Pakistani Taliban, like the Taliban in Afghanistan, is opposed to western education and to the education of girls and has targeted schools and advocates of equal education.



SYRIA

GTI RANK | **5**
GTI SCORE | **8.108**




INCIDENTS  232

PROPERTY DAMAGE  301

DEAD 
 1,698

INJURED 
 1,473

INCREASE IN DEATHS SINCE 2000



The continual impact of terrorism in Syria is a direct result of the Syrian civil war. There were no recorded acts of terrorism in the two years prior to the civil war commencing in 2011. In 2014 there were 1,690 deaths compared to 600 in 2012. Most of the deaths in Syria are accounted for as battlefield deaths.

The present-day civil war in Syria began in March of 2011 as protests against President Bashar-al-Assad's government. These protests were similar to the various democratic uprisings occurring throughout the Arab region since December 2010, known as the Arab Spring. In several of the Arab Spring nations, the uprisings led to the toppling of some authoritarian leaders, but in the case of Syria the Assad regime aggressively responded to the demonstrations, which unwound into civil war. From its inception, the core of the opposition has been the Free Syrian Army, with many other groups entering the war and establishing themselves as opposition forces, including Islamist rebel groups such as ISIL and the al-Nusra Front.

It is estimated that over 200,000 people have been killed in the civil war. The majority of these deaths are classified as a result of conventional warfare rather than acts of terrorism. However, terrorism has been deployed as a tactic by some of the rebel forces to bring about a political, economic, religious, or social goal rather than purely military objectives. As of September 2015, there are 4.1 million Syrian refugees and 6.5 million people displaced within Syria. Many have fled to nearby countries, with a growing number fleeing to Europe, underlining the worldwide spill-over effects of the Syrian civil war.

A quarter of terrorist attacks in Syria are from unknown perpetrators. The biggest terrorist group in Syria is ISIL who killed 615 people, or 36 per cent. The second biggest group, the Sunni and al-Qa'ida linked al-Nusra Front, claimed responsibility for 27 per cent of deaths or 461 people.


Whilst there were terrorist attacks in 76 cities in 2014, over half of all attacks occurred in just four cities. Damascus, the capital and second largest city in Syria, had 37 attacks which resulted in 63 deaths. Homs recorded the most fatalities with 345, representing 20 per cent of total deaths from terrorism in Syria. Palmyra, an area 215 kilometres north-east of Damascus, had 310 deaths. Palmyra has also seen many sites of historical significance destroyed by ISIL, including the Temple of Bel which was nearly 2000 years old. The largest city of Aleppo had 23 attacks which resulted in 193 deaths. Kobani in northern Syria near the border with Turkey had 34 attacks resulting in 71 deaths.

Most deaths from terrorism in Syria have been from bombings. Bombings can be extremely deadly. There were two bombings in 2014 which killed more than 50 people and at least 19 bombings that killed ten or more people. Private citizens are the target of 53 per cent of attacks, with 475 people being killed. There were at least 30 different kidnapping incidents which resulted in 382 deaths. This includes two American journalists, James Foley and Steven Sotloff, who were kidnapped in Syria and murdered by ISIL in late 2014.




INCIDENTS 763 PROPERTY DAMAGE 769
 DEAD 416 INJURED 639

GTI RANK | **6**
 GTI SCORE | **7.747**



ATTACKS BY TARGET



- Private citizens & property
- Police
- Government
- Military, militia or terrorist groups
- Other



DEATHS BY GROUP

- Other
- Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist)
- National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)
- Garo National Liberation Army
- Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)

DECREASE IN DEATHS SINCE 2000



India had a slight increase in terrorist deaths, increasing by one per cent in 2014 to reach a total of 416. This is the highest number of terrorist incidents and deaths since 2010. There were 763 incidents which represents a 20 per cent increase from 2013.

The majority of terrorist attacks in India have low casualties. In 2014 around 70 per cent of attacks were non-lethal. Reflecting this, there were many groups which committed terrorist acts that didn't kill anyone. Of the 50 different terrorist groups that engaged in a terrorist act in 2014, 28 groups did not kill anyone. However, there were ten groups that were responsible for ten or more deaths.

Terrorism in India can be categorised into three distinct groups: communists, Islamists and separatist.

Communist terrorist groups are by far the most frequent perpetrators and the main cause of deaths in India. Two Maoist communist groups claimed responsibility for 172 deaths in 2014, which constitutes 41 per cent of all deaths from terrorism. Police are overwhelmingly the biggest targets of Maoists, accounting for over half of the deaths. Kidnapping is also a common tactic of the Maoists where it is often used as a political tool to force the government to release Maoist prisoners. The majority of Maoist attacks occurred in the provinces of Bihar, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand.

The dispute with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir is the main source of Islamic terrorism. Islamist terrorists were

responsible for 57 deaths in this region, which is 14 per cent of the total deaths in India from terrorism. The announcement in September 2014 that al-Qa'ida was establishing a presence in India has not led to a dramatic increase in terrorism by the group. Jammu and Kashmir is in the north and has a population that is nearly two thirds Muslim. The two deadliest Islamic terrorist groups in 2014 were Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Hizbul Mujahideen. Lashkar-e-Taiba is a terrorist group that operates mainly in Pakistan and was responsible for 24 deaths in 2014. Hizbul Mujahideen is an Islamist group allegedly based in Pakistan with a membership of around 15,000. Hizbul Mujahideen were responsible for 11 deaths in 2014, down from 30 deaths in the prior year. In 2013 Hizbul Mujahideen was the only group in India to use suicide tactics, but in 2014 there were no suicide attacks in India.


India's north east region has for the last three decades seen continual ethno-political unrest from ethnic secessionist movements. The biggest year on year change for terrorist groups was the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) which killed seven people in 2013 and 80 in 2014. This was the second deadliest group in India in 2014. Other separatist groups include United Liberation Front of Assam and National Liberation Council of Taniland, both of which were responsible for ten deaths in 2014. Separatist groups are largely in the regions of Assam, Bodoland, Kamtapur and Meghalaya. The Assam region recorded 106 deaths in 2014 which is 25 per cent of the total deaths.

YEMEN




GTI RANK | **7**
GTI SCORE | **7.642**

INCREASE IN DEATHS SINCE 2000




ATTACKS BY TARGET

-  Private citizens & property
-  Military, militia or terrorist groups
-  Government
-  Police
-  Other



DEATHS BY GROUP

-  Unknown
-  Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
-  Houthis
-  Tribesmen
-  Other



In 2014 the number of terrorist attacks in Yemen increased by 72 per cent and the number of fatalities increased by 123 per cent. There were 654 people killed from terrorism in Yemen in 2014 which represents the highest level recorded. Previously, the worst year in terms of terrorism in Yemen was 2012, the year that President Ali Abdullah Saleh was ousted, when 372 people were killed.

Whilst there were ten different groups that committed a terrorist attack in Yemen in 2014, two major groups committed over 80 per cent of terrorist acts. These groups are the Houthis and al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The Houthis are the smaller group and claimed responsibility for 19 per cent of deaths in 2014, a 115 per cent increase from 2013. AQAP claimed responsibility for 61 per cent of attacks in 2014. They had a 125 per cent increase in the deadliness of their attacks killing 402 in 2014 up from 179 in 2013. Both groups in Yemen are in conflict with the government and deploy terrorist tactics. Despite this, the Houthis and AQAP are opposed to each other and are based in separate parts of the country. The other groups active in Yemen include Muslim fundamentalists, tribesmen and Southern Mobility Movement (Yemen).

AQAP is an al-Qa'ida affiliate which was led by Nasir al-Wuhayshi who was Usama bin Ladin's former secretary. After al-Wuhayshi's death by a drone strike in June 2015, Qasim al-Raymi took over the organisation. AQAP remains loyal to al-Qa'ida and is supportive of the al-Nusra Front over ISIL. AQAP has mainly




operated in the south of Yemen and has been the target of US drone attacks since 2002. AQAP are responsible for over 1,275 deaths from terrorist attacks over the last five years. They were the only group in Yemen to use suicide bombings, conducting 16 attacks that killed 184 people. Suicide bombings were very deadly, with an average of 12 deaths and nearly 18 injuries per attack. These bombings mainly targeted the police and military. However, the most deadly suicide bombing attacks targeted private citizens. The worst attack in Yemen was a suicide bombing which killed 50.

The other major terrorist group, the Houthis, is a militant Islamist insurgency made up of followers of a Shi'a sect known as Zaydi. The Houthis are in conflict with the Sunni-majority government and military. The Houthis are also opposed to AQAP, a Sunni group, and there have been several major battles between the two groups. Since 2009 the Houthis have killed 321 people in terrorist attacks. In September of 2014 the Houthis invaded the capital demanding a change of government and forced the President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi to flee in February 2015. Hadi fled to Aden and rescinded his resignation as President, but fled again when Aden was taken over by Houthi forces. The Houthis were fought back by a coalition which included bombing campaigns by Saudi Arabia and in September Hadi returned to Aden to continue running the Government from there.

SOMALIA



GTI RANK | **8**
GTI SCORE | **7.6**



Somalia has recorded an increase in terrorism for the fourth year in a row. There were twice as many attacks and deaths in 2014 than in 2013. In 2014 Somalia had the most attacks and deaths from terrorism in its history.

Somalia continues to face violence in the south with rebel forces and terrorist groups. As in previous years, the al-Shabaab group were responsible for most claimed attacks. This militant group is allied with al-Qa’ida and has an estimated 7,000 to 9,000 soldiers. The only other group that claimed responsibility for attacks in 2014 was the Raskamboni Movement, a paramilitary group opposed to al-Shabaab and seeking to control the Jubbaland region.

There has been infighting in al-Shabaab over whether it should focus on local and regional objectives rather than transcontinental jihad. Notably, this was one of the reasons why the American recruit to al-Shabaab, Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki, was killed by al-Shabaab in 2013 as he criticised the group for being too focused on domestic affairs and neglecting international jihad. Nevertheless, al-Shabaab continues to attract foreign fighters, particularly in Kenya. Radicalisation is in part due to perceptions by Muslim youth of mistreatment by the Kenyan government.²

As well as recruiting people from Kenya, al-Shabaab has staged numerous attacks in Kenya. This includes the Westgate shopping mall attack in September 2013 which resulted in 67 deaths and 175 injuries and the 2 April 2015 massacre at

Garissa University where gunmen stormed a university and killed 147 people.

Al-Shabaab has controlled several areas of Somalia including the capital Mogadishu in 2010. A joint military mission called Operation Indian Ocean began on 16 August 2014 to challenge al-Shabaab. The military mission involves the Somali military, the African Union and the US military. This military mission has led to the death of many of the leaders of al-Shabaab. The overall leader, Moktar Ali Zubeyr, was killed by a US drone strike in September 2014.




Al-Shabaab generally uses guerrilla warfare and is structured as an insurgency force in three parts: intelligence gathering, law enforcement and a military arm. A third of their attacks are bombings or explosions, averaging 1.8 deaths per attack. This is a lower lethality than 2013 where two and a half people were killed per attack. The change in lethality may reflect deterioration in their effectiveness. The highest death toll from a bombing was 20 in 2014, whereas in 2013 there was an attack which killed 38 and another that killed 28.

Southern Somalia continues to have the majority of attacks. The largest city and capital Mogadishu experienced 36 per cent of attacks, followed by 11 in the southern city Kudhaa in Lower Juba and eight per cent of attacks in Baidoa in the south-central Bay region. The Bay region saw the biggest increase in terrorist attacks in 2014 with 133 deaths compared to 21 deaths in 2013.

LIBYA



GTI RANK | **9**
GTI SCORE | **7.29**



Libya recorded a 255 per cent increase in terrorist fatalities in 2014 compared to the previous year. Terrorism in Libya is linked to the Libyan crisis which began in 2011 after the Arab Spring and subsequent military battle to overthrow leader Muammar Gaddafi. However, levels of terrorism have increased drastically since the beginning of the second Libyan civil war in 2014. There were no deaths from terrorism in Libya until 2012 when 28 people were killed in 51 separate attacks. In 2013 terrorism more than quadrupled to 121 deaths.

Although 60 per cent of attacks were from unknown groups, in 2014 there were still 30 groups that claimed responsibility for an attack, with 18 groups killing at least one person. In comparison in 2013 there were just 11 groups that claimed responsibility for attacks, and only five groups in 2012.

The most deadly group in 2014 was Ansar al-Sharia, a jihadi group which was responsible for the attack on the US consulate in Benghazi. Ansar al-Sharia was responsible for 67 deaths in 2014, up from 14 in the previous year. The second most deadly group in 2014 was the Haftar Militia, a group which is opposed to the pro-Islamic militias led by Major General Khalifa Haftar. The Haftar Militia mainly operate in the two largest cities in Libya; Tripoli and Benghazi.

There were 21 provinces which had at least one attack from terrorism in 2014, up from 13 in 2013. Of these, eight provinces had no deaths and nine had five or less deaths. The remaining four provinces accounted for 407 of the deaths in 2014.

Benghazi had the most attacks with 214 people being killed in 2014 up from the 88 killed in the previous year. The city with the second largest deaths from terrorism is Tripoli with 121 deaths, followed by Sirte with 47 and Derna with 25.

Private citizens are the major target, representing 23 per cent of incidents and 38 per cent of the total fatalities. Other major targets for terrorism include the government, representing 22 per cent of attacks, and business, representing 12 per cent.

Just under half of all attacks in Libya were bombings, with armed assaults making up a quarter of attacks and hostage taking 11 per cent. There were six suicide bombings in 2014 which killed 15 people. Three-hundred and nine attacks did not cause any fatalities, whilst there were six attacks that had over 15 deaths.

The deadliest attacks were when the Haftar Militia targeted the bases of two Islamist militant groups, Rafallah al-Sahati Brigade and Ansar al-Sharia, in Benghazi city as one of three attacks on 16 May 2014 which killed at least 75 people including civilians.



INCIDENTS  366


PROPERTY DAMAGE  654

DEAD  156

INJURED  582


GTI RANK | 10
GTI SCORE | 7.279

INCREASE IN DEATHS SINCE 2000



ATTACKS BY TARGET

-  Private citizens & property
-  Police
-  Business
-  Government
-  Other



DEATHS BY GROUP

-  Unknown
-  Separatist
-  Other



WORST ATTACK

Separatists were suspected of being behind an attack where assailants on motorcycles shot at villagers offering food to a monk.

In 2014 Thailand recorded the most terrorist incidents ever in the country with a 16 per cent increase on the previous year. However there were fewer deaths than the peak recorded in 2009 of 255 people.

Terrorist activity is overwhelmingly confined to the south of the country where there is an ongoing insurgency between Muslim separatists and the Thai government, with Malay Muslims opposed to the Thai Buddhist minority and supporters of the government. This conflict has been ongoing since 2004 with estimates of 5,000 deaths and 10,000 injuries. Terrorist activity is so localised that only 18 out of the 76 provinces of Thailand suffered from attacks. However, this is up from 11 provinces in 2013.

Historically, most attacks have occurred in the three southern border provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala. In 2014 two of these provinces had the most attacks with 99 and 98 in Narathiwat and Pattani respectively. Pattani and Yala had increases in deaths in 2014, whereas Narathiwat had a slight decrease in the number of deaths with 37 deaths, down from 46 in 2013.

These areas are not where most people in Thailand live. Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala all have a population under a million people. However, the capital and most populous city, Bangkok, has seen a recent increase in attacks. Bangkok recorded a five-fold increase in attacks in 2014 with 58 attacks

compared to nine attacks in the previous year. This is the most attacks ever recorded in Bangkok. Despite the large number of attacks there were nine deaths in Bangkok. However, in August 2015 there was a bombing at Hindu Erawan shrine in Bangkok which killed 20 people.

Two thirds of terrorism in Thailand is conducted by unknown actors. Of the known actors, Runda Kumpulan Kecil (RKK) were the deadliest killing nine in 2014 up from three the previous year. Separatists in the south remain deadly, killing 41 in 2014, up from 17 in 2013.

The two groups which were the deadliest in 2013 committed no terrorist acts in 2014. Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), a group which killed 12 in 2013, has engaged in peace talks with the Thai Government in Malaysia for a number of years. A splinter group of the BRN, the Aba Cheali Group, similarly killed four in 2013 and did not engage in a terrorist attack in 2014. This suggests that peace talks may continue to be fruitful. Nevertheless, there are difficulties in peace talks among separatists in Thailand as there are indications that groups have become more fractured than in previous years.³

Around 60 per cent of attacks are bombings and explosions, followed by armed assaults at 28 per cent. Private citizens are targeted 39 per cent of the time, with police and businesses targeted around 30 per cent each.

TERRORISM COMPARED TO OTHER FORMS OF VIOLENCE

Although terrorism is undoubtedly a major concern for safety and security, there are other forms of violence which result in more deaths globally. The global homicide rate is 13 times the global terrorism rate, with 437,000 people dying from homicides compared to 32,685 from terrorism.


The homicide rates, like rates of terrorism, are generally more centralised in one area or city than others. Many cities in the world have higher homicide rates than the highest terrorist rates. Some of these cities are Basseterre (Saint Kitts and Nevis), Belize City (Belize), Cape Town (South Africa), Caracas (Venezuela), Guatemala City (Guatemala), Maseru (Lesotho), San Salvador (El Salvador) and Tegucigalpa (Honduras).

Caracas has the highest homicide rate in the world at 111 per 100,000 for the decade starting from 2000. This shows that whilst terrorism is very deadly in many places in the world, there are other forms of violence which have a higher impact. The deadliest city in the world for terrorism is Baghdad, the capital city of Iraq. There were 2,454 deaths in Baghdad in 2014 with a death rate from terrorism of 43 per 100,000 people. Over half of these deaths were by unknown actors. ISIL conducted attacks which led to 99 per cent of the deaths where a group claimed responsibility. Around 94 per cent of terrorist attacks in Baghdad were bombings which kill on average around three people per attack. Private citizens are the target for most attacks in Baghdad with 1,323 killed and 4,069 injured from 456 attacks.

The second most deadly city for terrorism in 2014 is Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State in north-east Nigeria, where there were 39 per 100,000 people killed by terrorism. Since early 2013 areas of Maiduguri have been under the control of Boko Haram. The group, which is based in Borno State, was responsible for all attacks in Maiduguri. Whilst generally Boko Haram engages in terrorist acts using armed assaults, in Maiduguri bombings account for half of the deaths.

FIGURE 7 GLOBAL HOMICIDE RATE (2012) VS GLOBAL TERRORISM RATE (2014), PER 100,000 PEOPLE

The homicide rate is 13 times the terrorism rate. This means that for every one person killed from terrorism in 2014 there were 13 people who were victims of homicide.




Source: UNODC, START GTD, IEP calculations

“ Many cities in the world have higher homicide rates than the highest terrorism rates.

FIGURE 8

CITIES WITH HIGHEST HOMICIDE RATE (AVERAGE 2001-2010) COMPARED TO CITIES WITH HIGHEST TERRORISM RATE (2014)

The cities with the highest homicide rates have more than double the death rate than the cities with the highest terrorism rates. This highlights that there are types of violence that result in more deaths than terrorism.



Source: UNODC, START GTD, IEP calculations

Mosul in Iraq is the third most deadly city with 510 deaths from terrorism in 2014. Mosul was initially overrun by ISIL on 10 June 2014, which led to over 500,000 people fleeing the city.⁴

The fourth most deadly city is Peshawar in Pakistan. Over half of the deaths in Peshawar last year were from one attack by Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) on 16 December 2014. TTP gunmen entered a school and opened fire, killing 157 and injuring 131.

There were only four cities with a death rate of higher than ten. Other cities which had the highest fatality rates from terrorism in 2014 all had fewer than ten deaths per 100,000. This includes Donetsk in Ukraine which is where pro-Russian separatists have fought with Ukrainian forces. Odessa in the Ukraine had 46 deaths mainly from a right-wing Ukrainian nationalist group called Right Sector. Most of the deaths were from one attack when the House of Trade Unions building was set on fire which led to at least 42 deaths.

Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, had 206 deaths from terrorism in 2014, the most recorded in the last 15 years. Almost all attacks in Kabul were by the Taliban.

Kano in northern Nigeria had 184 deaths from terrorism, with all acts committed by Boko Haram who killed 15 people per attack. Similarly, Kaduna in northwest Nigeria had 46 deaths, all by Boko Haram.

Karachi, the largest city in Pakistan, had 374 deaths due to attacks by 11 different groups. However, the TTP were responsible for 79 per cent of attacks by known groups.

“ Only four cities had a death rate from terrorism higher than ten per 100,000 in 2014.

TABLE 1 TEN CITIES WITH HIGHEST FATALITY RATE FROM TERRORISM, 2014

CITY	COUNTRY	DEATHS FROM TERRORISM	POPULATION	RATE PER 100,000
Baghdad	■ Iraq	2,454	5,673,000	43
Maiduguri	■ Nigeria	431	1,112,000	39
Mosul	■ Iraq	510	1,740,000	29
Peshawar	■ Pakistan	304	1,219,000	25
Donetsk	■ Ukraine	102	1,025,000	10
Kabul	■ Afghanistan	206	3,044,000	7
Kano	■ Nigeria	184	3,626,000	5
Odessa	■ Ukraine	46	1,002,000	5
Karachi	■ Pakistan	374	11,624,000	3
Kaduna	■ Nigeria	46	1,582,000	3

“ The global homicide rate is 13 times the global terrorism rate, with 437,000 people dying from homicides compared to 32,685 from terrorism.

TRENDS

Over the last 15 years, more than 61,000 incidents of terrorism claiming over 140,000 lives have been recorded. Since the beginning of the 21st century, there has been a nine-fold increase in the number of deaths from terrorism, rising from 3,329 in 2000 to 32,685 in 2014. From 2013 to 2014 Nigeria witnessed the largest increase in terrorist deaths ever recorded by any country, increasing by over 300 per cent to 7,512 fatalities.

Boko Haram was responsible for 6,644 deaths in 2014, becoming the most deadly terrorist group in the world. ISIL was responsible for 6,073 terrorist related deaths but the group was also involved in at least 20,000 battlefield-related deaths with other state and non-state combatants.

During 2014 there was also a shift in the distribution of targets; with an 11 per cent decrease in deaths of religious figures and worshipers. This was offset by the increase in deaths of private citizens. Deaths of private citizens increased by 172 per cent, which is over double the increase in the global growth rate of deaths from terrorism.

The flow of foreign fighters into Iraq and Syria continued in 2014 and 2015. Between 25,000 and 30,000 foreign fighters are estimated to have arrived in Syria and Iraq since 2011, 7,000 in the first six months of 2015. Europe comprises 21 per cent of all foreign fighters, while 50 per cent are from neighbouring MENA countries.

CHANGES IN THE PATTERNS & CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY

This section summarises the overarching patterns and characteristics of terrorist activity over the last 15 years in terms of targets, weapons used, tactics, lethality, ideology and location.


In 2014 private citizens were targeted more than in previous years.⁵ In 2014 private citizens were targeted eight per cent more frequently, which is the biggest proportional change in target type in the 15 years covered by this report. This reflects the increasing lethality of Boko Haram and ISIL which predominantly target private citizens. The types of weapons used differ between the groups, with Boko Haram mainly undertaking attacks with firearms and ISIL mainly using explosives.

Whilst it continues to be the case that most terrorist attacks do not result in heavy loss of life, in 2014 the proportion of attacks that resulted in more than five deaths increased. The ratio of deaths per attack also increased with 2.4 deaths per attack in MENA and 6.7 deaths per attack in sub-Saharan Africa. The most lethal terrorism continues to be located in MENA, South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 9 shows that the primary target of most terrorist attacks has been private property and citizens. In 2014, 31 per cent of all attacks targeted private citizens, up six per cent from the previous year. This is the biggest proportional change in target type from any of the years covered in the report. Government targets were attacked 12 per cent of the time which is the lowest level since 2007. Police were also targeted slightly less in 2014. The two most lethal terrorist groups in 2014, Boko Haram and ISIL, overwhelmingly attack private citizens.

FIGURE 9 TARGETS OF TERRORISM, 2000-2014


The primary target of terrorism has historically been private property and citizens. In 2014 this trend continued with a six per cent increase towards private citizens and their property.



Source: START GTD

FIGURE 10 NUMBER OF ATTACKS AND DEATHS FOR PRIVATE CITIZENS AND PROPERTY, 2000-2014

Private citizens have borne the brunt of the increase in deaths from terrorism. Deaths of private citizens increased 172 per cent between 2013 and 2014 compared to total deaths which rose 80 per cent.



Source: START GTD

“ The two most lethal terrorist groups in 2014, Boko Haram and ISIL, overwhelmingly attack private citizens.

TABLE 2
DEATHS BY TARGET TYPE BETWEEN 2013 AND 2014

TARGETS	2013	2014	DIFFERENCE	PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE
Private citizens & property	5,647	15,380	9,734	172%
Other	1,921	3,496	1,576	82%
Military	1,439	2,530	1,091	76%
Police	4,536	6,124	1,589	35%
Business	1,604	1,983	379	24%
Government	1,715	2,060	345	20%
Religious	1,250	1,111	-139	-11%

In 2014 there was a 172 per cent increase in private citizens as victims of terrorism. Over three quarters of this was due to three groups: Boko Haram, Fulani militants and ISIL. Private citizens constituted 38 per cent of deaths by Boko Haram in 2013, but this rose to 77 per cent in 2014.

Similarly, Fulani militants killed 992 private citizens in 2014, up from 61 the previous year. This was 81 per cent of total deaths from terrorism by Fulani militants.

ISIL has also increased its targeting of private citizens. ISIL killed 2,667 private citizens in 2014 which was 255 per cent higher than 2013. The three groups have different tactics. Boko Haram and the Fulani militants mainly use automatic weapons and have very high levels of fatalities per attack, whereas ISIL mainly target private citizens using explosives and bombings.


Proportionally there was not a big change in the use of weapons with 58 per cent of attacks by explosives, bombs and dynamite, 28 per cent of attacks by firearms and 14 per cent of attacks by other weapons.

In 2014 there were 854 more incidents where firearms were the main weapon, 1,626 more uses of explosives, bombs or dynamite and 928 cases with ‘other.’ Other involves mainly incendiary attacks and unknown weaponry. Unknown weaponry is predominantly kidnapping or hijacking, both of which are activities where the weaponry is incidental to the act.

Attacks involving weaponry that fall under the category of ‘other’ increased proportionally from nine per cent in 2013 to 14 per cent in 2014. This was largely due to the increase in kidnappings. There were at least 269 more kidnappings in 2014 than the previous year. This reflects the increasing use of kidnappings by ISIL. In 2014 ISIL used kidnapping 677 per cent more than in 2013, with over 100 separate kidnappings often involving multiple people. For example, on 12 September

FIGURE 11 WEAPONS TRENDS IN TERRORISM, 2000-2014

The proportion of different weapons used in terrorist acts has remained relatively constant. Approximately 60 per cent of all attacks use explosives, 30 per cent use firearms and ten per cent use other weapons.




Source: START GTD

“ Incidents and fatalities from terrorism are largely centralised in three regions: South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and MENA.

FIGURE 12 SUCCESS RATES OF TERRORIST ATTACKS, 2000-2014

In 2014, 12 per cent of all incidents were unsuccessful. This represents a fourfold increase from 2007 when only three per cent of attacks were unsuccessful.



Source: START GTD

2014, 50 Sunni Muslim civilians were kidnapped from Riyadh in Iraq. The targets of kidnapping by ISIL are private citizens 44 per cent of the time, police 25 per cent of the time and journalists 15 per cent of the time.

Figure 12 highlights that in 2014 the success rate was 88 per cent. This represents a substantial decrease since 2007 when 97 per cent of attacks were successful. The type of attack which had the lowest success rate, meaning the attack was not carried out, was assassinations. Of the 791 different assassination attempts in 2014, 42 per cent were unsuccessful.

Incidents and fatalities from terrorism are largely centralised in three regions: South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and MENA. All three regions have more deaths than attacks. South Asia had 1.6 deaths per attack and MENA had 2.4 deaths per attack.

Terrorism in both regions is predominantly in the form of explosions and bombings. In 2014, explosives accounted for 69 per cent of attacks for MENA and 56 per cent of attacks for South Asia. In MENA the group responsible for the most deaths in 2014 was ISIL, and in South Asia it was the Taliban.

Deaths per attack are much higher in sub-Saharan Africa than anywhere in the world. In 2014 there was an average of 6.7 deaths per attack, up from four deaths per attack in 2013. Unlike in South Asia and MENA, in sub-Saharan Africa the main weapon type for attacks was firearms, which were the primary weapon used in 48 per cent of attacks. This reflects the tactics of the largest terrorist group in sub-Saharan Africa, Boko Haram. Firearms account for 63 per cent of deaths from attacks by Boko Haram.

In the regions with lesser incidents and deaths from terrorism, the ratio of deaths per attack is generally much smaller. Central America and the Caribbean, the region with the least amount of deaths from terrorism, recorded 0.6 deaths for every attack. The region with the lowest ratio of deaths per attack was Europe which had 0.1 deaths per attack. This figure is influenced by Northern Ireland which had 79 incidents and no casualties in 2014. In Europe around half of the attacks used explosives and ten per cent of attacks used firearms.

Terrorist attacks became more deadly in 2014, even though 46 per cent of attacks didn't kill anyone, the lowest proportion since 2007. Attacks which only had one death also decreased to the lowest proportion in a decade at 19 per cent.


At the same time as attacks with none or one death fell, the proportion of attacks with two or more deaths increased. The proportion of attacks that killed more than five people was 17 per cent in 2014, the highest proportion since 2007.

This change in lethality of attacks in 2014 was largely due to Boko Haram and the Fulani militants in Nigeria. In Nigeria in 2014, 60 per cent of attacks resulted in deaths of more than five people, whereas in Iraq only 18 per cent of attacks resulted in five or more deaths.

Terrorism has become more lethal across the world. Globally there were on average 1.82 people killed per attack in 2013. This increased by 34 per cent to 2.44 people killed per attack in 2014. This is the highest levels of lethality since 2007 when deaths due to terrorism increased because of a dramatic increase in bombings in Iraq.

FIGURE 13 ATTACKS AND DEATHS BY REGION, 2014

Middle-East and North Africa (MENA) and sub-Saharan Africa have the highest deaths in 2014. Both regions have many more deaths per attack than other regions.



Source: START GTD

TERRORIST GROUP TRENDS

The five most deadly terrorist groups were responsible for 74 per cent of all deaths from terrorism by known actors in 2014. This represents a large increase in the lethality of these groups as in 2013 these same five groups were responsible for 59 per cent of deaths. In 2013 these five groups killed 5,932 people from terrorist attacks whereas in 2014 they killed 18,444, more than tripling their deadly impact.


Although every one of the five groups killed more people in 2014, two groups became dramatically more lethal. The most deadly terrorist group in 2014 was Boko Haram which killed 5,049 more people than in the previous year. ISIL was the second most deadly terrorist group, killing 4,672 more people in terrorist acts in 2014 than 2013. This highlights just how drastic an increase there has been in the deadliness of Boko Haram and ISIL. The Taliban, the most deadly group in 2013, dropped to the third most deadly group in 2014 despite killing 1,121 people.

The fourth most deadly terrorist group of 2014, Fulani militants, has never previously featured among the most deadly terrorist groups. The death toll of the Fulani militants, also from Nigeria, jumped to 1,229 people compared to 63 in 2013.

The fifth most deadly group in 2014, al-Shabaab, was also the fifth most deadly in 2013. Despite being ranked the same, al-Shabaab killed 504 more people in 2014 which was almost double the number of people it killed in the previous year.

FIGURE 14 DEATHS PER ATTACK, 2000-2014

Whilst the majority of attacks still result in no deaths, the number of attacks which have deaths increased. The proportion of attacks that killed two or more also increased in 2014.



Source: START GTD

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The most deadly terrorist group in 2014 was Boko Haram which killed 5,049 more people than in the previous year.


TERRORISM & ONGOING CONFLICT

The five most deadly terrorist groups are also responsible for more deaths than those caused by their terrorist acts. All of the groups also engaged in battle with either government or non-state actors. The most deadly of the groups in conflict was ISIL which was involved in battles that killed over 20,000 people. When deaths from battles are considered alongside deaths from terrorism, ISIL would be viewed as by far the most destructive terrorist group in 2014.

Similarly the Taliban was involved in battles with the Government of Afghanistan and its allies that resulted in 15,675 battle-related deaths. This is the most deaths caused by this conflict since the conflict began. Along with an increase in terrorist attacks and deaths, in 2014 the Taliban had its most deadly year ever.

The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) classifies terrorism as actions outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. This means that only acts which are contrary to international humanitarian law, such as the deliberate targeting of civilians, conducted by sub-national actors are viewed as terrorism. The actions of governments do not get counted in the GTD and are therefore not included in the GTI. The GTD and START do not count state terrorism and only record incidents by sub-national actors.


FIGURE 15 DEATHS FROM TERRORISM BY THE FIVE DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUPS, 2010-2014
Both Boko Haram and ISIL dramatically increased their deadliness from 2013 to 2014.



Source: START GTD

FIGURE 16 BATTLE-RELATED DEATHS FOR FIVE DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUPS IN 2014

The five most deadly terrorist groups are also responsible for deaths not categorised as terrorism. ISIL is the deadliest terrorist group and was in conflicts which killed over 20,000 people in 2014.




Source: UCDP

NOTE: There were 53,948 battle-related deaths recorded between the Assad regime and Syrian insurgents which includes ISIL amongst other groups. This means the figures of battle-related deaths for ISIL are likely to be much higher. It is possible that some deaths which have been coded by UCDP as battle-related deaths may be coded by START as terrorism. In order to prevent any possibility of double counting the numbers for battle-related deaths have been reported separately to deaths from terrorism.

FIGURE 17 BATTLE-RELATED DEATHS FOR THE TALIBAN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN, 2003-2014

The conflict between the Government of Afghanistan and its allies and the Taliban recorded the highest number of battle-related deaths in 2014. There were 55 per cent more deaths in this conflict in 2014 than the previous year.



Source: UCDP

Battle deaths are when state actors are involved and are therefore not defined as acts of terrorism, but rather the result of war. As such, a group such as ISIL attacking a Syrian Army regiment would not be classified as terrorism by either side but as a wartime activity. Terrorism often invokes a distinct political or ideological message to be conveyed to a larger audience than the immediate victims, which is another reason that battle conflicts are not regarded as terrorism. UCDP defines battle-related deaths as fatalities that are related to combat in a conflict. Typically, this is through conventional warfare tactics involving the armed forces of the warring parties which includes traditional battlefield fighting and bombardments. Whilst the targets are usually the military and its installations there is often substantial collateral damage in the form of civilians killed in crossfire and indiscriminate bombings. All deaths – military as well as civilian – incurred in such situations are counted as battle-related deaths.⁶

“ The five most deadly terrorist groups are also responsible for deaths not categorised as terrorism. All of the groups also engaged in battle with either government or non-state actors.

THE FIVE MOST DEADLY TERRORIST GROUPS



INCIDENTS	453
DEATHS	6,644
INJURIES	1,742
LOCATION OF ATTACKS	CAMEROON, CHAD & NIGERIA

Boko Haram was the deadliest terrorist group in 2014, killing 6,644 people. The group is also known as Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād and more recently Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP). The name Boko Haram can be translated as 'Western education is forbidden.' Following a dispute with Nigerian government authorities and the death of their leader Mohamad Yusuf in 2009, the group began engaging in a campaign of violence. The new leader, Abubakar Shekau, declared jihad against the Nigerian Government and the United States in 2010.

Boko Haram seeks to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria, a country which is divided between the Christian south and the Muslim north. Sharia is fully implemented in nine and partially implemented in three of the 36 states of Nigeria, all of which are in northern Nigeria. Boko Haram has interacted heavily with al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and more recently ISIL in military training, funding channels and social media. In March 2015, the group formally pledged allegiance (bayat) to ISIL and recognised the leader of ISIL, al-Baghdadi, as the Caliph of Muslims.

In 2014 Boko Haram doubled its attacks and more than quadrupled the number of deaths from terrorism. Boko Haram also has logistic routes running through the border regions of Cameroon and Chad. When they attacked these countries in 2014 it was the first time that they committed an attack outside of Nigeria. Boko Haram killed 520 people in 46 attacks in Cameroon and six people in one attack in Chad. However, attacks in bordering countries have increased in 2015. A series of

suicide bombings in the middle of 2015 in Chad's capital, N'Djamena, killed at least 53 people.

Private citizens, who make up 77 per cent of fatalities, are overwhelmingly the target of Boko Haram's attacks. These attacks are also extremely deadly, with an average of 17 people killed per attack. Boko Haram has increased the use and lethality of bombings and explosions, largely due to the increased training from other terrorist groups.⁷

In 2014, bombing increased three-fold to 107, up from 35 in 2013. However, deaths increased 14 times, from 107 people to 1,490. Many bombings target markets or public places, such as in January 2015 when a bomb attached to a ten year old girl exploded and killed at least 20 people at the Monday Markets in Maiduguri. Nevertheless, most of the attacks by Boko Haram are armed assaults using machine guns. These attacks were responsible for 63 per cent of deaths in 2014 with an average of 19 deaths per attack. Machine guns were also the main weaponry used in the Baga massacre, which may be the deadliest terrorist attack since September 11. Between 3 January and 7 January 2015, Boko Haram killed an estimated 2,000 people in the town of Baga in the state of Borno in north-east Nigeria.




INCIDENTS	1,071
DEATHS	6,073
INJURIES	5,799
LOCATION OF ATTACKS	EGYPT, IRAQ, LEBANON, SYRIA & TURKEY

ISIL, also known as ISIS, Islamic State or Daesh, is a terrorist group based in Syria and Iraq. It emerged from al-Qa'ida in Iraq, moving into Syria during the Syrian civil war. In February 2014 al-Qa'ida formally broke ties with ISIL, with the leader of al-Qa'ida stating ISIL disobeyed directions from al-Qa'ida to kill fewer civilians. Like other fundamentalist jihadi groups, ISIL seeks to create an

FIGURE 18 DEATHS FROM TERRORISM BY ISIL AND ITS PRECURSORS, 2010-2014

ISIL is a much more deadly terrorist group than any of its precursor groups. Precursors to ISIL are the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI).



Source: START GTD

area of Islamic rule. They now control a significant amount of territory in both Iraq and Syria. The group promotes violence to those who do not adhere to its interpretations. ISIL aspires to control the Levant region which includes Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. It is opposed to the Alawite Assad regime and the Shia Iraqi Government of Haider al-Abadi. ISIL has also claimed to be fighting a holy war against Shia Muslims, Christians and Yazidis, an ethno-religious group in Iraq and Syria.

The entire organisation is led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who is known as the Caliph or political successor. ISIL has a strong military presence in the region with many former members of the Iraqi army under the Saddam Hussein regime. In 2014 ISIL were engaged in conflict with governments including Iraq, Lebanon and the Assad regime as well as different groups active in Syria such as the al-Nusra Front, the Islamic Front, the Mujahideen Army and Syria Revolutionaries Front. There were more than 20,000 battle-related deaths from these conflicts.

In 2014 ISIL killed 5,002 more people from terrorism than in the previous year, representing a threefold increase. Ninety per cent of attacks were in Iraq with the cities of Nineveh, Al Anbar, Baghdad and Saladin accounting for 73 per cent of total deaths. Other attacks occurred in Syria resulting in 615 deaths from 89

attacks, Egypt recorded ten deaths from three attacks, Lebanon had nine deaths from 17 attacks and Turkey recorded three deaths from three attacks.

The majority of attacks targeted civilians, who account for 44 per cent of deaths. Over half of attacks on civilians were kidnappings or assassinations. The biggest attacks by ISIL were massacres and kidnappings of private citizens. This includes the attack of Yazidi civilians in Sinjar town on 3 August 2014 when 500 people were killed and at least 300 women were kidnapped. Another incredibly deadly attack by ISIL targeting civilians occurred on 10 June 2014 when ISIL stormed a prison in Badush city and executed 670 Shiite prisoners, releasing all Sunni inmates.

Of the 705 bombing attacks by ISIL:

- 40 per cent did not lead to any deaths.
- Suicide bombings were much more deadly than other bombings. There were 117 instances of suicide bombings which resulted in 1,101 deaths, with an average of 9.4 people killed per attack. In contrast, bombings which were not suicide bombings averaged 1.9 deaths per attack.

Twenty per cent of deaths by ISIL were through armed assaults which averaged 13.4 deaths per attack.

TALIBAN

INCIDENTS	891
DEATHS	3,477
INJURIES	3,310
LOCATION OF ATTACKS	AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN

Founded in 1994 by Mohamad Omar, the group was originally constituted by a mixture of Mujahedeen, who fought against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, and a group of Pashtun tribesmen. The Taliban took control of Afghanistan in 1996 and ruled until 2001, when they were overthrown by the US-led invasion of Afghanistan. They have since regrouped as an insurgency movement to fight the now former Karsai administration and the NATO-led International Security Forces (ISAF). Now known as the 'Neo-Taliban' or the Quetta Shura Taliban due to the current location of their leadership, the organisation has rebranded itself as an independence movement in an attempt to gain support as it attempts to recapture and take control of Afghanistan.

In 2014 the Taliban killed the most people from terrorism since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2002. There were 3,477 people killed from 891 attacks, which is a 38 per cent increase in fatalities and 48 per cent increase in attacks from the previous year. The Taliban are seeking to destabilise the country through undermining the institutions of government. For this reason the police were the major target of the Taliban, accounting for 45 per cent of incidents and 53 per cent of deaths. On average there are 4.6 deaths per incident from attacks targeting the police. The second biggest target was private civilians who were targets for around 20 per cent of both incidents and deaths, with an average of 4.3 deaths per attack. The government was also a major target, with the Taliban targeting convoys with government officials. This includes domestic officials, such as the attack on 22 January 2014 against the Shindand governor's convoy in Shindand district which led to five deaths. Another attack on 27 November 2014 involved a suicide bomber attacking a

convoy with members of the British embassy in Kabul which led to six deaths.

All but one attack by the Taliban was committed in Afghanistan. Forty-eight per cent of attacks were through bombings which killed an average of three people per attack. Whilst only 12 per cent of attacks were suicide bombings, they accounted for 19 per cent of fatalities with an average of 6.4 deaths per attack. Armed assaults were 23 per cent of attacks and 35 per cent of deaths. Most armed assaults were against the police, with the Taliban targeting checkpoints and police posts.

FULANI MILITANTS

INCIDENTS	154
DEATHS	1,229
INJURIES	395
LOCATION OF ATTACKS	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC & NIGERIA

Fulani militants in Nigeria come from a semi-nomadic, pastoralist ethnic group and are engaged in conflict with farming communities. The Fulani, or Fula, people live in at least seven countries in West Africa and the tribe comprises over 20 million people. In Nigeria, Fulani communities have faced tension with farmer communities over resources for many years. Seventy per cent of Fulani's are nomadic grazers. Groups of Fulani militants have used mainly machine guns and attacks on villages to assault and intimidate farmers.

Alongside the destabilised security situation in Nigeria due to the increased activity of Boko Haram, there was a dramatic increase in attacks by Fulani militants in 2014. From 2010 to 2013, Fulani militants killed around 80 people in total. In 2014, Fulani militants killed 1,229.

Most of the attacks occur in just six of the 36 states of Nigeria. Unlike deaths from Boko Haram which are mainly in the north, the majority of deaths occur in the Middle Belt. The five states of Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba recorded 847 deaths, which accounts for 69 per cent of the total. The state of

Zamfara in the Northern Belt had 229 deaths, which is 19 per cent of the total.

Overwhelmingly, Fulani militants target private citizens accounting for 92 per cent of attacks and 81 per cent of deaths. These attacks have mainly been through armed assaults, which kill, on average, 11 people per attack. The largest attack committed by Fulani militants was in April 2014 when assailants opened fire on community leaders and residents that were meeting in Galadima village in Zamfara state, killing at least 200 people.

In addition to terrorist attacks, in 2014 Fulani militants were also engaged in non-state armed conflicts with groups from three different ethnic groups that resulted in 712 deaths. These conflicts were with groups from Eggon, Jukun and Tiv communities which are largely farming communities. Tensions between the Fulani and the other ethnic groups are over the use of land and there may also be religious elements to conflicts. Some communities, particularly among the Tiv, may also be largely Christian, adding a religious dimension to conflict with predominantly-Muslim Fulani groups.



INCIDENTS	496
DEATHS	1,021
INJURIES	850
LOCATION OF ATTACKS	DJIBOUTI, ETHIOPIA, KENYA & SOMALIA

Al-Shabaab, also known as Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen, is an al-Qa'ida affiliate based in Somalia that is seeking to create an Islamic state in Somalia. The group was in control of cities throughout Somalia, including large areas of the capital Mogadishu. However, due to a military campaign by the African Union, al-Shabaab no longer has the territorial reach it once had. Nevertheless, 2014 was the deadliest year for the group with the number of deaths from terrorism doubling to 1,021 and the number of attacks increasing by one and a half times to nearly 500.

Three quarters of deaths and 84 per cent of attacks are in Somalia, with most of the remaining 25 per cent of deaths and 16 per cent of attacks occurring in Kenya. There was also one incident in Djibouti, which killed five, and one incident in Ethiopia which had no casualties. The group has also called for attacks in shopping malls in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, including in February 2015. Although al-Shabaab has attracted members from the United Kingdom and the United States, they have not conducted attacks in countries outside of East Africa.

Private citizens are the target of 36 per cent of attacks, with an average of 2.5 deaths per attack. The military is also a major target of al-Shabaab, accounting for 237 deaths over 55 attacks. The biggest attack by al-Shabaab was against the paramilitary group Raskamboni Movement and the military forces of Jubaland which killed 91 people. Al-Shabaab also had 70 separate kidnapping or hostage attacks which resulted in 238 deaths. Most of the kidnappings were of private citizens such as in February 2014 when several elders in Jowhar town were abducted because of their vocal opposition of al-Shabaab's activity in the region. The group has also targeted others for kidnappings such as Radio Andalus journalist Abdi Samad and a World Health Organisation doctor, Mohiyadin Taruri.

FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN IRAQ & SYRIA

The rise of ISIL has brought with it several challenging dynamics for counterterrorism. One of many concerns is the increasing prevalence of foreign fighters joining armed groups, especially in Iraq and Syria.

In order to assess the scale of movement of foreign fighters, IEP assembled estimates from ten different government, media and expert sources. Overall estimates from UN and government reports indicate that nearly 30,000 foreign individuals have travelled to Iraq and Syria from roughly 100 countries.

Foreign fighters are not a new factor in violent conflict. As many as 20,000 foreign fighters are believed to have travelled to Afghanistan over the course of the conflict with the Soviet Union, from 1980 to 1992.⁸ However, the flow of fighters into Iraq and Syria since 2011 is believed to be the largest influx in the last sixty years, with current estimates ranging from 25,000 to 30,000 fighters from roughly 100 countries.

There has been a great deal of debate regarding the number of foreign fighters that have travelled to and that are currently in Iraq and Syria. Estimates vary depending on sources, with some counting total numbers, including those killed in action or those who have returned home, whilst others try to estimate only the number of currently active fighters.

The majority of the individuals are fighters travelling to join armed movements, but figures may also include family members travelling with these fighters. IEP was able to identify numeric estimates for 67 countries from which recruits came, totalling 27,371 individuals, including 350 women and girls. IEP identified an additional 21 known countries from which individuals are believed to have travelled, but estimates of number of the number of fighters were unavailable.

Figures 19 and 20 illustrate the various estimates for Muslim-majority countries and for the rest of the world. The conservative and high-end estimates from the International Centre for the Study of Radicalism (ICSR) reflect data published in December of 2014 based on estimates totalled in mid-2014.⁹ IEP further collated individual estimates from more recent government announcements, press releases, media and expert reports including those published by The Soufan Group.

BOX 1

BUILDING IEP'S FOREIGN FIGHTER DATASET

Estimating the number of foreign fighters in an armed conflict is very difficult given the associated intelligence and human security challenges. As a result, there are few datasets that capture figures for more than a handful of countries. The most authoritative, publically-available datasets to-date have been those published by security analysts The Soufan Group (TSG) and the think tank International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), the latter including data for 50 countries. However, the UN and the US government have repeatedly issued statements estimating that fighters come from 100 countries. In order to understand how many fighters are in fact present in Iraq and Syria and which countries they come from, IEP has supplemented these two existing datasets with additional information to account for fighters from 67 countries.

IEP's foreign fighter data represent a compilation of estimates from TSG, ICSR, US government reports, UN Security Council report S/2015/358, accounts of individuals by independent researchers and media reports that reflect individual government estimates of the number of national's estimated to be fighting or joining fighters in Syria and Iraq.

Approximately 65 per cent of known fighters come from countries which are members of the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

Tunisia has the greatest number of nationals who have joined groups in Iraq and Syria with a high-end estimate of 5,000 people. An estimated 500 Tunisians foreign fighters have returned home, while between 5,000 and 6,000 additional individuals have reportedly had their movements restricted to prevent them from leaving the country. Saudi Arabia is the source of the second most foreign fighters with an estimated 2,500 people.


Of the countries which are not members of the OIC, Russia and France have the most foreign fighters. Proximity to the region and visa-free travel for Europeans into Turkey make it easy for European jihadists to reach Iraq and Syria. The risk of returning foreign fighters carrying out terrorist attacks in their home countries has prompted different responses from Western governments. For example, Denmark has established a reintegration program whereas Australia has criminalised travel to certain areas. France is estimated to have 180 returnees, and as of April 2014, 76 individuals had been arrested.

“ Among non-majority Muslim countries, Russia has the highest number of nationals who have travelled to fight, followed by France.

FIGURE 19

FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN IRAQ AND SYRIA FROM ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION COUNTRIES, 2015

The majority of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria come from neighbouring Middle Eastern and North African states, as well as Turkey. Tunisia has the greatest number of departing foreign fighters of any country in the world.




Source: IEP, ICSR

*ICSR High-end estimate for the UK as of December 2014.

NOTE: Estimates represent the best available figure for the number of fighters who have ever left the country, to join any armed group, including but not limited to ISIL. These figures do not reflect those who may have been arrested, been killed or have returned to their country of origin. See Annex D for more data sources.

FIGURE 20 FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN IRAQ AND SYRIA FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD, 2015

Among countries where Muslims are not in the majority, Russia and Western Europe have the highest numbers of fighters known to have travelled to Iraq and Syria.



Source: IEP, ICSR

*ICSR High-end estimate for the UK as of December 2014.

NOTE: Estimates represent the best available figure for the number of fighters who have ever left the country, to join any armed group, including but not limited to ISIL. These figures do not reflect those who may have been arrested, been killed or have returned to their country of origin. See Annex D for more data sources.

Figure 21 shows the number of foreign fighters by region. Fighters have travelled to Iraq and Syria from every one of the nine world regions. There has been significant concern from Western governments about the high numbers of individuals joining armed groups in Iraq and Syria and the potential for returnees to carry out terrorist attacks in their home countries.¹⁰





Figure 22 estimates the total number of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria at three different dates: the end of 2013, mid-2014 and mid-2015.



“ There has been significant concern from Western governments about the high numbers of individuals joining armed groups in Iraq and Syria and the potential for returnees to carry out terrorist attacks in their home countries.

TERRORISM IN WESTERN COUNTRIES

Over the last 15 years there have been a number of large and devastating terrorist attacks in Western countries. This includes the September 11 attacks which killed 2,996 people, the Madrid train bombings which killed 191, the Norwegian massacre which killed 77 and the London bombings which killed 56. However, it is important to compare these significant events with the more persistent and severe impacts of terrorism occurring in the rest of the world.

Attacks in Western countries accounted for a small percentage incidents, representing 4.4 per cent of terrorist incidents and 2.6 per cent of deaths over the last 15 years. The four large attacks listed above make up 91 per cent of deaths from terrorism in the West during this period.


In the last two decades the West has been a target by some terrorist groups based in Afghanistan or Iraq. More recently ISIL has replaced al-Qa'ida as the biggest threat for attacks in the West through lone wolf tactics. On 22 September 2014 the spokesperson of ISIL called for sympathisers to engage in attacks in Western countries.¹¹ This section of the report uses ISIL's designation of the West which includes Europe, the United States, Canada and Australia.

Despite this link between Middle-East and South Asia based terrorist groups and attacks in the West, the West is not the main focus of these groups with domestic considerations dominating their actions.

In 2014 there were 37 deaths in the 38 countries categorised as the West. This constitutes 0.11 per cent of total deaths from terrorism in 2014. In the 15 years between 2000 and 2014 there were 3,659 deaths from terrorism in the West.

FIGURE 23 DEATHS FROM TERRORISM IN WESTERN COUNTRIES, 2000-2014

Deaths from terrorism in the West constitute 2.6 per cent of all deaths in the 15 years up to 2014. Most of these deaths occurred in the September 11 attack which killed 2,996 people.



Source: START GTD

However, Western countries have also seen some of the most deadly terrorist attacks in the last 15 years. This includes the September 11 attacks which killed nearly 3,000. On its own, the September 11 attack accounts for 82 per cent of the total number of deaths from terrorism in Western countries from 2000 to 2014. The Madrid train bombings which killed nearly 200 people represents five per cent of total deaths from terrorism, whilst the Norwegian massacre which killed 77 and the London bombings which killed 56 account for around two per cent each. These attacks caused mass panic and are considered serious security breaches by citizens of the West expecting their governments to provide protection from such events.

In 2014, in the countries classified as the West, the United States had the most deaths from terrorism with 18 deaths. Eighty-two per cent of fatal attacks in the US involved a firearm where the assailant was an American citizen. Of the 19 attacks that occurred in the United States in 2014, all but five were committed by individuals. These attacks were largely motivated by right wing extremism or white supremacists.

There were eight attacks by right wing extremists undertaken by individuals or people with an affiliation to Sovereign Citizens, which is a network of individuals that have anti-government views. Two attacks were motivated by anti-government views and two attacks by anti-semitism.

Four out of the 19 attacks in the US had a jihadist element. These attacks were three shootings by Ali Muhammad Brown who cited opposition to US foreign policy as the motivation for his attacks, and the hatchet attack of police officers in New York by Zale Thompson.

TABLE 3 DEATHS FROM TERRORISM IN 2014 FOR WESTERN COUNTRIES

Of the 37 deaths from terrorism in Western countries in 2014, 18 people were killed in the United States in 2014. The eight other countries that had a fatal terrorist attack had a combined total of 19 deaths in 2014.

COUNTRY	DEATHS	ATTACKS	COUNTRY	DEATHS	ATTACKS
United States	18	19	Germany	0	12
Australia	4	7	Italy	0	7
Canada	4	2	Sweden	0	6
Belgium	4	1	Cyprus	0	4
Kosovo	2	4	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	3
Austria	2	1	Macedonia	0	3
France	1	11	Spain	0	3
Czech Republic	1	3	Bulgaria	0	1
Albania	1	2	Hungary	0	1
United Kingdom	0	102	Iceland	0	1
Ireland	0	30	Netherlands	0	1
Greece	0	26			

Australia, Belgium and Canada all recorded four deaths. The most deadly single attack in these countries occurred in Belgium where four people were killed in Brussels when a fighter who had recently returned from Syria and who had ties to ISIL opened fire at the Jewish Museum. The United Kingdom recorded the highest number of incidents with 102, however these resulted in no deaths. The majority of these attacks occurred in Northern Ireland and involved the New IRA.

The other countries which suffered fatalities from terrorism in 2014 were Kosovo, Austria, France, Czech Republic and Albania. Collectively these countries accounted for seven deaths, or 19 per cent of the total deaths seen in the West. There were more terrorist attacks in Europe than in North America, with 222 attacks occurring in Europe which is 89 per cent of attacks in the West. However, the lethality of these attacks was low with 0.05 deaths per attack compared to the global average of 2.4 deaths per attack.

THE FIVE MOST DEADLY ATTACKS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES IN 2014

1 COUNTRY: UNITED STATES

Date	8 June 2014
Fatalities	
Injuries	None
Organisation	Individual
Attack details	Gunmen ambushed two police officers eating at a restaurant and attacked a nearby Walmart in Las Vegas, Nevada. Two officers, a bystander and two assailants were killed in the attack. On social media, the assailants decried the federal government, taxes, anti-gun laws and demanded a revolution.

2 COUNTRY: BELGIUM

Date	24 May 2014
Fatalities	
Injuries	None
Organisation	Individual (former ISIL member)
Attack details	Assailants opened fire on visitors of the Jewish Museum in Brussels. Four people, including two Israeli tourists, a French tourist and a Belgian museum worker, were killed. An Islamic extremist and former ISIL member who had recently returned from Syria, claimed responsibility for the attack.

3 COUNTRY: AUSTRALIA

Date	15 November 2014
Fatalities	
Injuries	
Organisation	Individual
Attack details	An assailant took 18 people hostage in the Lindt Chocolate cafe in Sydney. After 16 hours, police stormed the cafe. The assailant and two hostages were killed and four other hostages were wounded in the attack and siege.

4 COUNTRY: CANADA

Date	22 October 2014
Fatalities	
Injuries	
Organisation	Individual
Attack details	An assailant attacked a ceremonial guard at the National War Memorial and proceeded to enter the Parliament building on Parliament Hill in Ottawa.

5 COUNTRY: CANADA

Date	20 October 2014
Fatalities	
Injuries	
Organisation	Individual
Attack details	An assailant in a vehicle struck two Canadian Armed Forces soldiers injuring one and killing the other in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec. The assailant was killed after approaching police with a knife.


The threat of terrorism to the West has been viewed as primarily coming from terrorist groups based in Afghanistan or Iraq and other Middle East and North African countries. Historically the threat was seen to be from al-Qa'ida and its affiliates. However, in recent times ISIL has overtaken al-Qa'ida as the largest perceived threat. Prior to the call for attacks in the West by the spokesperson of ISIL on 22 September 2014, there had been no sympathiser attacks in the West motivated by ISIL. However, in the ten months following the call, 21 plots which killed 15 people took place.¹² This suggests that attacks in the West have been influenced by the call by ISIL in September.

Surveys of law enforcement agencies in the United States show that jihadists have been replaced by anti-government groups as the biggest perceived threat. Instead, the anti-government group Sovereign Citizens is viewed as the biggest threat. A series of surveys conducted by researchers affiliated with START in 2014 showed that 39 per cent of law enforcement respondents thought that Islamic extremists were a serious threat. In contrast 52 per cent of respondents thought that Sovereign Citizens were a serious threat. The study consisted of surveying 4,500 officers from 2,100 agencies in the United States and was conducted in 2006 and 2014. The study was conducted only with law enforcement officers that had undertaken training related to terrorism prevention as most officers had little experience with working with the intelligence process.¹³

Sovereign Citizens are an anti-government group which are mainly linked through the internet and seminars. The group believes that the government and all workers of the government have an illegitimate claim to authority.

FIGURE 24 PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE IN WESTERN COUNTRIES THAT ARE CONCERNED ABOUT DOMESTIC ISLAMIC EXTREMISM, 2005-2015


Concern about domestic Islamic extremism has increased to the highest levels in 2015.



Source: Pew

FIGURE 25 CHANGES IN PERCEIVED THREAT OF EXTREMIST GROUPS BY US LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, FOR 2006-7 AND 2013-14

Law enforcement agencies in the United States view the anti-government group Sovereign Citizens as a bigger threat than Islamic extremists.



Source: Carter D et. al., START


LONE WOLF TERRORISM IN THE WEST

The majority of terrorist attacks in the West are not carried out by well-organised international groups. Instead, the terrorist threat in the West largely comes from lone wolf terrorism. Lone wolf terrorists are individuals or a small number of individuals who commit an attack in support of a group, movement, or ideology without material assistance or orders from such group.¹⁴ For example, the Boston bombings would be a lone wolf attack as the two brothers committed the attacks without any outside support. These types of attacks account for 70 per cent of all deaths in the West from 2006 to 2014.

FIGURE 26

DEATHS FROM LONE WOLF ATTACKS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES, 2006–2014

Seventy per cent of deaths from terrorism in Western countries were from lone wolf attacks.



Source: IEP Lone Wolf Database, START GTD

IEP coded 100 instances of lone wolf terrorism in the West from 2006 to 2014, which resulted in 164 deaths and 491 injuries. This accounts for 70 per cent of deaths and 46 per cent of injuries from terrorism over this time period.

There is not a strong relationship between the number of lone wolf attacks in a country and the number of deaths that country has from terrorism. The United States had the most lone wolf attacks with 42 and the second highest number of deaths at 52. In contrast, the United Kingdom had the second highest number of lone wolf attacks at 20 with two deaths. Norway had the most deaths but only three attacks. This discrepancy highlights that lone wolf terrorism encompasses a wide range of actors with differing motivations, aims and targets. As such, few patterns can be determined about the state of terrorism in a particular country just by assessing lone wolf terrorist attacks. What the data does show is that some countries have much higher levels of lone wolf terrorism than others. The data also demonstrates that lone wolf attacks in Western countries are not exclusively inspired by the calls for international jihad by al-Qa'ida and ISIL.

From 2006 to 2014 the three largest lone wolf attacks in the West occurred in three different countries. One individual was responsible for all 77 deaths in Norway with two attacks on the same day in 2011 that killed 77 and injured 75 people. The second largest lone wolf attack occurred in the United States when a soldier killed 13 people at a military base in Texas in 2009. Like Norway, the Netherlands also had one attacker commit all terrorist deaths. This occurred in 2009 when an individual drove his car into a crowd to try and damage the bus carrying the Dutch royal family killing seven and injuring 12 people. None of these attacks were inspired by al-Qa'ida or ISIL, but all would be classed as acts of home-grown terrorism.

The largest category of lone wolf attacks in the West was political attacks. There were 37 political lone wolf attacks which caused 110 deaths and 135 injuries. The biggest political lone wolf attack took place in Norway in 2011 when far-right terrorist Anders Breivik conducted two attacks in one day. These killed 77 people including children attending a youth camp run by a political party. The United States had the most incidents of lone wolf political terrorism with 21 different attacks, 13 of which resulted in deaths. Extremist political views were also prevalent in attacks in the United States, with lone wolf attackers motivated by a desire to bring about a political revolution, anarchism and anti-government sentiments, opposition to opponents of gay marriage and opposition to proponents of abortion.

The United States also had the most incidents of Islamic fundamentalist lone wolf attacks with 12 attacks that killed 19 and injured 308 people. The majority of deaths in the United States were from an attack by Major Nidal Malik Hasan who killed 13 and injured 32 of his fellow soldiers on a military base in Texas. This attack has been coded as jihadism due to statements made by Hasan about his motivation in the trial. The majority of injuries

BOX 2 CODING THE LONE WOLF DATABASE

Lone wolf terrorism is defined as terrorist acts committed by individuals who act alone and without the support of a terrorist organisation.

To code the Lone Wolf Database, IEP categorised attacks in the Global Terrorism Database from 2006 to 2014. Incidents were classified as lone wolf terrorism if:


- **The attack occurred in one of the 38 countries designated as the West. This includes Europe, Canada, the United States and Australia.**
- **An attack had no group claiming responsibility.**
- **There were three or fewer perpetrators.**
- **It was coded in the GTD as activity by an individual or unknown actor (i.e. the act did not involve a known terrorist group).**
- **There was no evidence of external support from a group.**

If the motivation of the attacker was unknown or it could not be established in the circumstances or through searching news accounts of the attack, then the attack was excluded from coding.

This criteria means that the Madrid bombings in 2004 and the London bombings of 2005 could not be coded as lone wolf terrorism as both bombings were conducted by groups.¹⁵

FIGURE 27 INCIDENTS AND DEATHS FROM LONE WOLF ATTACKS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES, 2006–2014

Lone wolf terrorist attacks in the West were largely confined to seven countries: Norway, United States, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Canada and Australia. Out of the 38 countries in the West, 11 countries had deaths from lone wolf terrorism and 19 had at least one lone wolf terrorist incident.



Source: IEP Lone Wolf Database, START GTD

TABLE 4 MOTIVATIONS OF LONE WOLF ATTACKS

CATEGORY	SUBCATEGORY	DEFINITION
Racial and religious supremacists	Anti-Islamic	The target chosen purely because of their association with Islam. This includes attacks on mosques and retaliation attacks.
	Anti-semitism	Motivated by a prejudice against Jews.
	White supremacist	Motivated by a racist worldview and could include identification with views of the Nazi's and the KKK.
Individual issues	Individual issues	The attack is due to issues specific to an individual. This may involve a desire to gain attention, a particular dogma or actions relating to particular delusions stemming from the influence of drugs or a mental illness.
Islamic fundamentalism	Al-Qa'ida inspired	Influenced by al-Qa'ida and undertook an attack without al-Qa'ida's involvement to further the ideology of the group.
	ISIL inspired	Influenced by ISIL and undertook an attack without ISIL's involvement to further the ideology of the group.
	Jihadism	Inspired by Islamic fundamentalism to engage in violence. The attacker may be inspired by a particular Islamist group, but is more focused on violent jihadism.
Political	Anti-American	Attack undertaken to express opposition to specific foreign policies or other actions by the United States and its allies.
	Anti-government	Anti-authoritarian motives for their attack including opposition towards the police, tax office, post office or other instruments of government. Anarchists are included in this category.
	Nationalists	The attacker was inspired by nationalism. This includes separatists.
	Political extremism	Action undertaken to promote a particular political viewpoint. This may include stances of immigration, abortion, LGBT rights or any other view. It is extremist by definition due to the violence involved.

were from the Boston Marathon bombing which killed three and injured 264 people.

There were six attacks motivated by individual issues. Included in this category is a bombing in the Czech Republic which was considered a suicide, the activity of the Italian 'Unabomber' and bombings planted by an individual in the United States in 2014 which were intended to gain the attention of the FBI.

Idiosyncratic lone wolf terrorists may operate for a long time, such as the Unabomber Ted Kaczynski who operated between 1978 and 1995.

Political motivations for lone wolf terrorism accounted for 110 deaths out of 164 in the West. The biggest cause of death was political extremism which had a total of 87 deaths. The majority of these deaths were from the attack in Norway which killed 77 people. If the Norway attack is removed then political motivations for terrorism was ten deaths or six per cent of total deaths. Anti-government motivations were responsible for 13 deaths and anti-American motivations were behind eight attacks.

Another motivation for lone wolf terrorism in the West was racial and religious supremacists. White supremacists killed 12, anti-semites killed eight, while people motivated by anti-Islamic attitudes killed one. There were at least 11 anti-Islamic attacks conducted by lone wolf terrorists, four of which happened in 2013 in the United Kingdom as part of the anti-Muslim backlash


following the murder of soldier Lee Rigby on a London street by two Islamist extremists.

Islamic fundamentalism as a motivation for terrorism was responsible for 31 deaths in the West. ISIL inspired attacks was the motivation behind five attacks and resulted in 11 deaths and al-Qa'ida inspired 14 incidents and killed seven. Overall, this accounts for 19 per cent of total deaths from lone wolf terrorism in the West.

Since 2006 there have been at least 37 incidents of lone wolf terrorism motivated by political reasons, 27 attacks by racial and religious supremacists, 25 attacks by Islamic fundamentalists and eight attacks by people motivated by individual issues. Over half of politically motivated attacks occurred in the United States. Attacks motivated by Islamic fundamentalism spiked in 2010, mainly due to five attacks in the United States by a Marine Corps reservist inspired by al-Qa'ida who shot at various military targets throughout October. Racial and religious supremacists undertook four attacks targeting Jews in France in 2012 and four anti-Islamic attacks in 2014 in Germany and the United Kingdom.

FIGURE 28 DEATHS BY LONE WOLF TERRORISTS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES BY CATEGORY, 2006-2014


Sixty-seven per cent of deaths by lone wolf terrorism in the West are political in motivation.



Source: IEP Lone Wolf Database, START GTD

FIGURE 29 NUMBER OF DEATHS FROM LONE WOLF TERRORISTS IN THE WEST BY MOTIVATION, 2006-2014


Politically motivated terrorists acts account for the most number of deaths in the West. Lone wolf attacks motivated by Islamic fundamentalism accounted for 19 per cent of total deaths.



Source: IEP Lone Wolf Database, START GTD

FIGURE 30 NUMBER OF LONE WOLF TERRORIST ATTACK IN THE WEST BY MOTIVATION, 2006–2014

Islamic fundamentalism was not the major motivation for lone wolf terrorism in 2014.



Source: IEP Lone Wolf Database, START GTD

“ Islamic fundamentalism was not the major motivation for lone wolf terrorist attacks in 2014.

TERRORISM & THE REFUGEE CRISIS

The countries with the highest number of deaths as a result of terrorism also have some of the highest levels of internally displaced people. There were over 16 million refugees and IDPs from the five countries with the highest levels of terrorism in 2014. This includes Syria, which has over seven million IDPs. Approximately 70 per cent of the UN Refugee Agency's total population of concern came from the 20 countries with the highest number of terrorism-related fatalities.

The link between refugees and IDPs and terrorism appears even starker in figure 31. There were 11 countries that had more than 500 deaths from terrorism in 2014. Apart from Cameroon, all of these countries had the highest levels of refugees and IDPs in the world. Cameroon ranked as having the 30 highest levels of refugees and IDPs in the world. The world's 60 million displaced people are fleeing traditional armed conflict, political persecution and other forms of violence in addition to terrorism. Figure 33 highlights the number of first-time asylum seeker applications to the EU for four countries of the five countries with the highest deaths from terrorism. These four countries are all accessible to Europe by land: Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Syria. Each country had more first-time asylum applications lodged in the first seven months of 2015 than in all of 2014.

While Europe struggles to accommodate the recent influx of arrivals, Turkey, Pakistan and Lebanon continue to host nearly one third of the world's refugees, or 4.25 million displaced people. Figure 32 highlights the foreign refugee populations in 2014.

Amidst the recent rise in displacement, concerns have surfaced about the link between refugees and future acts of terrorism, with Western countries expressing fears that accepting refugees will leave them vulnerable to violence. Anecdotal evidence suggests that refugee camps and their associated conditions of poverty, insecurity and vulnerability can serve as so-called breeding grounds for terrorism.

Of the ten countries which host the most refugees only one country, Pakistan, had among the highest levels of terrorism. Turkey, Lebanon and Iran are all impacted by regional conflict and yet had fewer terrorism-related fatalities than many countries which do not host large numbers of refugees. Germany, the country with the second largest refugee intake in Europe, has not had a death from terrorism since 2007.


BOX 3 THE 2015 REFUGEE CRISIS

At the start of 2015, nearly 60 million people worldwide were displaced from their homes by violence and violent conflict, including terrorism. This is the highest number of forcibly displaced people since the end of the Second World War. There are 12 million refugees and IDPs from Syria alone, more than half of the Syrian population. The majority of Syrian refugees have fled to the neighbouring countries of Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq. In the first seven months of 2015 the number of first-time asylum seeker applications in the EU reached 1.9 million. This is four times the figure for the entire year of 2008. However, these applications represent just three per cent of the world's displaced people.

As the refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey filled and winter ended, hundreds of thousands of Syrians embarked on international journeys to seek safety in European countries. From January until August 2015 there have been nearly half a million Syrians applying for asylum in Europe. They are joined by a half million Afghans, Iraqis, Pakistanis and Nigerians. As violent conflicts and terrorism continue in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Nigeria, the flow of migrants seeking refuge in Europe is likely to continue.

FIGURE 31 AVERAGE NUMBER OF IDPs/REFUGEES BY LEVEL OF TERRORISM FATALITIES, 2014


Countries which have the highest levels of refugees and IDPs also have the most deaths from terrorism.



Source: IDMC, UNHCR, START GTD

FIGURE 32 SHARE OF WORLD REFUGEE POPULATION BY COUNTRY OF REFUGEE, 2014


Turkey, Pakistan and Lebanon host nearly one third of the total population of refugees and people in refugee-like situations. Only Pakistan ranks among the ten countries most affected by refugees and most affected by terrorism.



Source: UNHCR

FIGURE 33 NUMBER OF FIRST-TIME ASYLUM SEEKER APPLICATIONS TO EUROPE VS DEATHS FROM TERRORISM

In countries that have high levels of terrorism, there appears to be a relationship between proportional increases in terrorism and proportional increases in asylum seeker applications to Europe.



Source: Eurostat, START GTD

ECONOMIC COSTS OF TERRORISM

The global economic costs of terrorism are at the highest level since at least 2001. It is estimated that in 2014 the global economic costs of terrorism reached US\$52.9 billion, with a total economic impact of US\$105.8 billion. This was calculated using IEP's economic cost of violence methodology which measures the direct and indirect costs from the loss of life, destruction of property and losses from ransom payments. The economic impact refers to the direct and indirect costs in the current year represented in constant 2014 US\$.

Quantifying the total global economic costs of terrorism is complicated. The direct costs of terrorism include the direct loss of life and damage to property from a terrorist attack. Measuring the indirect costs is less tangible and precise. For example, studies trying to assess the cost of the September 11 attack have estimates ranging from US\$35 billion to US\$109 billion.¹⁶ In addition, there are many different types and methods of terrorist attacks. The difference in type, size and severity of attacks makes a generalisation of the economic cost of an attack difficult to quantify.

KEY FINDINGS

- The global economic costs of terrorism reached the highest ever level in 2014 at US\$52.9 billion, up from \$32.9 billion in 2013.
- However, compared to other forms of violence, the losses from terrorism are relatively small. For instance, costs associated with violent crime and homicide are 32 times higher than losses from terrorism.
- IEP has aggregated global national security expenditures, finding that the world spends approximately US\$117 billion on national security agencies which are tasked with preventing terrorist activity.
- The countries most affected by terrorism have had their economic growth and foreign direct investment negatively affected. In other countries the economic effect is minor.

The costs of a particular terrorist attack, particularly large scale events, can be significant. However, most terrorist attacks are relatively small and other forms of violence lead to a much greater human and economic cost.

The methodology used to calculate the economic costs of terrorism is conservative. It mainly involves counting the lost wages of the injured and deceased and the immediate flow on effects on family and friends. The study does not estimate additional costs such as the increased level of security guards or higher insurance premiums, or broader economic impacts such as city gridlock after an attack. When comparing terrorism costs to other forms of violence, such as homicides, similar costing approaches have been adopted for comparability.

For most countries, terrorism does not have a meaningful impact on economic growth and foreign direct investment (FDI). However, for very large terrorist events or countries with very high levels of terrorism, there can be very notable economic impacts. This is especially true for the ten countries most affected by terrorism.

For instance, very large attacks like September 11 can have a significant economic impact. The loss of life and destruction of infrastructure from September 11 is estimated to be US\$14 billion in New York alone. Very significant levels of terrorism

can also cause large decreases in output. In Nigeria, FDI decreased by 30 per cent due to increased levels of terrorism in 2010. Further, terrorist events in Israel in 2001 were said to have decreased GDP by one per cent.¹⁷

As can be seen in figure 34, in 2014, IEP estimates the direct global costs of terrorism amounted to US\$52.9 billion. This is a 61 per cent increase from the previous year's total of \$32.9 billion, and over a tenfold increase since 2000. The vast majority of the costs stem from injury and death.

Since 2000, there has been a growing trend towards minor bombings and explosions and a decrease in major property attacks, defined as those causing over \$1 million of damage.¹⁸

Figure 35 on page 65 highlights that the losses from terrorism in 2014 are \$52.9 billion compared to \$1.7 trillion for the losses from violent crime and homicide. This equates to a 32 times difference.

FIGURE 34 THE COSTS OF TERRORISM, US\$ BILLIONS, 2000–2014

Based on IEP’s methodology, the global economic costs of terrorism reached the highest ever level in 2015 at \$52.9 billion. Figures reported in constant 2014 US\$ billions.



Source: IEP Calculations

NOTE: Figures include property damage from the September 11 attacks.¹⁹

BOX 4 ECONOMIC COST OF TERRORISM METHODOLOGY AT A GLANCE

IEP has developed a methodology which assesses the annual direct and indirect costs of terrorism. The methodology for counting the economic cost of terrorist events was included in IEP’s 2015 Global Peace Index report and has been updated for this report with the most up-to-date data. The calculation includes the direct and some of the indirect costs from the loss of life and injury from terrorism. The method used is similar to the methodology for counting the costs of homicides and assault. IEP has broken down the cost of terrorism by type, covering bombings and explosions, infrastructure attacks, armed assault, hijackings, hostage taking, assassinations and unarmed assault.

Within the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) events are coded by the level of property damage in four categories: unknown; minor; major; and catastrophic. The GTD records the costs associated with particular terrorist incidents. IEP calculates the average cost by type of attack for each of the four property categories and then bands the costs by national per capita income to determine average unit costs which are then scaled across each event recorded in the GTD. The total cost of each category of terrorism is shown in table 5. For more details on the costings methodology refer to Annex E of this report.

TABLE 5
TOTAL COST OF TERRORISM BY TYPE
IN 2014, US\$ MILLIONS

EVENT	TOTAL COSTS (US\$ MILLIONS)
Death	\$51,275.00
Injuries	\$918.00
Bombing/explosion	\$410.00
Facility/infrastructure attack	\$104.00
Armed assault	\$99.00
Hijacking	\$67.00
Hostage taking (barricade incident)	\$12.00
Hostage taking (kidnapping)	\$8.00
Unarmed assault	\$3.00
Assassination	\$2.00
TOTAL	\$52,898.00

ECONOMIC COST OF GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO TERRORISM

As terrorist activity increases, insecurity within societies also increases with governments responding by increasing spending on counterterrorism enforcement, national security agencies and the military. This section compares the losses from direct terrorism activity to the costs borne by government in containing and mitigating the potential for terrorist violence.

Since September 11 various national governments, including the United States, have significantly expanded their national security architecture. National security agencies generally are defined as government organisations in charge of monitoring, collecting and processing information for intelligence and counter intelligence purposes. According to Hippner and IEP research, global security agency costs totaled US\$117 billion in 2014.²⁰ The activities of these organisations are related to a range of security functions and it is not possible to disaggregate the proportion of national security agency activity that is specifically related to dealing with terrorist activity.

The United States accounts for 70 per cent of total global spending on national security agencies. It is estimated that from 2001 to 2014 domestic security agency expenditure in the United States has been US\$1.1 trillion, an average of US\$73 billion a year. While national security agency expenditure isn't fully devoted to counterterrorism, it is a major component of most intelligence agencies in the developed world. Forty-four per cent of expenditure by the United States domestic security agencies is estimated to be devoted towards counterterrorism.²¹ In the United Kingdom 81 per cent of the resource budget of MI5 is devoted to domestic and international counter-terrorism. Expenditure by MI5 on Northern Ireland-related counter-terrorism activities alone totalled more than US\$2.28 billion in 2014.²² This highlights the large investment committed by various governments to counter clandestine terrorist groups.

The following analysis on security expenditure focuses on two countries, the United States and the United Kingdom. This is due to the high levels of transparency in the national accounts of these countries. Other countries, such as Russia or China, may have higher per capita expenses but there is not the transparency to allow for meaningful analysis.

As can be seen in figure 35, the direct expenditures on containing terrorism are generally much larger than the economic losses caused by terrorism. For instance, in 2014 the United States spent US\$115 per capita on national security agencies. However, the per capita economic losses from terrorism were only 61 cents per annum. This does not suggest

BOX 5

UNITED STATES SECURITY EXPENDITURE

The US security budget is calculated from the combined accounts of the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). Both accounts are comprised of 13 departments: CIA, FBI, DoS, DCP, MI, AF ISR, MCIA, ONI, SOCOM, NSA, DIA, NGA and the Office of Intelligence Support. The budget for the above departments totaled \$75 billion in 2010. This does not take into account the department of homeland security which, if added, would add an additional \$59 billion.


more or less should be spent on terrorism containment because the critical data on how effective each dollar spent on counterterrorism is simply not available. Also, because terrorist events have a 'black swan' nature in that they can be large, unpredictable and occur infrequently, rational risk frameworks are very difficult to apply to counterterrorism spending.

Conversely, when looking at the equivalent ratio in relation to interpersonal violence and police spending, the United States spends US\$281 per capita on police services and encounters US\$988 worth of losses per capita from homicides and violent assault. A similar ratio of spending to losses is seen in the United Kingdom where per capita losses from terrorism were only 15 cents, whereas US\$40 per capita was spent on counterterrorism programs. In contrast, the United Kingdom had an average of US\$888 per capita of losses from interpersonal violence compared to US\$231 of expenditure on containment of that violence via policing.

Relative comparisons of police spending versus national security agency expenditures in the United States and the United Kingdom find that more expenditure per crime is committed to preventing violence from terrorism versus interpersonal violence. The significant expense on counterterrorism underscores the impact that the fear of terrorism has on the general population.

FIGURE 35 COSTS OF TERRORISM COMPARED TO COST OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE, US\$ MILLIONS, 2014


Terrorism is not the most costly form of violence. Interpersonal violence costs 32 times more and accounts for 13 times more violent deaths.



Source: IEP Calculations

FIGURE 36 EXPENDITURE AND LOSSES PER CAPITA FOR TERRORISM COMPARED TO INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE IN THE US AND THE UK, 2014

In 2014 counter terrorism expenditure in the United States and the United Kingdom was 186 and 263 times larger than the losses incurred. In contrast, the cost of interpersonal violence is three to four times higher than expenditure for both countries.



Source: IEP Calculations

NOTE: Costs for terrorism were taken from the portion of security agency costs which are allocated to counterterrorism programs. This is 44 per cent in the US as per Stewart, Ellingwood and Mueller (2011) and 81 per cent in the UK as per MI5's budget. The calculation does not take into account the costs from the Department of Homeland Security in the US. The costs of interpersonal violence are calculated from IEP's economic costs of violence methodology. This takes into account the costs of homicide and violent crime. The expenditure on interpersonal violence is only a measure of the costs of police. All estimations are converted to per capita terms using population data from the IMF.

TERRORISM & ECONOMIC GROWTH

Many countries which experience high levels of terrorism also have high levels of internal armed conflict. As a result it is difficult to separate the effects of terrorism on the economic performance of these countries from the economic impact of the conflict.²³

While economic growth and output can be negatively affected by acts of terrorism, there is not a uniform relationship across all countries. The literature defining the indirect economic effects of terrorism shows mixed and often contradictory results. Further, the effect terrorism has on output is significantly affected by government type, level of development and location.²⁴

There is no significant correlation between the GTI and GDP growth, with an r value of 0.09 over a ten year period. Analysis of FDI to terrorism shows a similarly weak statistical relationship with a correlation of $r=0.18$.


The diverse nature of terrorism, the resilience of an economy and the level of security are all influential factors which can determine how costly terrorism is on a country's economy. Research shows that the September 11 terrorist attacks had little effect on US FDI,²⁵ and that FDI in Spain actually increased by

US\$6 billion in 2005 following the 2004 Madrid train bombings.²⁶ Conversely, decreased FDI flows were attributed to terrorism in Greece and Spain in the 1980s and 1990s and were worth up to US\$500 million to each nation.²⁷ Similarly, the effect of terrorism on FDI in Nigeria was substantial. It has been estimated that FDI flows dropped US\$6.1 billion in 2010 due to Boko Haram.²⁸ This represents a decline of almost 30 per cent from the previous fiscal year. This is further supported by a recent study which found that the ten most affected countries had decreased GDP growth rates of between 0.51 and 0.8 per cent, while also reducing investment growth by 1.3 to 2 per cent. Using a similar methodology, IEP has calculated that Iraq has lost US\$159 billion PPP since 2005.

While terrorism does have an impact on economic performance, it is only visible in countries experiencing a large number of attacks. Terrorism often occurs in countries with limited institutional capacity or low levels of development. Under these circumstances, terrorist events can have a significant effect on output, investment and growth.

FIGURE 37 IRAQ'S TOTAL ACCUMULATED LOSSES TO GDP FROM TERRORISM, 2005-2014

Terrorism is estimated to have cost Iraq a total of US\$159 billion PPP since 2005. This is equivalent to 32 per cent of the country's 2014 GDP.



Source: IEP Calculations

CORRELATES & DRIVERS OF TERRORISM

IEP has conducted a wide range of statistical tests comparing levels of terrorism to over 5,000 datasets, indices and attitudinal surveys to find the most significant factors linked to terrorist activity. The results show that terrorism is highly related to the levels of political violence as measured by the Political Terror Scale and ongoing conflict within a country. Around 55 per cent of all terrorist attacks between 1989 and 2014 occurred in countries that at the time were in a period of violent internal conflict. An additional 33 per cent occurred in countries that were involved in a civil conflict involving international powers.

What this suggests is that in a majority of cases, terrorist activity is intrinsically linked to the broader safety and security environment of states. The grievances that drive these much larger conflicts also tend to drive terrorist activity.

In countries that are not undergoing internal violent conflict, socio-economic drivers correlate more prominently with terrorist attacks.

KEY FINDINGS

- Terrorist activity is highly correlated to the level of political terror and violent conflict. Ninety-two per cent of all attacks since 1989 occurred in countries with high levels of political terror.
- Since 1989, 88 per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries that were experiencing or involved in violent conflicts.
- Less than 0.6 per cent of all terrorist attacks since 1989 occurred in countries without any ongoing conflict and any form of political terror.
- In OECD countries socio-economic factors such as youth unemployment, confidence in the press, belief in democracy, drug crime and attitudes towards immigration correlate significantly with the GTI. In non-OECD countries factors such as a history of armed conflict, ongoing conflict within the country, corruption and a weak business environment are more strongly correlated.
- Higher levels of political terror, lower respect for human rights, the existence of policies targeting religious freedoms, group grievances, political instability and lower respect for institutions like the UN or the EU all correlate with higher levels of terrorism.

Terrorism is driven by a variety of country-specific factors and individual characteristics. Reasons that people join FARC will be different to those who join ISIL, which will again be different to those who perpetrate lone wolf attacks. IEP analysis finds that there are different factors statistically associated with terrorism which are based on a country's level of development and history. Two groups, OECD and non-OECD countries, were analysed against a large set of socio-economic data and yielded different results.

In OECD countries, socio-economic factors such as youth unemployment, confidence in the press, faith in democracy, drug crime and attitudes towards immigration correlate significantly with the GTI. This suggests that social disenfranchisement is a leading cause of terrorist activity. This reflects the key finding that over 70 per cent of deaths from terrorism in the OECD from 2006 to 2014 were committed by lone wolf terrorists.

In non-OECD countries terrorist activity is mostly perpetrated by organisations with a broader political, religious or ideological agenda. Other factors such as a history of armed conflict, corruption and a weak business environment feature more prominently in the correlation results.

However, there are important commonalities between OECD and non-OECD countries as well. Higher levels of political terror, lower respect for human rights, the existence of policies targeting religious freedoms, group grievances, political instability and lower respect for the UN or the EU all correlate with higher levels of terrorism.

There are also factors that notably do not correlate. For instance, percentages of religious denominations or migrants as a per cent of the total population does not correlate with the GTI for both OECD and non-OECD countries.

TABLE 6 KEY CORRELATIONS WITH THE GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX

Correlates of terrorism are different for OECD and non-OECD countries reflecting the different nature of terrorist activity in these countries. However there are important global correlations — political instability, policies restricting religious freedoms and political terror all correlate for both groups.

NON-OECD ONLY	GLOBAL	OECD ONLY	FACTORS THAT DID NOT CORRELATE FOR ANY GROUP
Ongoing conflict	High group grievances	Negative perception of immigration	Extreme poverty \$2 a day (PPP)
Violent demonstrations	Greater political terror	High militarisation	Extreme poverty \$2.5 a day (PPP)
Weaker business environment	Safety and security	Low confidence in the press	Extreme poverty \$5 a day (PPP)
Factionalised elites	Religious violence	High perception of criminality	Primary school enrolment rate
History of intergroup violence	Low respect for human rights	High income inequality	Secondary school enrolment
	Existence of violent political organisations	Lower government effectiveness	Tertiary school enrolment
	Policies targeting religious freedoms	Wider access to small arms	GDP per capita PPP
	Lower respect for international law	Lower confidence in education system	Infant mortality rate
	Political instability	Higher youth unemployment	
		Higher urbanisation	
		Lower faith in democracy	
		Lower social cohesion	
		Lower confidence in education	
		Higher drug crime	

NOTE: The cut off for significance was $r=0.47$; for the full table of correlations refer to Annex F.

“ Higher levels of political terror, lower respect for human rights, the existence of policies targeting religious freedoms, group grievances, political instability and lower respect for the UN or the EU all correlate with higher levels of terrorism.

THE LINK BETWEEN POLITICAL TERROR & TERRORISM

Political Terror is defined as state sanctioned or state perpetrated violence against its citizens.²⁹ Examples of political terror include political imprisonment, state-sanctioned extrajudicial killings, torture and mass violence against civilians.


To analyse the link between the levels of political terror and terrorism carried out by non-state actors, the GTI was correlated to the Political Terror Scale, a one-to-five scale with one reflecting no political imprisonment and five reflecting unrestrained political terror which is waged against the whole of the population.³⁰ Terrorism correlates significantly with the Political Terror Scale with $r= 0.69$. Extrajudicial killings by government officials without due process of law, measured by the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project hold a significant correlation of $r=-0.65$ with the GTI. This also includes murders by private groups that have been instigated by the government.

IEP has analysed the location of all terrorist attacks included in START's Global Terrorism Database in which at least one person was killed between 1989 and 2014. Figure 38 highlights that 92 per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries where the Political Terror Scale was very high. Fifteen of the countries with the highest levels of terrorism in 2014 also had very poor Political Terror Scale scores in 2002.

FIGURE 38

POLITICAL TERROR AND TERRORISM, 1989–2014

Around 92 per cent of all terrorist attacks between 1989 and 2014 occurred in countries where violent political terror was widespread.



Source: START GTD, Political Terror Scale

“ 92 per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries where the Political Terror Scale was very high.

THE LINK BETWEEN ONGOING CONFLICT & TERRORISM


Terrorist activity historically occurs within nations that are also experiencing broader internal armed conflict. IEP has compared the location of all terrorist attacks to all battle-related deaths resulting from conflicts involving at least one state actor³¹ and has found that 55 per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries in the midst of an internal armed conflict.³² Additionally another 33 per cent occurred in countries that were either experiencing or involved in an internationalised conflict.

Figure 39 highlights the percentage of terrorist attacks that occur in the context of different types of conflict. Between 1989 and the end of 2014 less than 0.6 per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries without any ongoing conflict and with the lowest levels of political terror.

Figure 40 highlights the close link between levels of terrorism and levels of conflict. This is measured by comparing the GTI to the Global Peace Index (GPI) sub-domain 'Ongoing Conflict' which measures the number, intensity and duration of a country's involvement in either internal or external conflicts.

FIGURE 39 PERCENTAGE OF TERRORIST ATTACKS THAT OCCURRED IN COUNTRIES WITH ONGOING CONFLICT, BY TYPE, 1989-2014


Eighty-eight per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries that were experiencing or involved in violent conflicts. Eleven per cent of terrorist attacks occurred in countries that at the time were not involved in conflict. Less than 0.6 per cent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries without any ongoing conflict and any form of political terror.



Source: START GTD, UCDP

FIGURE 40 IMPACT OF TERRORISM (2015 GTI) VERSUS AVERAGE ONGOING CONFLICT SCORE (2008–2015)

Terrorism is significantly correlated to conflict. Involvement in external conflicts by OECD members correlates with higher impacts from terrorism.



Source: IEP

“ Less than 0.6 per cent of all terrorist attacks since 1989 occurred in countries without any ongoing conflict and any form of political terror.

Figure 40 highlights the strong relationship between the levels of terrorism and armed conflict. Globally the link between conflict and countries that have been targets of terrorism correlates at $r = 0.66$. This trend is also statistically significant in OECD countries at a level of $r = 0.53$. This is due to the military involvement of many OECD members in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

WHY INDIVIDUALS BECOME FOREIGN FIGHTERS FOR VIOLENT EXTREMISTS GROUPS

One of the most pressing issues, particularly in Western countries, is understanding why individuals become violent extremists.

This is an important question with limited good quality data to inform evidence-based research. Access to violent extremists for qualitative studies is limited and individuals who have joined terrorist groups have done so for vastly different reasons based on their own socio-economic, political and ideological world views.

This makes generalisations difficult. What is commonly agreed from the available data is that there is no single ‘terrorist profile’ that can be used to identify at risk individuals reliably.³³ Given that radicalisation can happen very quickly, in months or weeks in some cases, countering violent extremism (CVE) needs to take a broad view of risk factors and assess vulnerability accordingly.³⁴

To understand violent extremism, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) undertook a qualitative study of 2,032 individuals who chose to leave their home countries to fight for al-Qa’ida primarily against the United States and its allies. The sources were primarily drawn from interviews from detainees of coalition forces in Afghanistan, Iraq and Guantanamo Bay. Data was augmented with additional sources such as captured documents, interviews with family or friends and public records.³⁵ The dataset was made entirely of male subjects as very few females were on record for becoming a foreign member of al-Qa’ida.³⁶


The results of the USIP study found that individuals who chose to travel to fight for al-Qa’ida:

- Were not ‘crazy’ or psychopathic — they had made a measured choice to fight for al-Qa’ida. Furthermore, the appeal of groups like al-Qa’ida is that they only recruit the most devout and reliable people. People with anti-social behaviour tend to be unreliable in practice.
- Were not from one economic profile — some had been long-term unemployed whilst others were from privileged backgrounds.
- Had an inadequate understanding of Islam — many were raised in households where faith was routinely practised but was not a dominating force.
- Were not approached by al-Qa’ida but rather sought out membership.

Figure 41 shows the prevalence of four broad motivations developed by USIP to assess individuals that joined al-Qa’ida. These were ‘identity seeking’, ‘revenge seeking/anger’, ‘status seeking’ and ‘thrill seeking’. The most common motivation was ‘identity seeking’. Anger and status seeking followed with 30 and 25 per cent respectively. The thrill seeker accounted for the least at five per cent.³⁷ Interestingly, similar motivations can be found in right-wing extremism where alienation, culture and identity have been found to be contributing factors to membership.³⁸

FIGURE 41 MOTIVATIONS FOR FOREIGN FIGHTERS JOINING AL-QA’IDA, 2010

Identity was the largest reason that foreign fighters joined al-Qa’ida, followed by anger, status and thrill seeking.



Source: USIP

Such results are perhaps not surprising considering that most foreign fighter recruits are between the ages of 15 to 35.³⁹

High levels of idle youth who are not in employment, education or training correlates with the GTI at $r= 0.48$. In the OECD negative perceptions of immigration correlated at $r=0.71$ with the GTI.

Lack of inclusion and engagement can fuel feelings of isolation and alienation. This then can lead to anger and finally to seeking revenge. Many alienated individuals seek an identity group where they feel welcomed and belong. In other cases, the desire for status is more important as individuals seek to assert their skills and personality to a goal. Finally, in societies where engagement and satisfaction of youth is low, thrill seeking can emerge as a driver.

A common policy recommendation of CVE approaches is the need to propose counter-narratives to the messaging of jihadi and right-wing extremist groups. This can be in the form of religious refutation and reframing common myths around the attractions of violent extremism.⁴⁰

The USIP study suggested that, in particular, thrill seekers were most likely to defect once the harsh realities of conflict failed to live up to their expectations. The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) recently surveyed 58 defectors from ISIL and found that infighting and brutality against other Muslims, especially Sunni, was a major cause for defection. Quality of life is also a significant factor along with the realisation that corruption and un-Islamic behaviour was prominent among the ISIL ranks. Positive steps towards the goals of CVE include effectively communicating such experiences to youth at risk while focusing on social cohesion, inclusion and providing adequate opportunities.

The USIP study offers important insights into the motivations of individuals joining al-Qa'ida as a foreign fighter. However, reasons people may join other organisations can vary depending on the situation and the circumstances. Economic incentives are known to play an important part for some in the decision to pursue violent extremism.⁴¹ In other cases, martyrdom and social encouragement can play a larger role. Martyrdom may bring social kudos and benefits to a perpetrator's family.⁴² In other examples, children and youth are abducted and forced into service by terrorist organisations.⁴² Such motivations highlight the non-existence of a 'one-size-fits-all' approach to combatting terrorism.⁴³ It is important that further research is funded to continue to understand the multidimensional motivations and mitigate risks.

COUNTERTERRORISM & COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM SYSTEM DYNAMICS

Traditional counterterrorism approaches target terrorist activity directly through increased security measures. However, as the understanding about the drivers of terrorism improves, discussion has shifted to prevention strategies so as to reduce the pool of individuals that may choose to participate in terrorist activities. Recently the term countering violent extremism has entered public debate for just this reason. CVE aims to understand the interplay of the social, economic, political and ideological push and pull factors to inform prevention programs.

This report highlights that the factors that correlate with terrorism differ from country to country. In non-OECD countries, terrorism occurs on a larger scale and in the context of ongoing armed conflict and extensive political terror. In OECD countries, terrorism is correlated to lower levels of social cohesion and lack of opportunity. In recognition of this diversity, CVE programs employ different strategies to tailor to local contexts. In the case of terrorism occurring in the midst of extensive political terror and ongoing conflict, CVE will often overlap with general peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations within the region.⁴⁵ In the developed world, CVE programs can overlap with holistic policing strategies and broader social and economic policy on youth employment and training as well as social cohesion.


Figure 42 depicts a systems diagram that combines the correlates of terrorism with a summary of the CVE literature. Traditional counterterrorism is shown to be intrinsically linked to violent extremist activity. However, at the centre of the system is the individual or group who have a grievance within society but have not yet aligned with violent extremism. CVE programs target factors, individuals and groups before violent extremism is pursued. These can include whole-of-community approaches such as educating students at schools to the dangers of violent extremism. CVE can also be directed at individuals and groups identified as being at risk of being drawn to violent extremism and offering alternatives paths.⁴⁶

Counterterrorism and CVE are both needed to tackle violent extremism. Figure 42 depicts the factors that lead individual and groups towards or away from terrorism. Counterterrorism approaches need to be sensitive to the factors driving terrorism and avoid further alienating individuals at risk.⁴⁷

The systems map in figure 42 was derived through correlations which show how different factors relate to each other. This does not mean that IEP has identified all the causes of terrorism: the systems map does not explain when specific causal factors are active. However, it does reflect statistically significant factors which aid in explaining potential drivers of terrorism and violent extremism.

FIGURE 42 SYSTEMS MAP OF GTI CORRELATES

This is a visual representation of the key correlations with the GTI from over 5,000 socio-economic datasets. Arrows depict flows of influence.



EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS

ISIL INC.: A PORTRAIT OF A MODERN TERRORIST ENTERPRISE

Dr Christina Schori Liang, Senior Programme Advisor and Senior Fellow,
Emerging Security Challenges Programme, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)

INTRODUCTION

In the past year the world became fixated on the rise of the Islamic State (ISIL), the richest and most violent terrorist group in modern history. It is gathering extremist fighters from around the globe to support its goal of establishing a “lasting and expanding” caliphate. ISIL has eclipsed all other terrorist groups on the world stage by transforming terror from a regional to a global security threat. This is due to its ability to establish and govern a semi-functioning autonomous territory, its use of 21st century marketing tools to create an international brand, and its strategy of attracting foreign fighters. ISIL’s power is also due to its unprecedented wealth, which is based on diverse and sophisticated financing strategies.

The West’s reaction to ISIL has been driven largely by a desire for regional stability and fears that ISIL-fuelled terrorism will spread to its borders. So far the US and its 60 member coalition in 2014-2015 have spent most of their war chest on kinetic power. The coalition claims to have targeted some 13,781 assets ranging from armored vehicles to oil facilities. The cost of the campaign from August 2014 to October 2015 had an average cost of US\$11 million per day, or a total of US\$4.75 billion.¹

Despite this investment, ISIL has proven to be resilient. Indeed, its reach has been spreading far beyond the Levant and Mesopotamia. ISIL has been engaging in attacks in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen. It has received support or affiliation from 42 international groups, of which 30 have pledged formal affiliation, and 12 have pledged support. Groups such as Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, the Okba Ibn Nafaa Battalion in Tunisia and Ansar Beit al-Maqdis in the Egyptian Sinai have carried out attacks, and pro-ISIL factions have begun to emerge in Algeria and Gaza while splinter factions from Afghanistan and Pakistan have sent fighters to the Syria-Iraqi battlefields. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) declared its support to ISIL, and in 2014, the Indonesian Abu Sayyaf Group announced its allegiance as well.²

The West’s inability to contain ISIL stems from its singular perception that it is a rogue state and nothing more. ISIL is indeed now a real, if nascent and unrecognised, state actor. ISIL does not operate out of a safe haven within a sponsor state; it has become a de facto state that provides a safe haven for terrorists, ruthlessly and mercilessly administrating a territory. However ISIL has

become much more than a hostile state entity; it is also a successful criminal enterprise. The West has so far failed to impede the ISIL’s financial gains which are marked by a fluidity and wealth never seen before. ISIL’s diverse financial portfolio makes it the richest terrorist organisation in history, with an estimated wealth of 2 billion US\$. The aim of this paper is to examine the business side of ISIL and to put forward that the West’s strategy to fight ISIL should take a much broader and more holistic approach.

THE ISIL BUSINESS STRATEGY

ISIL is effective because it runs its criminal/terrorist enterprise with a business acumen that has no historical precedent. The predecessor of ISIL, the Islamic State of Iraq, compiled a list of ‘lessons learned’ based on what it perceived as al-Qa’ida’s failure in effectively using its financial resources. Among these were the failure to distribute funds among local cells and the inability to acquire a regular funding source.³ Based on al-Qa’ida’s failures, ISIL redesigned a modern business strategy to run its terrorist enterprise.

ISIL also has a corporate plan which originates from a blueprint designed by Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khifani, a former

colonel in the intelligence service of Saddam Hussein's air defence force. Also known as the "Lord of the Shadows", he meticulously designed the original structure of ISIL. His master plan represents the source code of how to create and run an "Islamic Intelligence State" resembling the Stasi, East Germany's notorious domestic intelligence agency.⁴ The plan articulates how to recruit followers, how to identify sources of income, and how to target influential families and military opponents. ISIL is also results-oriented: it has articulated its strategic goals, complete with a 2020 vision and 14 key indicators that measure its monthly performance and investments from region to region. To emphasise its transparency and professionalism, it publishes an annual report which sets out its business strategy of terror and destruction, including specific investments, down to the cost of each suicide mission.

THE ISIL BRAND

Moreover, ISIL has effectively managed its strategic branding. It uses online media tools to disseminate its vision of the caliphate. Similar to a start-up business, it retains its competitive advantage with its al-Hayat Media arm which oversees several media divisions and provides each province content that pays tribute to fighters and extols battlefield exploits. Its strategic messaging and use of media as a psychological weapon in war is used tactically to magnify its power, attract foreign fighters and new citizens, and win greater economic resources. It has not only populated social media platforms but has attracted a global network of supporters that articulate, magnify and circulate its violent extremist messages worldwide. So far little has been done to counter the ISIL's digital campaign.⁵

One of the most powerful tools of the ISIL is the creation of its brand and image, linked to the notion that it is a modern-day "caliphate". By creating this notion, ISIL presents itself as the vanguard of militant Islam, the only legitimate jihadist movement to hold territory and govern a pseudo state. It claims to offer an "authentic" way of life different from secularism. The ISIL propaganda machine maintains that it is providing medical, social, policing, and rescue services and an effective administration.⁶

ISIL has attempted to preserve its public service personnel in their jobs through pre-existing governance structures. Some

services are even financed by Baghdad, which has continued to pay public employees. ISIL profits from this arrangement by forcing state employees to give "zakat" a percentage of their salary. ISIL obligates financially capable Muslims to pay a sum of their money and assets to the Caliph's treasury. ISIL has a Zakat Department which is responsible for collecting the fee, it claims to use the money for locals in need. A research paper published earlier this month by Aymenn al-Tamimi found that ISIL documents obtained from pro- and anti-Islamic State sources pointed to a "bureaucratic system with a level of complexity and professionalism that probably makes the Islamic State sustainable, even under containment."⁷

The claim to be the true Islamic State has facilitated the group's recruitment of Westerners, thousands of whom have flocked to join its ranks. The appeal to join is rooted deeper than just the romanticised rise of an Islamic fighting force; the caliphate is also appealing to more secular interests by advertising jobs, a regular monthly salary, a wife or husband, and in some cases even a home.

ISIL maintains that the new "caliphate is all inclusive and allows Muslims to practice their religion without discrimination." Even those with criminal or troubled pasts have the opportunity to become extraordinary overnight. ISIL's appeal was captured in statement by Canadian foreign fighter Abu Muslim al-Canadi (André Poulin) in a September 2014 video released by ISIL.

You know, there's a role for everybody. Every person can contribute something to the Islamic State...If you cannot fight, then you give money, if you cannot give money then you can assist in technology, and if you can't assist in technology you can use some other skills.⁸

ISIL's military prowess is also attractive to many. ISIL leadership includes former officers in the military and intelligence services of the Saddam Hussein regime. ISIL's military as of September 2015 has attracted approximately 25,000 foreign fighters from over 100 different countries, including 4,500 Westerners.⁹ Foreign fighters bring with them new skills, and they are offered the highest salaries ranging from US\$400-1,200 a month.¹⁰ Salaries are a magnet for attracting fighters in Syria: there are accounts that some Free Syrian Army fighters left their US\$60 per month positions to join Jabhat al-Nusra group

who offered US\$300; ultimately they joined ISIL which offered the highest salaries, housing and career advancement.¹¹

In addition to fresh troops, foreign fighters also provide ISIL with new income, either by depositing funds that are later accessed in areas near ISIL or by bringing cash. ISIL also solicits funds online via Skype and Twitter or via money remitters, and international prepaid cards.¹²

OIL

Oil is the black gold of ISIL. As of September 2015, ISIL controls 10 oilfields in Syria and Iraq. Oil wealth serves several purposes: it provides energy needs for the estimated 10 million civilians living in ISIL controlled territory and it helps fuel the war machine. More importantly, oil is used as a leveraging device to control its enemies. Many opposition forces are dependent on ISIL for diesel.

ISIL sells most of its crude directly to independent traders at the oil fields in an organised system. Tankers queue for weeks to get access to the prized commodity. Estimates by local traders and engineers put crude production in ISIL-held territory at about 34,000-40,000 barrels per day. The oil is sold at the wellhead for between US\$20 and US\$45 a barrel, earning the militants an average of US\$1.5 million a day.¹³ The US Assistant Secretary of Treasury for terrorist financing stated that in a one month period earlier this year, ISIL made about \$US40 million off the sale of oil.¹⁴ A large portion of the money that ISIL raised from June 2014 onwards came from oil fields and refineries.

Oil is also a tool to launder money.¹⁵ Oil is smuggled throughout Iraq and Kurdistan and into Syria through a shadowy network of criminal operatives using desert routes and rugged mountains using trucks or donkeys, and through legitimate crossings for consumption in Turkey, Iran, and Jordan. Many of these were already established to circumvent the UN sanctions imposed on Iraq. If they are caught, poor border guards in Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey are bribed.

Oil also allows ISIL to extort the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Gas supplies 90 per cent of Syria's power grid on which ISIL and the Assad regime depend on for energy. ISIL controls at least eight power plants in Syria, including three hydro-electric facilities and the countries' largest gas plant. Cooperation between ISIL and Syrian regime is strongest over gas that generates Syria's electricity grid.

Both parties of the conflict are attacking each other's energy infrastructure in an attempt to secure better terms, but neither one is willing to destroy the other.¹⁶

ISIL's oil wealth depends on its ability to refine and transport oil. As such, ISIL has built underground pipelines, and rudimentary stationary and mobile oil refineries. The coalition forces have been targeting its refineries and pipelines, destroying 16 mobile refineries by the end of 2014. However ISIL can rebuild a single mobile refinery in 10 days for as little as US\$230,000.¹⁷

EXTORTION AND TAXES

Another source of income for ISIL comes from taxing everyone and everything that crosses its territories and from expropriating real estate and property from those who fled. ISIL already exercised a criminal hold on Mosul long before seizing it. Prior to capturing Mosul, ISIL members were acting like "mafias managing organised crime and controlling all economic resources of the province", according to an Iraqi Parliamentary inquiry into what led to the city's fall. According to the report, ISIL made US\$11 million per month from organised crime with an elaborate taxation system. It collected money from different social groups and levied taxes on everything.¹⁸

In territories now under ISIL control, there is a 10 per cent income tax, 10-15 per cent tax on business revenues, and a 2 per cent value added tax on everyday purchases. There are road taxes and custom taxes for vehicles crossing ISIL held territory and taxes for smuggling drugs and weapons. ISIL is also profiting from "departure taxes" of up to US\$1,000 from those able to pay to leave ISIL territory. Fearing that many will leave, ISIL requires that civilians sign over car titles and family homes in order to just to leave its territory for two weeks. Christians are forced to pay jiza, a religious levy or "protection tax," unless they convert to Islam.

Food crops are also a source of terrorist financing. The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation estimates that ISIL currently controls over 40 per cent of Iraq's wheat cultivating land. It reported that ISIL extorts farmers to pay "zakat" with portions of their wheat and barley. ISIL also has control over wheat silos, five major cement plants and a phosphate mine.

ISIL has also gained money from pillaging two state-owned banks in Mosul and over 90

private banks, worth an estimated US\$500 million to a billion. The looting of Mosul's Central Bank netted approximately US\$.425 million.¹⁹ The US estimates that ISIL has access to the equivalent of at least a half billion dollars in cash alone.²⁰

ANTIQUITIES

ISIL has gained control over one of the richest archaeological sites in the world, an important source of income as well. Items looted from al-Nabuk alone has earned ISIL up to US\$36 million. As sites such as Nimrud, Nineveh and Hatra are being looted, a growing number of artifacts are appearing in global antiquity markets, black markets or on Ebay. The Association for the Protection of Syrian Archeology (APSA) has reported that more than 900 monuments and archeological sites have been looted, damaged or completely destroyed.

This growing trade in antiquities has been dubbed "blood antiques," and while such artifacts are more difficult to sell than "blood diamonds," they are far more valuable. The US International Trade Commission has reported that imports of ancient artifacts from Iraq has increased fourfold from 2010 and 2014, reaching an estimated US\$. 3.5 million Among items in demand are ancient cuneiform tablets, cylinder seals, jars, coins, glass and particularly mosaics. Very few of the thousands of looted artifacts from Iraq and Syria are likely to be recovered. To date it is impossible to quantify how much money ISIL is profiting since it will take decades for these items to reappear. As a point of reference, Cambodian antiquities stolen during the civil war turned up at an auction 40 years later. Earlier this year the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution to prohibit the trade in illegally removed cultural materials.

HUMAN TRAFFICKING, KIDNAPPING AND SMUGGLING

ISIL has committed a staggering number of human rights abuses targeting entire communities based on their religion or ethnicity. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights reported that ISIL had "the intent... to destroy the Yazidi as a group," maintaining that ISIL may have conducted genocide.²¹ Abuse of children is rampant. ISIL is systematically subjecting children to indoctrination and grooming them to be future militants while forcing them to witness atrocities. ISIL's human rights abuses

has led to one of the greatest humanitarian disasters of the 21st century, with thousands being enslaved or murdered and creating millions of IDPs, refugees and migrants.

Human rights abuses are an instrument of terror and a source of revenue. In its online publication Dabiq, ISIL has set out its reasoning for upholding slavery of women and girls who are bought and sold at "slave auctions." The Islamic State Research and Fatwa Department recently established guidelines for slavery, a lengthy how-to manual justifying violence, and elevating sexual assault as spiritually beneficial. While the prices of slaves are quite low, family members who are able to buy back their children and wives pay ransoms as high as US\$3,000.²²

ISIL also has a special department dedicated to kidnapping for ransom (KFR). Kidnapping serves many purposes: as a source of income, as a means to acquire wives for its fighters, and as a tool to acquire new military recruits. KFR also helps control media, as the threat of KFR prevents many journalists from going to ISIL controlled areas.²³ According to Reporters without Borders, 181 journalists have been killed in Syria since 2011. Kidnapping generated US\$ 45 million for ISIL last year.²⁴ KFR is a complex business operation. A special intelligence apparatus within the ISIL relies on a network of informers, spies, kidnappers, and jailers.

ISIL also attracts organised criminals who harbor motives to attack Western targets. Criminals with Russian connections operating from Moldova have attempted selling cesium in exchange for 2.5 million Euro in February 2015. This case represents the growing nexus of crime and terror where criminal groups are soliciting both ISIL and al Qa'ida as it is known that these groups have expressed aspirations of using weapons of mass destruction.²⁵

TECHNOLOGY AND CYBERCRIME

The threat from ISIL may be compounded by the group's apparent investment in information and communications technology. ISIL to date has not been able to conduct any major cyber-attack. In early 2015, hackers claiming to be with ISIL released a video threatening cyber-attacks against the US, Europe, and Australia. At the same time, ISIL defaced the CENTCOM website and posted the names and addresses of US troops on Twitter and urged followers in the US to kill them. So far ISIL has been focused mostly on strategic messaging using such applications

as Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, SoundCloud, AskFM, and Instagram to spread their messages. Most recently, ISIL is using Telegram, a fully encrypted end-to-end operational theater and repository for private chats, posting info and as an electronic hawala tool. ISIL has created an operational infrastructure within Telegram in at least 13 different languages.²⁶ Overall the internet is used to recruit fighters and employees, to post propaganda, to procure weapons, to offer advice on encryption tools and crypto currencies for funding. ISIL is actively recruiting hackers for its “cyber army” in the hopes of attacking the West, harvesting more donations and increasing cybercrime.

CONCLUSIONS

ISIL strength lies in the fact that it possesses its own means of income generation and financing. So far the US and its coalition forces are losing the war against ISIL and the geopolitical situation is continuing to deteriorate. Russia’s intervention has made the complex pattern of alliances and enmities in Syria still more multifarious. As long as ISIL holds territory, the more plausible its caliphate and its accompanying political, ideological, social and economical pretensions become. To respond to this challenge, the international community needs to focus on three pillars: military, markets and messaging.

The military has an important role in eradicating ISIL. However, so far the air campaign is having limited effect on removing ISIL. The drone campaigns are creating hundreds of civilian casualties that continue to help terrorists recruit new fighters. Alternative solutions must be found. However, adding more foreign “boots on the ground” is a risky option because their presence will only reinforce the ISIL claim of being under attack and feed its propaganda, which will continue to strengthen its global recruitment campaign. It is important to bolster both moderate opposition groups in Syria as well as the Iraqi military and the Kurdish peshmerga forces to help contain ISIL and ultimately remove it from power. This will take time as well as pressure on Iraq’s Shia-dominated central government to reconfigure its sectarian approach and help end the Sunni disenfranchisement that is fueling the insurgency.

As this paper has attempted to argue, the global community must also focus on destroying terrorist markets. The lifeblood of

any terrorist organisation is its ability to generate funds. As was shown, ISIL is economically exploiting the 10 million people and the resources under its control. ISIL relies on exploitive governance and uses both licit and illicit means to generate funds. While a recent report has argued that ISIL will soon face the dilemma of having more expenses than they can cover, such analyses do not take into account that ISIL markets are not only internal but external, licit and illicit, with its neighbors and with supporters worldwide.²⁷ The fact that ISIL acts largely as a mafia organisation allows it conduct business even if it is cut off. North Korea is an example of a ‘mafia state’ that has relied on this strategy. Even though North Korea was largely cut off from the world’s financial system since the 1970s, it was able to finance nuclear armament through its criminal business activities in many parts of the globe. ISIL is not as vulnerable as other terrorist groups because they can exploit their own tax base by holding territory they can tax and raise revenue at will.

The international community has been hard at work at suppressing terrorist funding since the al-Qa’ida attacks on 9/11. In 2001 the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) expanded its mandate to include the financing of terrorism. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Egmont Group all became more involved in countering terrorist financing (CTF). At the international level, UN Security Council Resolution 1373 calls on all UN members to criminalise the use or collection of funds intended for terrorism in addition to freezing funds, denying support, and denying safe haven to those who finance, plan, support or commit terrorist acts.

Some of these measures seem to be working. al-Qa’ida leader, Ayman Al-Zawahiri is no longer able to offer much financial assistance to its affiliates. However, this has done little to stem their power. Al-Qa’ida affiliates such as al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Shabaab have increasingly engaged in criminal markets that includes KFR, smuggling of drugs, arms, wildlife, coal, oil, gas, timber, precious metals, and people to replace their former funding streams. This has enabled them not only become independent but also richer and more powerful.

The UN has passed four key resolutions on countering the financing of ISIL.²⁸ In March 2015, the Counter ISIL-Finance Group was established. While important legislation has been put in place, it has largely been ineffective since ISIL trades in informal markets and most of its trade appears to be with countries where regulations are weak or not upheld.

Terrorism can only be stopped if there is a whole-of-society approach to counter radicalisation, including not only governments but political and civil society, especially community and religious leaders. In February 2015, the White House convened a summit on Countering Violent Extremisms (CVE) bringing together international leaders to discuss how to design and develop community-oriented approaches to counter hateful extremist ideologies that radicalise, recruit or incite others to violence. Many countries are now beginning to widen their counter-terrorism to include prevention and de-radicalisation programs. This will mean that important work must be done to understand the push factors, the underlying conditions and root causes that lead to extremism.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 of September 2014 (on threats to international peace caused by terrorist organisations) has helped mobilise the international community to design better solutions to counter violent extremism. There is now a growing consensus that tools to counter the ideology that drives violent extremism are needed since military force alone cannot defeat violent extremism. It would be useful to not only conceive of ISIL as a hostile state, but a malevolent enterprise whose markets and message need to be contained. Increased international cooperation on terrorist financing and CVE messaging require the same sustained investment that the current military efforts receive.

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EXTREME MEASURES: THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF MEASURING TERRORISM

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In October 2003, little more than six months after the invasion of Iraq, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld asked a question that has continued to resonate: ‘Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?’¹ His concern was focused around the tactics the United States was employing against the insurgency in Iraq at the time, but masked a deeper question about metrics of terrorism which has not really been answered. Is there any real way of effectively measuring terrorism or the impact of policies to counter it?

It should seem a fairly easy exercise to undertake. A terrorist act — a bombing, for

example, or a shooting — is a real-world event that, by its very nature, has an observable effect (someone dies, or a property is damaged.) A terrorist act is purposefully tangible and detectable: an unrecorded terrorist is a failure. Most of the time, the event is written about and recorded, whether in a newspaper or in a police record. Therefore, surely, all the experts have to do is count the events, plot them on a graph, and we should be able to see at a glance what is happening over time.

It is not, though, as easy as that. Different experts can produce very different answers to these questions. The renowned science writer Stephen Pinker, for example, has used data from the GTD to show that casualties from

terrorist attacks are actually reducing, and uses this to support his argument that humans are becoming progressively less violent.²

If, however, we add in a different set of statistics we find that terrorism has actually got a lot worse very quickly. When the US State Department counted terrorist attacks and their casualties in its *Patterns of Global Terrorism* report in the 1990s, the numbers of fatalities were generally in triple figures: 1995, for instance, showed a mere 165 killed in 440 incidents. They carried on counting until the invasion of Iraq, when an intra-governmental controversy caused the suspension of the report and its replacement from 2004 with *Country Reports on Terrorism*, which did not contain global

statistics. As they were no longer counting casualties in the same way, simple comparisons between the pre- and post-9/11 world became impossible with US government data. (Cynics suggested that this was the purpose of the change.) So if we look at the GTD as a surrogate dataset, we find that terrorists in 2014 can kill over a thousand each month — whereas from 1995 to 2003 only 2001 showed more than a thousand killed. Nor is the GTD the only study that shows a very large increase: similar conclusion emerges from a BBC Monitoring/ICSR study of Islamist violence in November 2014 which showed that around 5,000 were killed.

How can this be? How can Stephen Pinker, using robust data, produce one conclusion, while statistics drawn from the same database indicate the opposite? The obvious answer is that they are actually talking about different things. Pinker excludes attacks on Coalition forces in Afghanistan after 2001 and Iraq after 2003. The State Department in the 1990s defined terrorism pretty narrowly as politically motivated violence outside a state of war. The BBC/ICSR study narrows the scope in one dimension (Islamist violence only) but is extremely wide in another dimension (the form the violence takes and the context in which it occurs.) Given the nature of early twenty-first-century conflicts which, for various historical and geopolitical reasons are predominantly taking place in Muslim-majority countries, a lot of violence can readily be labelled as 'Islamist'. The GTD is wider still than the BBC/ICSR study as it includes violence not involving Islamists, but includes violence taking place in many of the same conflicts in South Asia, the Middle East, and East, North and West Africa that feature so heavily in that other study. When the State Department was counting, therefore, it excluded civil wars, insurgencies, and even some kinds of guerrilla movements from its attention. Now, those tend to be included.

That is not to say that the GTI is wrong to include these types of violence. In fact, it would be perverse to exclude the 'Islamic State' (ISIL/Daesh) or al-Shabaab from a report on the frequency and severity of terrorist violence. Both of those entities would unquestionably meet most people's definitions of terrorist organisations. (For instance, they are both proscribed in the UK under terrorism legislation.) But the point is that some forms of their violence are qualitatively different from terrorism as it was understood in the 1990s. In

particular, both groups see acquiring and holding territory as a primary objective, and this shapes what they do with their violent capabilities. Indeed, ISIL functions in many ways as a state with an army rather than as a terrorist group which happens to control some land. Without wishing to confer any kind of political or legal legitimacy to its aspirations, it would be absurd to categorise an organisation that is well equipped with heavy weapons, that controls territory in which perhaps 8 million or more are living, and which raises and spends millions of dollars in a month as being considered in same category as left-wing Greek terrorists or animal rights extremists (both of who are considered terrorist organizations in some jurisdictions).

The point is a lack of clarity about what constitutes a 'terrorist.' This is not only the well-worn cliché of one man's freedom fighter being another man's terrorist, but more fundamentally, the point that the group of actors that is increasingly grouped together as 'terrorist' is one that is becoming so broad as to lose all useful coherence.

This is important for researchers but for practitioners, policy-makers, and the public too. When politicians say — as many do — that the terrorist threat has never been higher, we are entitled to know whether there is evidence that supports their claims. Statistics can be manipulated but even in most areas of controversial policy there is someone, perhaps in a university, who is able to say definitively what the data shows. More urgently, practitioners and policy-makers need to know what works in both countering terrorism and its more recent near-synonym, 'violent extremism'. If terrorism is getting worse, what does this tell us about the billions of dollars, pounds and euros that have been expended on dealing with it since 9/11? Our difficulty with defining not just terrorism but forms of violence more generally is a significant part of the problem here. It seems clear, for example, that transnational terrorism targeting the West is rare (even if, on occasions, it can account for horrendous levels of casualties) and that while it has not gone away it has not got statistically worse. The threat from domestic terrorist movements in Europe has declined dramatically from its highpoint in the 1970s, when extreme left-wing groups terrorised the Continent and Irish republican and loyalist groups carried out almost daily attacks. And it is clear that, while wars are less destructive now than they were in the twentieth century,

there are still some very nasty ones indeed — and that some of the worst involve Islamist terrorist groups such as ISIL and al-Shabaab.

What might seem an arid discussion of statistics and terminology points, therefore, to a significant change in what we understand by terrorism, and perhaps to a change in the problem itself. Groups still try to put bombs on planes and assassinate their enemies but the transition to extremist state-building, signalled as early as the 1990s by the Algerian GIA but carried out most extensively by al-Shabaab and ISIL (with groups in South East Asia, Yemen and North Africa also attempting it), is an historically significant development. The wars that accompany state-building by groups espousing Islamist ideologies are linked to but qualitatively different from the Islamist terrorism that is exemplified by al-Qa'ida's major transnational attacks. But conflating these varying groups under the same banner causes further analytical issues.

This problem of conflation or aggregation has been well recognised by academics such as Peter Neumann who has described the tendency "to lump together groups and individuals in vastly different situations of violent conflict just because they use similar tactics" as "the cardinal sin of 'terrorism studies'"³. The dominance of Islamist violence in our concerns about terrorism may be leading to a different kind of conflation — of lumping together groups using different tactics just because they express themselves using a similar ideology. This problem matters beyond academic debate because it may be one explanation for the lack of consensus in so many questions we need to answer about political violence in today's world, including the most fundamental questions of causality. Does, for example, poverty lead to terrorism? Absolute or relative deprivation was once widely assumed to be a major factor, until post-9/11 econometric studies appeared to show that it wasn't. Economists who turned to the study of terrorism demonstrated from robust data that transnational terrorism seemed to be perpetrated by people in countries with low levels of civil liberties against people living in rich countries — but wealth and inequality in the source countries appear to be irrelevant. These findings are important but they do not tell the whole story. If we look at a movement like Boko Haram, for

instance, it is striking that it recruits in the most economically marginalised regions of Nigeria. al-Shabaab recruitment in Kenya tells a similar story. How do we explain this disparity? It is partly because the economists focused on transnational terrorism, and their work mostly pre-dated the emergence of Islamist militias such as Boko Haram and al-Shabaab that adopt the garb of transnational movements while being fundamentally grounded in local injustices.

It also probably demonstrates a re-shaping of context by analysts whose conception of terrorism had suddenly become so dominated by al-Qa'ida in the wake of the September 11 attacks that they sought parallels to the group in everything else that they analysed. Prior to 9/11, terrorism was considered a marginal activity; after that event it became the defining menace of our age, something that has ramifications for those studying and analysing it. The story suddenly became a big one which editors would actively push their reporters towards — but their interest was in transnational terrorism targeting the West, potentially to the detriment of other forms of politically motivated violence, thereby further skewing datasets and analysis. All of this may also have had an impact on the threat side of the picture: groups that previously may have been engaged in anti-state violence due to specific grievances might now find that adopting the garb of Islamist extremists would bring the bright light of publicity to them. Some, like Boko Haram in West Africa, have sought to raise the al-Qa'ida banner (and then later the ISIL banner) to attract attention without having a strong operational connection to either group.

Distinguishing between different types of militancy is important: if their causes are different then the response must be different too. Poverty-reduction may be an important counter-measure for a group like Boko Haram, but utterly irrelevant to, say, al-Qa'ida. Governments are becoming increasingly attracted to ideological counter-measures, and these should not be discounted — but nor should they be assumed to work on the basis of an over-simplified diagnosis of what causes political violence. Furthermore, while one strategy may work in one context, it might have the opposite effect in another, potentially even exacerbating the problem that is trying to be addressed.

What we need, then, is a more precise set of terms and definitions to enable us to

distinguish between violence perpetrated by different groups (or individuals) in different circumstances and for different purposes. But we should not underestimate the difficulty of the task. If terrorism is a notoriously difficult word to define — the academic Alex Schmid counted 250 definitions in use and proposed one himself that ran to 570 words — then its potential surrogates are not much easier.⁴ 'Violent extremism', for example, has achieved a great deal of currency among governments and civil society organisations, but is also problematic, and not just because 'extremism' is almost indefinable in anything other than relative terms. As a broader term, it serves a purpose in negating some of the political contention of 'terrorism', but if anything this breadth makes it even worse as a catch-all term which can cover any form of violence. Terms describing different kinds of war participants, such as 'insurgent' and 'guerrilla', may be less politically fraught but tend to be used rather loosely and distinctions between them are difficult to draw. A universal definition of these terms may be too much to hope for, but that should not stop us from deploying them and others as long as we define them in each study.

How far, though, can and should we go in developing a more precise vocabulary for violent groups? The scale of the challenge is well illustrated by a 2008 study by the Israeli academic Boaz Ganor, who examined the many typologies of terrorist organisations which academics in a variety of fields and combined them into a model which proposed fifteen variables (such as preferred target, size, and organisational structure).⁵ Ganor proposes that a typology of terrorism must reflect the complexity and variability of terrorist violence, while cautioning that, taken to extremes, a typology may begin to contain categories so precise that they contain only one group. But even Ganor focuses only on certain kinds of violence (which he subsumes under the label 'terrorism') and unconsciously excludes others, so that his admirable work does not quite solve the conceptual problems thrown up by statistical studies.

What, then, should we do? The terrorism research community will continue the empirical study of terrorism and this can only be a good thing. Analyses such as the GTD are important contributions to our knowledge. The more we can develop and hone our methodological tools for categorising the

varied and dynamic phenomena we study, the closer we will come to answering the fundamental questions of what terrorism is, how it can be managed, and whether we are making progress. But there is still some way to go before Rumsfeld's questions can be adequately answered.

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MIGRATION, VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM: MYTHS AND REALITIES

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As evidenced by the findings and analysis of the 2015 Global Terrorism Index, violent extremism has become a universal crisis. This year, the publication of the index coincides with another ongoing emergency, that of refugees and migration. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports the highest number of displaced persons ever recorded. The statistics are sobering: one in three Syrians has been forced to abandon their home, Europe is facing unprecedented arrivals of asylum seekers and refugees, and thousands of migrants have lost their lives in the Mediterranean alone.

Inevitably, linkages are being drawn between these two crises. For a start, the rise in terrorism is one reason why more people are leaving their homes. What is more, experts suggest that displaced populations, especially those in a protracted situation, may be especially susceptible to radicalization to violent extremist agendas. More controversially, it has been suggested by some leading politicians and commentators across a range of European countries that violent extremist and terrorist groups may be infiltrating migrant and asylum flows.

Extreme caution is required in drawing these correlations. It is always an analytical challenge to discern individual motivations for migration and displacement. It is important to guard against generalizations — refugee camps can be sites of innovation and enterprise, not just hopelessness and despair. Anecdote is no replacement for evidence. In particular, there is a risk of fueling anti-immigration sentiment when unsubstantiated assertions are made about migration as a threat to national security.¹

This short contribution reviews what is known about the linkages between migrants and migration, and violent extremism and terrorism, fully cognizant of the reservations above. It is intended to begin to provide an evidence-base to correct some of the

misperceptions that abound, as well as to sharpen the focus where there are connections to be made. It identifies significant research gaps, and suggests initial policy directions. Most importantly of all, the purpose of this contribution is to promote an objective debate, something which we believe is all too often absent in discussion on migration and radicalization to violent extremism.

IS VIOLENT EXTREMISM A DRIVER OF DISPLACEMENT?

The first intersection to examine is the extent to which violent extremism or terrorism can be blamed for the explosion in the number of people displaced in the past year. Certainly we know that countries and regions where violent extremism is rife — Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, northern Nigeria, Mali, Yemen, to name a few — are among the top countries displacing significant numbers of people.

A conceptual challenge is that it is becoming increasingly difficult to discern individual motivations, or the relative weighting of combined motivations, in explaining displacement. Even people fleeing conflict usually factor in economic and social variables when weighing their decision; it is not uncommon that they consider the availability of work and future opportunities, along with factors such as access to education and healthcare. As such, it is important to distinguish underlying causes for displacement — such as conflict, state collapse, or persecution — from proximate factors such as loss of access to housing, employment, food, or welfare. Often it is the latter, not the former which triggers displacement.

The same conceptual challenge applies to differentiating terrorism from the wider environmental context in which it flourishes as a driver for displacement. Some people, especially religious minorities in the Levant — including Christians and Yazidis — are

fleeing Syria and Iraq because of direct persecution by ISIL (also referred to as Daesh). Equally as troublesome, if they are not fleeing because of the immediate threat of persecution, they are leaving because of their state's failure in will or capacity to protect them. Others who are not directly affected are also fleeing conflict. They may be leaving not for the sake of their lives, but for the sake of their futures. A related question is the direction of the causal chain between conflict, state collapse, and violent extremism or terrorism. In the case of Syria and Iraq, therefore, it may be fair to conclude that some people are explicitly fleeing the terrorist group ISIL, while others are fleeing the conditions in which ISIL has emerged.

The limited evidence on displacement caused directly by terrorist groups indicates that often displacement is a deliberate objective, and not merely a consequence. In northern Nigeria, for example, Boko Haram has kidnapped women, forcibly recruited children and men, and besieged entire villages, forcing immediate evacuation. Sadly, this strategy is not new; the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) used similar tactics when they terrorized northern Uganda from the late 1980s through the early 2000s.²

ARE THE DISPLACED VULNERABLE TO RECRUITMENT TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM?

The clearest example of displaced people becoming vulnerable to terrorist groups is the recent siege of Syria's Yarmouk refugee camp, situated mere kilometers from Damascus, which housed some 18,000 Palestinian refugees and Syrian internally displaced persons (IDPs). The consequences of the April 2015 takeover by ISIL and other violent extremist militants were felt immediately. Despite warnings of a potential massacre, it was days before humanitarian actors were granted sufficient access to the camp. As the emergency unfolded, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon implored the international

community to intervene, saying, “In the horror that is Syria, the Yarmouk refugee camp is the deepest circle of hell. ... A refugee camp is beginning to resemble a death camp. The residents of Yarmouk — including 3,500 children -- are being turned into human shields.”³ At the time, left out of the conversation were the arguments suggesting that another consequence may be the radicalization (of those besieged) to ISIL’s agenda, the very same argument politicians and commentators are making today in response to the steady stream of asylum seekers entering Europe.

At the moment, it is the prospect of displaced people becoming radicalized to the agendas of violent extremists that is of growing concern in Europe, and this concern applies not just to displaced Syrians and Iraqis, but also to transit migrants moving from sub-Saharan Africa. The need for caution is worth reiterating — in the majority of situations providing security for the displaced is far more important than securing our states from them. Nevertheless there have been examples where some IDP and refugee camps have become recruiting grounds for violent militant groups — as evidenced in certain Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan (including Jalozai near Peshawar, for example), or in Somali refugee camps in Kharaz in Yemen.

While specific examples are unusual, there is a more general risk that unless they are better managed, IDP and refugee camps can generate the conditions conducive to allow for radicalization to violent extremism to occur. Existing literature specifically highlights three conditions that allow for this — poor education (especially where the gap is filled by violent extremist education), a lack of work, and the absence of freedom of movement.⁴ These conditions are most likely in protracted situations, where refugees spend considerable periods of time in camps; and unfortunately, the proportion of refugees worldwide existing in protracted situations is growing.⁵

SHOULD WE FEAR TERRORIST GROUPS WILL INFILTRATE ASYLUM FLOWS?

This is perhaps the most electrifying question in Europe today, as policymakers consider resettling significant numbers of refugees from the Middle East. As if their journey hasn’t been arduous enough, in a number of countries security screening is proving a significant obstacle to their resettlement. Also

hampering the efforts of these desperate men, women, and children in pursuit of safety or opportunity, are what seems to be, a growing number of overly cautious European leaders.

If you were to believe the statements offered by some politicians, the conclusion is clear: Migrants and asylum seekers pose a serious risk to the security of Europe. President Milos Zeman of the Czech Republic recently warned of “ sleeper cells ” coming to Europe; Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico predicted that the current flow of migrants includes people connected to terrorist groups; and Italian Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni opined that there is a “ considerable risk ” of terrorists infiltrating immigration routes.

But in fact there is virtually no evidence to support such assertions. Several smugglers were interviewed last year by BuzzFeed and reported having transported ISIL recruits.⁶ One smuggler attested to having sent at least ten ISIL fighters posing as refugees to Europe, and affirmed that the fighters, once settled, were awaiting their orders to launch an attack on European soil. Two smugglers interviewed in Turkey also reported transporting fighters across the Mediterranean Sea. Without underestimating how vital it is to manage any such risk, we would observe that smugglers may not be the most trusted source of information, and in almost all other contexts are routinely described as criminals and liars by politicians and policymakers.

The ongoing European refugee crisis is, in any case, too current to permit a credible assessment in this regard. In most countries data on terrorist activities is confidential. However, where it is available, analyzing prior waves of asylum seekers suggests that there is very little evidence that during their journey, their routes had been infiltrated or their psyches co-opted by terrorists. The Migration Policy Institute, for example, reported this month that of 745,000 refugees resettled in the United States of America since 9/11, only two have been arrested on terrorism charges.⁷ What is unclear however, is whether these individuals were already radicalized to violent extremism when they arrived, became radicalized subsequently, or whether they were deliberately sent to the United States by terrorist groups.

CONCLUSIONS

The preceding short review of the evidence on the linkages between migration and violent extremism yields three main conclusions.

First, it is clear that there is a lack of evidence on both sides of the argument. The need for a better conceptual framework for understanding drivers of displacement has been highlighted. Data collection in IDP and refugee camps remains limited and rarely permits understanding of issues such as radicalization to violent extremism. And while data confidentiality on sensitive subjects like radicalization to violent extremism is understandable, it restricts much-needed wider analysis from taking place. As such, further research is required, but must be carefully conducted in order to guard against the risks of misperceptions or justifying xenophobic attitudes or promoting similarly narrow policies.

Second, this review has intentionally pointed the way towards a number of policy interventions. Violent extremism and terrorism may not be the primary cause of displacement for most people worldwide, but certainly they are part of a complex set of variables that force too many families to abandon their homes. This suggests the need for a more integrated approach to tackling the root causes of displacement. A revised and comprehensive approach would include interventions specifically focused on preventing and countering violent extremism. Equally it suggests that coordinated efforts by the international community to reduce conflict, stabilize post-conflict settings, and build peace, can prove relevant in preventing and countering radicalization to violent extremism.⁸

While reiterating that in most cases IDPs and refugees are populations at risk, rather than populations that pose a risk, a second policy implication concerns the need to focus on measures to prevent radicalization to violent extremist agendas among refugee communities. Testimonials suggest that often contributing factors to an individual’s pathway toward radicalization (whether sympathizing with a violent extremist agenda or going so far as to participate in a violent act) is a lack of opportunity and/or a perceived or actual grievance. It is crucial that the international community devote ample resources to ensure that migrant and transit communities, including those confined to camps, are afforded as best access possible to the social services and economic opportunities they were deprived of in their home countries. Education, employment, and freedom of movement are essential interventions, along with broader approaches to building

community engagement and resilience, which might take the form of youth engagement, job training and placement, and women's empowerment.

The need for an objective debate on refugees (and migration more generally), violent extremism and terrorism, and in particular the potential intersections between the two, has never been more urgent. Assuming their comments are unfounded, political leaders and commentators should refrain from making reckless assertions that migrants and refugees may have direct links to terrorist groups. Not only do such allegations unfairly scapegoat refugees and fuel anti-immigration sentiments, they also detract from the real priorities. One is the need to rehabilitate returning European foreign terrorist fighters. The other is to lay the foundations for the sustainable integration of those asylum seekers and refugees who are arriving, to ensure not only that they and their descendants not subsequently fall victim to the agendas and rhetoric of violent

extremists, but also to help them to achieve their maximum potential.

History demonstrates that migration is the most effective way to generate tolerance and cross-cultural understanding. For every failure of integration, there are countless successes, manifested through mixed marriages, hybrid arts and cuisine, and cosmopolitan global cities. Far from being a reason to stem migration, the rise of violent extremism should be a reason to promote it.⁹

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TERRORISM: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

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The September 11 attacks on the United States in 2001 marked the beginning of an increased focus on terrorism and the terrorist threat in the media, in politics, and in general. Some scholars and experts argued that the attacks represented a new era in world politics marked by the increased threat of violence from non-state actors. Indeed 21st Century terrorism has changed the landscape of both national and international security. The rise of violence by non-state actors, against states as well as other non-state actors has shifted the focus from state on state warfare to warfare carried out by dissident groups and individuals operating both within and across borders. Alongside this surge in the phenomenon of terrorism, a new interest in the study of terrorism and global security has developed. Since the

September 11 attacks, the number of academic articles, books and research projects on terrorism has increased by a staggering 400 per cent.

Yet, terrorism has a long history in human affairs. The term 'terrorism' was first used in 18th Century France by the Jacobin government. The Regime de la Terreur (1793- 1794) or Reign of Terror described the period of the French Revolution when the revolutionary government executed anyone suspected to be an enemy of the revolution. By 1794, the Revolutionary Tribunal had ordered the execution of 2,400 people. Terrorism was deliberately and systematically organised by the state in order to create a better society.

The Russian Revolutionary group, the Nihilists, first used the term terrorism in the 1860s to describe their struggle against Tsar Alexander II. The Nihilists rejected all authority and believed that the ruling regime and the Orthodox Church must be destroyed in order to create a new society. Since then, the word terrorism has been used variably by governments and against governments.

In the 1930s and 40s, terrorism was used to refer to the rise of Nazi German and Stalinist Russia to describe mass repression by a totalitarian state and dictatorship against the citizens of the state. After the First World War, during the era of decolonisation, several groups fighting for self-determination actually described themselves as terrorist organisations. But this soon changed. As decolonisation quickened after the Second

World War, colonial governments used the term terrorism to negatively label groups fighting for national liberation. These groups preferred to label themselves freedom fighters.

There is no internationally accepted, unitary definition of terrorism. A brief review of the literature on terrorism reveals over 100 definitions. Official and unofficial definitions of terrorism today serve the political, legal, social or defence purpose of the particular government or organisation that defines it. Terrorism has variously been described as both a tactic and an ideology; a justified response to oppressive power and an unjustifiable assault on humanity; a criminal and a last resort of the powerless.

There are at least six different approaches to defining terrorism that can be identified among the various definitions used by different countries:

- 1. The first approach** does not provide a separate national definition of terrorism. Countries that use this approach are signatories to one or more International Treaties and use the definitions contained in these treaties to identify and deal with acts of terrorism.
- 2. A second approach** defines terrorism broadly in terms of disruption of the public order and/or intimidation of the population. Such a broad definition of terrorism might encompass any act that is seen to challenge political power such as protests.
- 3. Some countries adopt a very broad definition of the terms of the acts, intentions, results or focus that are considered to be terrorism.** Such definitions are seen to be problematic because they are subjective and can, potentially, apply to a range of actions selectively.
- 4. Other countries adopt a narrow definition of terrorism** that specifically describes the kinds of actions, intentions, results or focus that are considered terrorism. In many of these instances, terrorism is confined to an act that harms the State, its representatives and/or organisations.
- 5. Another approach is to define terrorism in the Criminal Code as a criminal offence.** In some cases criminal offences regarded as terrorism are specifically defined. In other cases, terrorism is

referred to in the Criminal Code but there are no specific offences defined.

6. The final approach to defining terrorism attempts to include both the reasons or motivations of terrorists and their aims.

This approach acknowledges that terrorism has many dimensions and cannot be defined in terms of a violent tactic alone. It takes into account the motivations for terrorism as distinct from other criminal acts of violence.

Despite the lack of an internationally accepted unitary definition of terrorism, most definitions of terrorism contain key features that can be considered essential aspects of any definition of terrorism:

- terrorism uses violence
- terrorism targets non-combatants
- terrorism is intended to influence, intimidate or coerce
- terrorism is motivated by political, social or ideological objectives
- terrorism creates a state of terror and fear.

VIOLENT EXTREMISM

In recent years, the term 'violent extremism' has been preferred to terrorism in both academic and policy circles. Violent extremism includes acts of terrorism but is considered a more comprehensive term and one that avoids the historical legacy and political labelling of terrorism. Like terrorism, violent extremism is violence that is motivated by extreme political, social or ideological objectives. Violent extremism acknowledges that extremism in and of itself is not necessarily harmful.

Preventing and countering violent extremism are sometimes described as the 'soft' side of counterterrorism. However, in practice, PVE and CVE, are very different to traditional counterterrorism that largely focusses on military and legal responses by states. In contrast PVE and CVE involve all civil society actors and are aimed at addressing the root causes of terrorism through approaches that target the social, political, environmental and individual conditions in which terrorism thrive. Consequently, methods to counter violent extremism include improving access to and quality of education; empowering women; ensuring political stability; interfaith dialogue and youth engagement.

Violent extremism is best approached as a social issue with security implications. Where violent extremism is defined primarily as a national security issue, governments risk imbalanced responses that rely heavily on the security apparatus. Responses that are heavily skewed towards punitive measures and legal remedies fail to address the drivers and underlying factors that cause violent extremism in the first place.

There are many explanations, theories and models that attempt to explain why individuals and groups turn to violent extremism. There is no single or simple answer as to why young men (and women) join the global violent jihadist movement and take up arms with the Islamic State (ISIL); nor is there any one single formula to explain why people become attracted to Neo-Nazi groups that preach violence based on ideas of racial superiority and inferiority. Each individual's trajectory towards violence is unique in its own way, though there are clear push and pull factors that act as drivers to violent extremism. Environments where there is a lack of effective governance, or where the government is perceived to be illegitimate feed individual and group grievances that can be directed into violence. Societies where social inclusion and social mobility are lacking create conditions where individuals can feel excluded and isolated from the political, economic and social structures. Such conditions, when coupled with a sense of injustice and narrative of victimhood that is exploited by terrorists create a toxic environment for violent extremism to thrive.

Much attention has also focussed on the role of the internet in promoting the growth of violent extremism. This aspect has particularly received attention since the growth and development of ISIS. With an online media presence comparable to some of the worlds' biggest multinationals, ISIL has managed to appeal to a new generation of violent extremists via well positioned online media. While much significance is attributed to the ISIL online media strategy, we must also keep in mind that terrorists have always relied on communication technologies to spread their message and draw international attention to their cause. The role of the internet and technology in promoting and growing the threat of violent extremism is still not fully understood though there is general consensus that the internet enables and accelerates violent extremism in the modern age.

The internet is just one of the ways that terrorism has adapted to the modern age. Today, terrorism is not confined to unstable states and regions with entrenched conflicts. Acts of terrorism are just as likely to be carried out by individuals from the suburbs of Australia or Canada. Today's terrorists are more agile, more media savvy and more appealing to a younger generation of

aggrieved than they were even 10 years ago. The rapidly changing character of terrorism requires dexterous responses that go beyond the 'hard' military and legal instruments traditionally used to counterterrorism. Combatting terrorism today is proving a far more complex and comprehensive undertaking than it was in the 1800's and

early 1900's. It is also an undertaking that almost every nation in the world has had to adapt- regardless of whether that nation has experienced terrorism or not.

WHAT TO DO WHEN FOREIGN FIGHTERS COME HOME

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Not every Westerner who comes home after joining the Islamic State (ISIL) is a threat. But whether they ultimately live a life of peace or violence can be shaped by what they find when they get back.

Since ISIL began its rampage through the Middle East, more than 20,000 people from around the world are estimated to have traveled to join the group. Of that figure, compiled from government data by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, a London-based research center, many will die. But many will also return either to their countries of origin or relocate somewhere new.

The choices these men and women make next, the sorts of lives they will lead, and the threat they may pose to their communities will be heavily determined by what options they have in this next stage of their lives, and how they are treated upon return. There is a pressing need to develop effective strategies to respond to these returnees — and these strategies must be rooted not only in a clear understanding of the reasons why these people left their home nations in the first place, but also what propelled them to return. Because, by utilizing a targeted and thoughtful strategy, governments can keep their communities safe while still acknowledging that not every returnee is a potential threat.

Fear of the returning fighters, and the security threat they may pose, is not a new concern — before ISIL became a beacon, foreign

fighters from Arab countries, the United States, and Europe were drawn to the conflicts in Bosnia and Afghanistan. But studies show that only a small proportion engaged in violent activities upon return to their homes. Thomas Hegghammer of the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment studied the impact of Western fighters returning after joining jihadi groups in places such as Afghanistan and Somalia over a 20-year period. He found that a clear minority of returning fighters presented a true and lethal risk. Because the number of fighters travelling to Iraq and Syria is higher by a degree of magnitude, however, identifying those who do present this risk is all the more critical.

Many countries both in Europe and North Africa have opted to treat all foreign fighters returning from Iraq and Syria as potential threats, criminalizing their travel and association, even though there is often little evidence to prove exactly what they did and how engaged they were in the "fighting." In some cases, the treatment they receive upon return by security forces or in prisons can further radicalize returnees and forge behavior that may not have occurred otherwise. Other punitive policies such as confiscating passports or revoking citizenship can serve to ostracize the returnees in ways that present a true barrier to de-radicalization and reintegration.

The experience of and exposure to the brutality of groups like ISIL, Boko Haram, and al-Shabab has been, and will be, deeply disillusioning for some who attempt to join

their ranks. Although the reasons why individuals leave terrorist groups have been less studied than why they join in the first place, research published in the *Journal of Peace Research* on "formers" points to disappointment in leadership as a motivating factor for leaving. Some who return may be damaged, scarred physically and emotionally by the experience, and in need of psycho-social support. In Nigeria and Kenya, USIP research found that trauma is prevalent not just among victims of violent extremism, but also among those who have joined in the violence, especially young teenagers. Options for recovery are limited — which poses a problem because it is possible that untreated, traumatized former fighters may be more prone to acts of violence.

With unprecedented numbers responding to a call to arms from the United States, Europe, North Africa, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Central Asia, Australia, and Indonesia, there is an imperative both to ensure that law enforcement responses to returning fighters are fair and accountable and to develop viable strategies to prevent returning fighters from continued involvement in violent activity. To determine how these states can prevent extremists from re-engaging in acts of violence, it is helpful to look at which approaches have worked in other contexts and which have failed.

Programs to de-radicalize violent extremists since 9/11 in places like Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Yemen have focused on attempts to contradict and refute the

doctrinal and ideological beliefs that were used to justify violence: Religious leaders were often engaged to publicly demonstrate the logical and moral errors in the rhetoric that was used to support the call to violence. These types of programs, often government-run, have however proven to be only partially successful.

This is largely because the reasons why individuals join violent extremist groups are only ever partially about the ideology: The ideological narrative is the hook that draws the fighters in, but the narrative is *how* they are recruited, not *why*. The government-run de-radicalization programs in Singapore and Indonesia, for example, that target members of Jemaah Islamiyah, the group responsible for the attacks in Bali in 2002, showed limited success because these programs failed to address the reasons individuals engaged: search for meaning, belonging, or identity that came with being part of the cause, the opportunities membership offered, or a desire to seek justice or revenge for real and perceived grievances. Efforts to employ “formers” or “rehabilitated violent extremists” as spokespersons for prevention backfired in some cases because the formers never truly renounced their beliefs.

Scholars who have studied the problem of violent extremism through a psychological lens have noted this challenge of cognitive dissonance in de-radicalization. Humans are unlikely to let go easily of beliefs that justify and support their behavior, especially extreme behavior. In fact, as some studies have shown, beliefs often change after our behavior changes, not the other way around. John Horgan and Tore Bjorgo, well-known researchers in this field, wrote in their 2008 book *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, that “some individuals are stripped of their radical views as a consequence of having left the group rather than that being a cause for leaving.”

Saudi Arabia began a program to rehabilitate those fighters who had returned from fighting in Afghanistan shortly after 9/11. The program, housed in what is known as the Care Rehabilitation Center outside of Riyadh, emphasized de-radicalization sessions with clerics and psychological counselors, and also financially incentivized fighters to disengage in violence. The limitations of this program were highlighted in 2009, when Saudi authorities arrested nine of its graduates for rejoining terrorist groups. Two

other former students of the program, both of whom had been imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay, were found to have joined the Yemeni branch of al-Qa’ida. This led to an overhaul of the program that increased attention on addressing behavioral factors as opposed to the motivating beliefs and ideologies, emphasizing instead relationships and opportunities to rejoin society. The program that was started in 2008 and has graduated more than 3,000 returnees, now focuses on the returnees’ families and acknowledges the importance of social, familial, and national relationships in reintegrating foreign fighters.

Peer and family relationships are key factors not only in shaping choices to join violent extremist groups in the first place but also in successful de-radicalization and reintegration efforts. Many of the youth who have traveled from Northern Europe have come from the same (often small) communities and social networks. In the city of Aarhus in Denmark, home to several dozen fighters, the East Jutland Police and Aarhus Municipality have spearheaded a reintegration program that emphasizes personal relationships and life skills. As profiled in an October 2014 *Newsweek* article, “the Danes are treating their returned jihadists as rebellious teenagers rather than hostile soldiers beyond redemption.” Returnees are given assistance in education, employment, and with repairing their relationships.

Programs designed to disengage right wing extremists in Norway, Germany, and Sweden have also largely been considered successful because of their emphasis on family relationships, life skills, and a lesser focus on addressing the extremist ideology. These types of programs are rooted in the idea that reintegration into society is what will in time truly de-radicalize individuals and prevent them from engaging in violence again. These programs can offer individuals a second chance at life and the opportunity to turn in a different direction. These programs, where they exist, are an important corollary to accountable and fair law enforcement responses — not every returning foreign fighter is a terrorist attack waiting to happen.

*** This piece was originally published in Foreign Policy.**

ANNEXES

ANNEX A

GTI RANKS AND SCORES, 2015

TABLE 7 GTI RANKS AND SCORES, 2015

GTI RANK	COUNTRY	2015 GTI SCORE (OUT OF 10)	CHANGE IN SCORE (ACTUAL YEAR 2013 TO 2014)	GTI RANK	COUNTRY	2015 GTI SCORE (OUT OF 10)	CHANGE IN SCORE (ACTUAL YEAR 2013 TO 2014)
1	Iraq	10	0.406	25	Bangladesh	5.921	0.448
2	Afghanistan	9.233	0.238	26	Mali	5.871	0.683
3	Nigeria	9.213	1.018	27	Turkey	5.737	-0.144
4	Pakistan	9.065	-0.009	28	United Kingdom	5.613	0.162
5	Syria	8.108	0.358	29	Greece	4.976	-0.259
6	India	7.747	0.046	30	Uganda	4.894	2.133
7	Yemen	7.642	0.486	31	Bahrain	4.871	0.198
8	Somalia	7.6	0.48	32	Nepal	4.791	-0.643
9	Libya	7.29	0.966	33	Indonesia	4.755	-0.021
10	Thailand	7.279	0.096	34	Algeria	4.75	-0.635
11	Philippines	7.27	0.073	35	United States	4.613	-0.055
12	Ukraine	7.2	4.059	36	France	4.553	-0.331
13	Egypt	6.813	0.475	37	Mozambique	4.386	0.278
14	Central African Republic	6.721	1.638	38	South Africa	4.231	0.707
15	South Sudan	6.712	1.392	39	Iran	4.222	-0.439
16	Sudan	6.686	0.988	40	Paraguay	4.094	0.391
17	Colombia	6.662	0.218	41	Myanmar	4.08	-0.275
18	Kenya	6.66	0.362	42	Sri Lanka	4.077	0.004
19	Democratic Republic of the Congo	6.487	0.733	43	Saudi Arabia	4.006	1.234
20	Cameroon	6.466	4.945	44	Mexico	3.985	-0.524
21	Lebanon	6.376	0.17	45	Tanzania	3.979	0.356
22	China	6.294	1.212	46	Chile	3.969	0.797
23	Russia	6.207	-0.432	47	Tunisia	3.697	0.145
24	Israel	6.034	1.118	48	Ireland	3.663	0.487

GTI RANK	COUNTRY	2015 GTI SCORE (OUT OF 10)	CHANGE IN SCORE (ACTUAL YEAR 2013 TO 2014)
49	Malaysia	3.579	0.056
50	Ethiopia	3.544	-0.085
51	Niger	3.485	0.767
52	Senegal	3.467	-0.067
53	Germany	3.442	1.676
54	Italy	3.364	0.483
55	Burundi	3.342	-0.506
56	Rwanda	3.334	-0.476
57	Peru	3.316	0.051
58	Cote d'Ivoire	3.141	-0.657
59	Australia	3.114	2.894
60	Sweden	3.083	1.37
61	Cyprus	3.08	-0.106
62	Kosovo	3.018	-0.188
63	Nicaragua	2.928	2.928
64	Norway	2.738	-0.674
65	Spain	2.622	-0.112
66	Dominican Republic	2.581	1.394
67	Djibouti	2.567	2.567
68	Czech Republic	2.484	1.62
69	Madagascar	2.444	0.635
70	Bulgaria	2.421	-0.333
71	Georgia	2.373	-0.576
72	Canada	2.297	0.368
73	Macedonia	2.252	0.875
74	Brazil	2.207	0.585
75	Chad	2.142	1.937
76	Venezuela	2.139	1.514
77	Belarus	2.125	-0.653
78	Albania	2.116	1.896
79	Austria	2.088	0.406
80	Honduras	2.077	-0.261
81	Guatemala	2.009	-0.632
82	Belgium	1.977	0.944
83	Kazakhstan	1.881	-0.666
84	Tajikistan	1.869	-0.244
85	Jordan	1.751	-0.207
86	Kyrgyzstan	1.722	1.474
87	Zimbabwe	1.71	0.141

GTI RANK	COUNTRY	2015 GTI SCORE (OUT OF 10)	CHANGE IN SCORE (ACTUAL YEAR 2013 TO 2014)
88	Argentina	1.674	-0.682
89	Eritrea	1.636	-0.709
90	Trinidad and Tobago	1.583	-0.646
91	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.516	0.038
92	Morocco	1.446	-0.648
93	Azerbaijan	1.381	1.247
93	Ghana	1.381	1.381
95	Switzerland	1.349	-0.677
96	Iceland	1.219	1.143
96	Liberia	1.219	1.143
98	Guinea	1.187	-0.665
98	Hungary	1.187	1.044
98	New Zealand	1.187	1.187
101	United Arab Emirates	1.045	0.768
102	Congo	0.823	-0.683
103	Montenegro	0.659	-0.657
104	Ecuador	0.577	-0.699
105	Netherlands	0.429	-0.596
106	Serbia	0.41	-0.744
107	Bhutan	0.305	0
107	Burkina Faso	0.305	-0.354
107	Mauritania	0.305	-0.841
110	Portugal	0.267	-0.282
111	Angola	0.243	-0.443
112	Jamaica	0.229	0.229
113	Cambodia	0.153	-0.152
113	Guinea-Bissau	0.153	-0.267
113	Taiwan	0.153	-0.152
116	Armenia	0.115	-0.229
116	Croatia	0.115	-0.114
118	Denmark	0.091	-0.09
119	Bolivia	0.076	-0.349
119	Estonia	0.076	-0.077
121	Laos	0.038	-0.038
121	Moldova	0.038	-0.31
123	Kuwait	0.019	-0.019
124	Benin	0	0
124	Botswana	0	0
124	Costa Rica	0	0

GTI RANK	COUNTRY	2015 GTI SCORE (OUT OF 10)	CHANGE IN SCORE (ACTUAL YEAR 2013 TO 2014)
124	Cuba	0	0
124	El Salvador	0	0
124	Equatorial Guinea	0	-0.129
124	Finland	0	0
124	Gabon	0	0
124	Gambia	0	0
124	Guyana	0	0
124	Haiti	0	0
124	Japan	0	-0.086
124	Latvia	0	0
124	Lesotho	0	-0.086
124	Lithuania	0	0
124	Malawi	0	0
124	Mauritius	0	0
124	Mongolia	0	0
124	Namibia	0	0
124	North Korea	0	0
124	Oman	0	0
124	Panama	0	-0.038
124	Papua New Guinea	0	0
124	Poland	0	0
124	Qatar	0	0
124	Romania	0	0
124	Sierra Leone	0	0
124	Singapore	0	0
124	Slovakia	0	0
124	Slovenia	0	0
124	South Korea	0	0
124	Swaziland	0	0
124	Timor-Leste	0	0
124	Togo	0	0
124	Turkmenistan	0	0
124	Uruguay	0	0
124	Uzbekistan	0	-0.286
124	Vietnam	0	0
124	Zambia	0	0

ANNEX B

50 WORST TERRORIST ATTACKS IN 2014

RANK	COUNTRY	DATE	CITY	ORGANISATION	FATALITIES	INJURIES	WEAPON TYPE
1	Iraq	10/06/14	Badush	ISIL	670	0	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
2	Iraq	03/08/14	Sinjar	ISIL	500	-	Unknown
3	Nigeria	05/05/14	Gamboru Ngala	Boko Haram	315	-	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
4	Syria	17/07/14	Palmyra district	ISIL	310	-	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
5	Ukraine	17/07/14	Hrabove	Donetsk People's Republic	298	0	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
6	South Sudan	15/04/14	Bentiu	Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO)	287	400	Firearms
7	Nigeria	14/03/14	Maiduguri	Boko Haram	212	-	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
8	Nigeria	17/09/14	Konduga	Boko Haram	201	-	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
9	Nigeria	13/05/14	Kalabalge district	Boko Haram	200	-	Firearms
10	Nigeria	05/04/14	Galadima	Fulani militants	200	-	Firearms
11	Pakistan	16/12/14	Peshawar	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	157	131	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
12	Nigeria	13/05/14	Garawa	Boko Haram	151	-	Firearms
13	Iraq	16/12/14	Fallujah	ISIL	150	0	Unknown
14	Iraq	07/09/14	Mosul	ISIL	150	0	Unknown
15	Iraq	29/10/14	Ramadi	ISIL	150	0	Firearms
16	Nigeria	28/11/14	Kano	Boko Haram	122	270	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
17	Cameroon	17/12/14	Am Chide	Boko Haram	117	-	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
18	Nigeria	15/02/14	Izghe	Boko Haram	106	-	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
19	Cameroon	06/09/14	Fotokol	Boko Haram	101	-	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
20	Nigeria	17/05/14	Unknown	Boko Haram	101	6	Firearms
21	Nigeria	03/06/14	Ngoshe	Boko Haram	100	-	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
22	Nigeria	03/06/14	Aganjara	Boko Haram	100	-	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
23	Nigeria	06/08/14	Gwoza	Boko Haram	100	-	Firearms
24	Nigeria	18/07/14	Dambo	Boko Haram	100	-	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
25	Nigeria	03/06/14	Agapalwa	Boko Haram	100	-	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
26	Nigeria	03/06/14	Attagara	Boko Haram	100	-	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
27	Nigeria	19/02/14	Bama	Boko Haram	96	-	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
28	Somalia	08/11/14	Kudhaa	Al-Shabaab	91	-	Firearms

RANK	COUNTRY	DATE	CITY	ORGANISATION	FATALITIES	INJURIES	WEAPON TYPE
29	Nigeria	12/09/14	Konduga	Boko Haram	81	-	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
30	Iraq	15/08/14	Kojo	ISIL	80	-	Firearms
31	Iraq	23/06/14	Hashimiyah	ISIL	75	5	Firearms
32	Iraq	30/10/14	Hit	ISIL	75	0	Firearms
33	Syria	27/10/14	Idlib	al-Nusra Front	71	-	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
34	Nigeria	14/04/14	Abuja	Boko Haram	71	124	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
35	Iraq	09/11/14	Hit district	ISIL	71	0	Firearms
36	Afghanistan	02/07/14	Red district	Taliban	70	50	Firearms
37	Iraq	03/08/14	Sinjar	ISIL	67	0	Firearms
38	Nigeria	25/11/14	Maiduguri	Boko Haram	65	98	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
39	Iraq	17/06/14	Baqubah	ISIL	63	6	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
40	Pakistan	02/11/14	Wagah	Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	62	110	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
41	South Sudan	17/04/14	Bor	Unknown	62	100	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
42	Nigeria	01/12/14	Damaturu	Boko Haram	61	-	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
43	Nigeria	06/06/14	Mainok	Boko Haram	61	-	Firearms
44	Nigeria	10/04/14	Kala Balge	Boko Haram	60	-	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
45	Nigeria	13/04/14	Amchaka	Boko Haram	60	-	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
46	Nigeria	13/05/14	Kalabalge district	Boko Haram	60	-	Firearms
47	Iraq	24/07/14	Taji	Unknown	60	15	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
48	Nigeria	20/05/14	Jos	Boko Haram	59	23	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
49	Nigeria	01/09/14	Bama	Boko Haram	59	30	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
50	Nigeria	04/07/14	Damboa	Boko Haram	59	-	Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite

ANNEX C

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX METHODOLOGY

The GTI ranks 162 countries based on four indicators weighted over five years. The Occupied Palestinian Territories is the only region that records notable amounts of terrorism that is not included in the index.⁴⁸

The GTI score for a country in a given year is based on a unique scoring system to account for the relative impact of incidents in the year. The four factors counted in each country's yearly score, are:

- › total number of terrorist incidents in a given year
- › total number of fatalities caused by terrorists in a given year
- › total number of injuries caused by terrorists in a given year
- › a measure of the total property damage from terrorist incidents in a given year.

Each of the factors is weighted between zero and three and a five year weighted average is applied to try and reflect the latent psychological effect of terrorist acts over time. The weightings shown in table one was determined by consultation with the GPI Expert Panel.

The greatest weighting is attributed to a fatality.

The property damage measure is further disaggregated into four bands depending on the measured scope of the property damage inflicted by one incident. These bandings are shown in table 2, incidents causing less than US\$1 million are accorded a weighting of 1, between \$1 million and \$1 billion a 2, and more than \$1 billion a 3. It should be noted a great majority of incidents are coded in the GTD as 'unknown', thus scoring nil, with 'catastrophic' events being extremely rare.

TABLE 8 INDICATOR WEIGHTS USED IN THE GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX

DIMENSION	WEIGHT
Total number of incidents	1
Total number of fatalities	3
Total number of injuries	0.5
Sum of property damages measure	Between 0 and 3 depending on severity

TABLE 9 PROPERTY DAMAGE LEVELS AS DEFINED IN THE GTD AND WEIGHTS USED IN THE GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX

CODE/ WEIGHT	DAMAGE LEVEL
0	Unknown
1	Minor (likely < \$1 million)
2	Major (likely between \$1 million and \$1 billion)
3	Catastrophic (likely > \$1 billion)

HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF A COUNTRY'S GTI SCORE

To assign a score to a country, each incident is rated according to the four measures, the measures are multiplied by their weighting factor and aggregated. This is done for all incidents, and then all incidents for a given country are aggregated to give the country score. To illustrate, assume Table 1 depicts a hypothetical country's records for a given year.

TABLE 10 HYPOTHETICAL COUNTRY
TERRORIST ATTACKS IN A GIVEN YEAR

DIMENSION	WEIGHT	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS FOR THE GIVEN YEAR	CALCULATED RAW SCORE
Total number of incidents	1	21	21
Total number of fatalities	3	36	108
Total number of injuries	0.5	53	26.5
Sum of property damages measure	2	20	40
Total raw score			195.5

Given these indicator values, the country for that year would be assessed as having an impact of terrorism of:

$$(1 \times 21) + (3 \times 36) + (0.5 \times 53) + (2 \times 20) = 195.5.$$

FIVE-YEAR WEIGHTED AVERAGE

To account for the after effects of trauma that terrorist attacks have on a society, the GTI takes into consideration the events of previous years as having a bearing on a country's score in the current year. For instance, the scale of the 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway will continue to have a psychological impact on the population for many years to come. To account for the lingering effects of terrorism, the prior four years are also included in the scoring with a decreasing weight each year. Table 11 highlights the weights used for each year.

TABLE 11
TIME WEIGHTING OF HISTORICAL SCORES

YEAR	WEIGHT	% OF SCORE
Current year	16	52%
Previous year	8	26%
Two years ago	4	13%
Three years ago	2	6%
Four years ago	1	3%

LOGARITHMIC BANDING SCORES ON A SCALE OF 1-10

The impact of terrorism is not evenly distributed throughout the world; there are a handful of countries with very high levels of terrorism compared to many countries which experience only very small amounts, if not zero terrorism. Hence, the GTI uses a base 10 logarithmic banding system between 0 and 10 at 0.5 intervals.

As shown in Table 12, mapping the scores in this way yields the total number of 21 bands. This maps all values to a band of size 0.5 within the scale of 0-10. In order to band these scores the following method is used:

1. Define the Minimum GTI Score across all countries as having a banded score of 0.
2. Define the Maximum GTI Score across all countries as having a banded score 10.
3. Subtract the Minimum from the Maximum GTI scores and calculate r by:
 - a. $\text{root} = 2 \times (\text{Highest GTI Banded Score} - \text{Lowest GTI Banded Score}) = 20 \times (10 - 0) = 20$
 - b. $\text{Range} = 2 \times (\text{Highest Recorded GTI Raw Score} - \text{Lowest Recorded GTI Raw Score})$
 - c. $r = \sqrt[\text{root}]{\text{range}}$
4. The mapped band cut-off value for bin n is calculated by r^n .

Following this method produces mapping of GTI scores to the set bands as defined in Table 12.

TABLE 12 BANDS USED IN THE GTI


BAND NUMBER	BANDS	BAND CUT OFF VALUES	BAND NUMBER	BANDS	BAND CUT OFF VALUES
1	0	0	12	5.5	328.44
2	0.5	1.69	13	6	556.2
3	1	2.87	14	6.5	941.88
4	1.5	4.86	15	7	1595.02
5	2	8.22	16	7.5	2701.06
6	2.5	13.93	17	8	4574.08
7	3	23.58	18	8.5	7745.91
8	3.5	39.94	19	9	13117.21
9	4	67.63	20	9.5	22213.17
10	4.5	114.53	21	10	37616.6
11	5	193.95			

COMPARING THE GLOBAL TERRORISM DATABASE TO OTHER DATASETS MEASURING TERRORISM

The START Global Terrorism Database is the most extensive database recording terrorist activity. It compares favourably to other databases of terrorist activity. Another database is the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) which runs from 1968 through to 2009. The two different databases correlate at 0.85 which shows a statistically significant connection between the two. This provides confidence in both databases which have been compiled by different organisations. However, as the RAND database has only been updated to early 2009 it is insufficient for use in this report.

FIGURE 43 DEATHS FROM TERRORISM BY YEAR ACCORDING TO RAND AND GTD, 1998–2008

The number of deaths from terrorism as measured by RAND and GTD trend together.



Source: START GTD, RAND

ANNEX D

FOREIGN FIGHTERS DATA SOURCE

Foreign fighters data captures estimates for foreign fighters aligned with any armed group in Syria and/or Iraq, by country of origin. Most data is sourced from the International Center for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR),

The Soufan Group (TSG), the United States House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee and Radio Free Europe. Additional data points have been added from alternate sources, listed below.⁴⁹

TABLE 13 DATA SOURCES FOR FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN IRAQ AND SYRIA BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

DATASET OR REPORT	SOURCE	DATA RELEASE DATE
European Foreign Fighters in Syria (14 countries)	ICSR	02/04/13
Foreign Fighters in Syria (50 countries)**	ICSR	26/01/15
Foreign Fighters in Syria (25 countries)	TSG	01/06/14
Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel (10 countries)	United States House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee	11/02/15
Foreign Fighters In Iraq and Syria (22 countries)	Government statements collected by Radio Free Europe /Radio Liberty	29/01/15
'Iraq and Syria: How many foreign fighters are fighting for Isil?' (27 countries)	TSG estimates from January to July 2015 reported by Kirk, A.	12/08/15
'Putin's Airstrikes Put Russian ISIS Fighters In The Line Of Fire' (11 countries)	TSG estimates from January to July 2015 reported by Tarabay, J.	01/10/15
ADDITIONAL DATA POINT BY COUNTRY	SOURCE	DATA RELEASE DATE
Armenia	Haji, H., ARA News	03/07/15
Australia	Statement, J. Bishop, MP	27/09/15
Austria — Estimated number of women	Bakker, E. and de Leede, S., ICCT	01/04/15
Belgium — Estimated number of arrested, killed and returnees	UN Human Rights Commission	16/10/15
Belgium — Estimated number of women	Van Ostaeen, P., Jihadology	07/05/14
Canada	Amarasingam, A., Jihadology	04/03/15
Denmark	Hooper, S., Al Jazeera	07/09/14
Indonesia	Hawley, S., ABC	22/09/15
Malaysia	Roworth, S., Australian Strategic Policy Institute	05/09/14
Malaysia	United Nations Security Council, Meeting Record S/PV.7453	29/05/15
Malaysia	Liow, J. C., The Brookings Institution	01/04/15
Maldives	Rasheed, Z., Maldives Independent	21/09/15
Maldives	Wright, O., Independent	14/09/14
Netherlands	Bakker, E. and de Leede, S., ICCT	01/04/15
Philippines	Roworth, S., Australian Strategic Policy Institute	05/09/14
Singapore	Roworth, S., Australian Strategic Policy Institute	05/09/14
Trinidad and Tobago	Trinidad Express Newspapers	26/09/14
US	US National Counterterrorism Center	11/02/15

ANNEX E

ECONOMIC COSTS OF TERRORISM METHODOLOGY

The costs of terrorism are calculated using data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is collated by the National Consortium of the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The model takes into account the direct and indirect costs associated with death and injury, as well as the direct costs from property damage and kidnapping.


While the value of property damage is taken from the START database, the losses due to death and injury are calculated using IEPs costs from homicide (death) and assault (injury). The costs of homicides and assault are taken from McCollister (2010) as the cost of violent injury or death. This is then scaled to an individual country's GDP per capita (GDP PPP) relative to the source of the estimate. The relative cost is then multiplied by the total number of deaths or injuries caused by terrorism for each country.

The cost of property damage is taken from the average cost of an attack as shown in the START database. The START database contains the size of the attack and the type of attack, shown by the eight columns in table 14. As data is missing for some attacks, IEP takes the average cost for each category and applies it as a set unit cost.

An example of the costing methodology can be shown using an incident which occurred in Beirut, Lebanon on 19, February 2014. A minor bombing occurred in Beirut targeting private citizens. A total of seven people were killed and 64 wounded. According to IEPs estimations, the total economic cost of the event accumulated to US\$27,812,477. This was comprised of \$24,342,254 due to death (88 per cent), \$3,067,860 due to injury (11 per cent) and \$402,333 from property damage (1 per cent).

FIGURE 44 ESTIMATED COSTS FROM AN ATTACK IN LEBANON ON 19 FEBRUARY 2014

The major components of the costs from this attack were associated with the fatalities. This is consistent with the total economic costs of terrorism.



Source: IEP calculations

ANNEX F

TABLE OF CORRELATIONS

TABLE 14 CORRELATIONS WITH THE 2015 GTI

The following indicators correlate with the GTI.

CATEGORY	SOURCE	INDICATOR	GLOBAL	OECD ONLY
Ongoing Conflict	IEP – Global Peace Index	Number of deaths from organised conflict (internal) (banded)	0.77	0.36
High Group Grievances	PEW – Social Hostilities Index	Social Hostilities Index	0.74	0.72
Low Social Cohesion	World Values Survey	Confidence: charitable or humanitarian organizations (a great deal (%))	-0.09	0.72
Negative Perception of Immigration	World Values Survey	Immigrants living in your country: feels like a stranger (Agree strongly (%))	Insufficient data points	0.72
High Group Grievances	Fund For Peace	Group grievance	0.71	0.49
Ongoing Conflict	IEP – Global Peace Index	Number and duration of internal conflicts (banded)	0.71	0.27
Low Confidence in the Press	World Values Survey	Confidence: the press (none at all (%))	-0.34	0.71
Negative Perception of Immigration	World Values Survey	Immigrants living in your country: there are too many (agree strongly (%))	Insufficient data points	0.71
Religious Violence	PEW – Social Hostilities Index	Was there mob violence related to religion?	0.58	0.7
Greater Political Terror	IEP – Global Peace Index	Political Terror Scale (Banded)	0.69	0.53
Ongoing Conflict	IEP – Global Peace Index	Intensity of organised internal conflict (banded)	0.68	0.4
High Militarisation	IEP – Global Peace Index	Militarisation 2015	0.36	0.68
Wider Access to Small Arms	IEP – Global Peace Index	Ease of access to small arms and light weapons (banded)	0.33	0.68
Low Confidence in the Press	World Values Survey	Confidence: television (none at all (%))	-0.37	0.68
Safety and Security	Fund For Peace	Security apparatus	0.65	0.59
Safety and Security	PolityIV	Security effectiveness	0.65	0.54
Religious Violence	PEW – Social Hostilities Index	Were there crimes, malicious acts or violence motivated by religious hatred or bias?	0.62	0.65
Safety and Security	PolityIV	Security legitimacy	0.64	0.56
Religious Violence	PEW – Social Hostilities Index	Were there deaths motivated by religious hatred or bias?	0.48	0.64
Higher Youth Unemployment	OECD, ILO and WDR	NEET youth (compiled from WDR, ILO, OECD)	0.22	0.64
Safety and Security	IEP – Global Peace Index	Safety & security 2015	0.63	0.61
High Militarisation	World Values Survey	Confidence: armed forces (a great deal (%))	0.21	0.63
Low Respect for Human Rights	IEP – Positive Peace Index	Acceptance of the rights of others	0.62	0.57

CATEGORY	SOURCE	INDICATOR	GLOBAL	OECD ONLY
Policies Targetting Religious Freedoms	PEW – Government Restrictions Index	Government Restrictions Index	0.35	0.62
Existence of Violent Political Organisations	Institutional Profiles Database	Violent activities – political organisations	0.61	0.59
Lower Respect for International Law	World Values Survey	Confidence: the United Nations (none at all (%))	0.17	0.61
Negative Perception of Immigration	World Values Survey	Immigrants living in your country: feels like a stranger (Agree (%))	Insufficient data points	0.6
Religious Violence	PEW – Social Hostilities Index	Did individuals or groups use violence or the threat of violence, including so-called honour killings, to try to enforce religious norms?	0.45	0.59
High Militarisation	IEP – Global Peace Index	Nuclear And Heavy Weapons Capabilities (Banded)	0.34	0.59
Religious Violence	PEW – Social Hostilities Index	Were there incidents of hostility over proselytizing?	0.39	0.58
Policies Targetting Religious Freedoms	PEW – Social Hostilities Index	Did organized groups use force or coercion in an attempt to dominate public life with their perspective on religion, including preventing some religious groups from operating in the country?	0.57	0.42
High Militarisation	World Values Survey	Aims of country: first choice (Strong defence forces (%))	0.17	0.57
Lower Respect for International Law	World Values Survey	Confidence: the European Union (None at all (%))	0.03	0.57
Ongoing Conflict	Institutional Profiles Database	Internal conflicts: ethnic religious regional	0.56	0.2
Low Faith in Democracy	World Values Survey	In democracy, the economic system runs badly (Agree strongly (%))	0.01	0.56
High Militarisation	World Values Survey	Approval: disarmament movement (Strongly disapprove (%))	Insufficient data points	0.56
Negative Perception of Immigration	World Values Survey	Immigrants living in your country: there are too many (Agree (%))	Insufficient data points	0.56
Policies Targetting Religious Freedoms	PEW – Social Hostilities Index	Were there physical assaults motivated by religious hatred or bias?	0.54	0.55
Negative Perception of Immigration	World Values Survey	Concerned with immigrants (Very much (%))	Insufficient data points	0.55
Low Confidence in the Press	Freedom of the Press	Repressive actions print	0.41	0.54
Low Government Effectiveness	PolityIV	Total effectiveness score	0.35	0.54
High Militarisation	World Values Survey	Political system: having the army rule (very good (%))	0.18	0.54
Policies Targetting Religious Freedoms	PEW – Social Hostilities Index	Did violence result from tensions between religious groups?	0.53	0.33
Low Respect for Human Rights	Walk Free Foundation – Global Slavery Index	Human rights risk	0.35	0.53
Low Confidence in the Press	World Press Freedom Index	World Press Freedom Index	0.26	0.53
High Inequality	Fund For Peace	Uneven development	0.24	0.53
Higher Urbanisation	World Bank	Urban population growth (annual %)	0.08	0.53
High Inequality	UNDP – Human Development Index	Human Development Index – quintile income ratio	-0.17	0.53
Religious Violence	PEW – Social Hostilities Index	Were there acts of sectarian or communal violence between religious groups?	0.52	0.48
High Perception of Criminality	IEP – Global Peace Index	Level of perceived criminality in society (banded)	0.41	0.52
Policies Targetting Religious Freedoms	PEW – Government Restrictions Index	Was there harassment or intimidation of religious groups by any level of government?	0.29	0.52
Negative Perception of Immigration	World Values Survey	Immigrant policy (prohibit people from coming (%))	0.2	0.52
Low Social Cohesion	World Values Survey	Do you think most people try to take advantage of you (10 point scale) (would take advantage (%))	-0.26	0.52
Violent Demonstrations	IEP – Global Peace Index	Likelihood of violent demonstrations (banded)	0.51	0.47
Religious Violence	PEW – Social Hostilities Index	Was there a religion-related war or armed conflict in the country?	0.51	0.39
Policies Targetting Religious Freedoms	PEW – Social Hostilities Index	Were women harassed for violating religious dress codes?	0.51	0.29

CATEGORY	SOURCE	INDICATOR	GLOBAL	OECD ONLY
Low Confidence in the Press	Economist Intelligence Unit	Freedom of the press	0.28	0.51
Low Confidence in the Press	IEP — Positive Peace Index	Free flow of information	0.26	0.51
Higher Youth Unemployment	International Labour Organisation	Youth not in education or employment (NEET)	-0.04	0.51
Weaker Business Environment	World Bank — Global Competitiveness Report	Domestic market size	0.5	0.41
Factionalised Elites	Fund For Peace	Factionalized elites	0.5	0.37
Lower Respect for International Law	PolityIV	Number of memberships of type C conventional intergovernmental organisations	0.5	0.25
High Inequality	International Institute of Social Studies	Uneven economic development along groups rating	0.36	0.5
Low Confidence in the Education	World Values Survey	Confidence: education system (none at all (%))	0.3	0.5
Existence of Violent Political Organisations	International Institute of Social Studies	Minority rebellion score	0.36	0.49
Policies Targetting Religious Freedoms	PEW — Government Restrictions Index	Does any level of government formally ban any religious group?	0.22	0.49
High Inequality	Economist Intelligence Unit	GINI Index (Banded)	-0.08	0.49
High Inequality	UNDP — Human Development Index	Inequality adjusted income index — loss in score	-0.11	0.49
High Inequality	UNDP — Human Development Index	Income GINI coefficient	-0.14	0.49
Low Confidence in the Press	World Values Survey	Confidence: the press (quite a lot (%))	0.26	-0.54
High Inequality	Millenium Development Goals	Poorest quintiles share in national income or consumption, percentage	0.24	-0.54
Low Confidence in the Press	World Values Survey	Confidence: television (quite a lot (%))	0.19	-0.53
High Inequality	World Bank	Income share held by lowest 20%	0.19	-0.66
Low Government Effectiveness	Institutional Profiles Database	Balance of power do other institutions parliament courts political parties other bodies etc. have real power to make proposals and exert control over the executive body	0.1	-0.55
Political Instability	Institutional Profiles Database	Political stability and legitimacy	-0.02	-0.53
Low Government Effectiveness	World Justice Report	Correctional system is effective in reducing criminal behaviour	-0.04	-0.49
Low Poltical Engagement	World Values Survey	Interest in politics (not very interested (%))	-0.11	-0.51
Less Satisfaction with City	Gallup World Poll	City beauty (15-24) (satisfied) (%)	-0.13	-0.49
Low Confidence in Education	World Values Survey	Confidence: education system (quite a lot (%))	-0.13	-0.66
Low Government Effectiveness	Institutional Profiles Database	The capacity of the political authorities to provide broadbased access to education, healthcare, culture, etc. for the population	-0.14	-0.51
Low Government Effectiveness	Institutional Profiles Database	De facto political legitimacy	-0.15	-0.53
Low Government Effectiveness	Institutional Profiles Database	Legality of political institutions	-0.16	-0.49
Low Confidence in Education	Millenium Development Goals	Percentage of pupils starting grade 1 who reach last grade of primary, girls	-0.2	-0.52
Religious Violence	International Institute of Social Studies	Religious tensions rating	-0.52	-0.22
Low Respect for Human Rights	Institutional Profiles Database	Civil and political rights	-0.24	-0.48
Low Government Effectiveness	Millenium Development Goals	Births attended by skilled health personnel, percentage	-0.24	-0.54
Higher Drug Crime	Institutional Profiles Database	Organised crime (drug trafficking, arms trafficking, trafficking in humans, etc.)	-0.24	-0.57
Low Government Effectiveness	US Department of State	Money laundering assessment incsr	-0.26	-0.49
Political Instability	Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Project	Assassinations	-0.27	-0.51

CATEGORY	SOURCE	INDICATOR	GLOBAL	OECD ONLY
High Militarisation	Institutional Profiles Database	Participation of armed forces in political life, de jure or de facto	-0.27	-0.53
Low Political Engagement	World Values Survey	Important in life: politics (Not very important (%))	-0.27	-0.59
Low Respect for International Law	World Values Survey	Confidence: the United Nations (quite a lot (%))	-0.28	-0.55
Policies Targeting Religious Freedoms	Institutional Profiles Database	Religious segregation	-0.28	-0.56
High Militarisation	Institutional Profiles Database	Control over the army	-0.28	-0.58
Low Respect for Human Rights	Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Project	New Empowerment Index	-0.3	-0.49
History of Intergroup Violence	Institutional Profiles Database	Ethnic, religious, regional or other types of conflicts	-0.53	-0.3
High Inequality	World Justice Report	Equal treatment and absence of discrimination	-0.31	-0.48
Low Faith in Democracy	World Values Survey	Democracy may have problems but is better (agree (%))	-0.31	-0.48
Low Government Effectiveness	World Values Survey	Satisfaction with the people in national office (fairly dissatisfied (%))	-0.33	-0.6
Low Government Effectiveness	Institutional Profiles Database	Domestic public security and control of violence	-0.44	-0.51
Negative Perception of Immigration	World Values Survey	Immigrants living in your country: feels like a stranger (disagree (%))	Insufficient data points	-0.49
Low Respect for Human Rights	Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Project	Physical Integrity Rights Index	-0.61	-0.5
Existence of Violent Political Organisations	Institutional Profiles Database	Violence by underground political organisations	-0.52	-0.6
Negative Perception of Immigration	World Values Survey	Immigrants living in your country: there are too many (neither agree/nor disagree (%))	Insufficient data points	-0.52
Greater Political Terror	Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Project	Extrajudicial killing	-0.65	-0.61
Political Instability	World Bank	Political stability	-0.75	-0.61
Negative Perception of Immigration	World Values Survey	Immigrants living in your country: there are too many (disagree (%))	Insufficient data points	-0.75

TABLE 15 INDICATORS THAT DID NOT CORRELATE WITH THE 2015 GTI

The following notable indicators did not correlate with the GTI.

CATEGORY	SOURCE	INDICATOR	GLOBAL	OECD ONLY
Religion Prevalence	Correlates of War	Islam general Muslim % adherents	0.31	0.41
Health	World Bank	Infant mortality rate	0.12	0.39
Religion Prevalence	Correlates of War	Judaism general Jewish % adherents	-0.12	0.36
Extreme Poverty	World Bank	Extreme poverty (\$1.25/day)t	0.03	0.35
Extreme Poverty	World Bank	Poverty gap at \$5 a day (PPP) (%)	0.12	0.26
Religion Prevalence	Correlates of War	Percentage of religious adherents	0.07	0.2
Number of Immigrants	United Nations	International migrant stock as a percentage of the total population (both sexes)	-0.14	0.19
Extreme Poverty	World Bank	Poverty gap at \$2.5 a day (PPP) (%)	0.06	-0.11
Extreme Poverty	World Bank	Poverty gap at \$2 a day (PPP) (%)	0.04	-0.14
GDP	World Bank	GDP per capita PPP (current international \$)	-0.16	0.01
GDP	World Bank	GDP per capita PPP (constant 2005 international \$)	-0.16	0
Education	World Bank	School enrolment tertiary (% gross)	-0.02	-0.12
Religion Prevalence	Correlates of War	Buddhism gen Buddhist % adherents	-0.02	-0.27
Religion Prevalence	Correlates of War	Buddhism other % adherents	-0.02	-0.27
Education	World Bank	School enrolment secondary (% net)	-0.14	-0.02
Health	World Bank	Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	-0.08	-0.12
Health	World Bank	Improved water source (% of population with access)	-0.18	-0.08
Education	UNESCO	School life expectancy, primary and secondary, both sexes (years)	-0.28	-0.08
Religion Prevalence	Correlates of War	Non-religious % adherents	-0.09	-0.2
Education	World Bank	School enrolment secondary (% gross)	-0.09	-0.23
Religion Prevalence	Correlates of War	Christianity general chrst % adherents	-0.25	-0.12
Religion Prevalence	Correlates of War	Animist religions % adherents	-0.13	-0.21
Education	World Bank	School enrolment primary (% net)	-0.18	-0.15
Health	World Bank	Improved water source urban (% of urban population with access)	-0.22	-0.16

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
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